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1.0 Introduction 
What makes a conflict continue for several years? Why are we not able to stop wars from 
starting again after resolutions have been found? The answers to these questions are not easy 
to find, and they are too complex for us to answer directly. There have been many studies on 
how peaceful resolutions to ending conflicts can be found, as well as studies on what keeps a 
conflict going. Not only is it difficult to give answers to the continuation of conflict, it is also 
difficult to give a clear answer to when a conflict continues, as opposed to when there is a new 
conflict. It would be reasonable to expect that after numerous years of warfare, especially 
within a country, people would be so sick and tired of this that the conflict would die out, yet 
this is not the case. Conflicts can go on for several years if the issue is one which neither the 
government nor the rebel group are willing to budge on.  
This is the issue in Northeast India today. Since the 1960s there have been conflicts in the 
Northeast of India, and these conflicts have still not been resolved. The insurgencies started as 
conflicts where tribal groups wanted autonomy and statehood, and this is the problem today as 
well. The States
1
 where there are insurgencies today are Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and 
Tripura, which means that in four of the eight States classified as Northeast India (Arunachal 
Pradesh, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Sikkim
2
 are the last four), there are conflicts. As many as 
50 insurgency groups are said to operate in the region, many of them cooperating together 
with others (Cline 2006: 127), as well as cooperating with neighboring countries. Despite all 
the research, there are few (to my knowledge) who have been able to explain why there are 
still conflicts there, even after some of the tribal groups were granted statehood in the Indian 
Union. Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland were all part of Assam when 
the conflicts started, and Manipur and Tripura were still Union Territories, while today they 
are all States of the Indian Union (Egreteau 2006: 21).  
The South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) catalogues every act of terrorism and insurgency in 
South Asia today. They bring daily updates on what happens in the region, as well as weekly 
and yearly assessment of the areas
3
. As shown in Table 1 below, there have since 2006 been 
4527 people killed from the different insurgencies in Northeast India (data till 5 May 2013). 
Over one third of the fatalities are civilians, making the conflicts in Northeast India a security 
                                                          
1
 States with a capital S means States within the Indian federation. 
2
 In this thesis Sikkim is left out of the analysis, because it has not experiences any conflicts and was 
only added to the Northeast in 2002 (Baruah 2005: 45; Cline 2006: 127).  
3
 http://satp.org/satporgtp/satp/index.html. 
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threat to the Southeast Asian region as well as an internal security problem in India. The 
number of fatalities is also large for an area of 262,230 square kilometers with almost 45 
million people belonging to different ethnic and cultural groups (Nayak 2009: 2; India Online 
Pages 2013). These numbers are also very high for a democracy. Numbers of fatalities per 
year in the respective States is found in Appendix A. 
Table 1: Fatalities in Northeast India 2006-2013 
Years States Civilians SFP* Terrorists Total 
Inhabitants 
in State 
2006-2013 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 2 3 73 78 1,382611 
 
Assam 882 124 735 1741 31,169272 
 
Manipur 545 142 1240 1926 2,721756 
 
Meghalaya 58 16 99 173 2,964007 
 
Mizoram 5 4 8 17 1,091014 
\ Nagaland 95 3 353 451 1,980602 
  Tripura 38 31 72 141 3,671032 
  
1620 322 2578 4527   44,980294 
*Security Force Personnel 
(Numbers from SATP 2013; India Online Pages 2013). 
This thesis aims to explore in depth the recurring conflicts in Northeast India. I will focus my 
analysis on three levels and attempt to explain which of these levels matter when it comes to 
the conflicts in Northeast. The first level is international and the focus is on the international 
borders surrounding the Northeastern States as a safe haven for the rebels to hide, and how 
support from the neighboring nations China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan 
complicates the peace processes for the Government of India (GoI). The different countries 
and their relationship to the insurgency groups in Northeast is examined, as well as some 
policy measures the Indian government has done in order to make these relationships harder 
to maintain (Egreteau 2006; Bhaumik 2007; 2009; Mukherjee 2007; Saikia 2009; Upadhyay 
2009). 
The second level is national or federal. The policy the Indian government has towards the 
Northeastern States and the federal system that exists in India today has been criticized by 
several influential authors (Rajashekara 1997; Adeney 2000; Baruah 2003; 2007; Hassan 
2008). Federalism and how it is effective for multi-ethnic societies have been researched by 
many (Smith 1995; Kymlicka 1998; 2005; 2007; Adeney 2000; 2002; McGarry & O’Leary 
2005; Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch 2012). This theoretic research will in my thesis be 
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compared to the claim by Sanjib Baruah (2003) that India is a cosmetic federation - where the 
structure is based on a federal model from the outside, but where it does not work properly 
from the inside - in order to see if this can explain the Northeastern conflicts.   
The third and last level is the group level, concerning horizontal inequalities (HIs) and 
unequal treatment of groups. As mentioned, there are at least 50 insurgency groups in the 
Northeast (for an overview see Appendix B), and they are mostly based on ethnicity or tribal 
affiliations. Not only are there around 200 tribes in the region (see Appendix D), but over 500 
different languages are spoken (Cline 2006: 127). This creates an environment where it is 
easy to put the tribes against each other, and all of them demanding special privileges given to 
them (Baruah 2003; Das 2010; Hassan 2006a; 2006b; 2008). When groups feel that they 
receive less than they feel entitled to, compared to others in the same society, this creates 
relative deprivation (Gurr 1970), which again can cause horizontal inequalities (Stewart 
2000). Lately, extensive research has been conducted on horizontal inequalities and its 
relationship to conflict and civil war (Stewart 2008; Murshed & Gates 2005; Østby 2008; 
Rustad, Rød, Larsen & Gleditsch 2008). This theoretical groundwork will be applied to the 
case of Northeast India to see if it can explain the insurgencies there. 
These three levels are chosen because they offer explanations as to why the Northeast region 
suffers from so much continuing and recurring conflicts, despite numerous peace agreements
4
. 
The main research question is therefore:  
Why do India’s Northeastern States experience recurring insurgencies? 
From this research question, three hypotheses follow, and they help to specify the main 
research question. These hypotheses are based on the three levels of analysis: international, 
federal and group level. Through this approach the thesis will contribute to the existing 
research field by (i) examining more closely the federal nature of the Northeastern States and 
their treatment by the GoI, (ii) looking at the differences between the ethnic and tribal groups 
in the Northeast, and see whether or not there are horizontal inequalities in the region, (iii) 
focusing on the insurgency groups and their cooperation with neighboring nations, and 
examining if the international borders prolong the conflicts and (iv) seeing whether any of 
these factors can explain the recurrence of insurgencies.  
                                                          
4
 A discussion of these can be found in Bhaumik 2007 and Rajagopalan 2008.  
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This is therefore a thesis where I focus on one case, Northeast India, using a qualitative 
analysis of the recurring conflicts there. Through a thorough discussion of the three levels in 
relation to Northeast India I am able to see which of the three levels is most important, and I 
will also be able to tell whether any of the three levels have little explanatory power, due to 
the lack of empirical findings. This thesis will add to the extensive research on the 
insurgencies in the Northeast of India, many of them addressing why the conflicts started, and 
why the government has not been able to stop them, thereby making them a recurring problem 
(Baruah 2005; Bhaumik 2007; Mukherjee 2007). The fact that three levels are looked at is 
what distinguishes this thesis from other works, and the fact that the conclusion is that all 
three levels of analysis are necessary, because they all contribute to understanding why there 
are recurring conflicts in Northeast India. However, the horizontal inequalities and the issue of 
identity have the most explanatory power and give support to the other two levels.  
This introduction is followed by five chapters. Chapter 2 defines what a recurring conflict 
really is, as opposed to when there is a new conflict. The chapter also gives background 
information on States in Northeast India, and the history behind the conflicts in each of the 
States in the region is given. Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical backdrop used in this thesis, 
at the three levels of analysis. After an explanation of why international borders and the 
geography of a conflict matter, an introduction to the federal theory follows before horizontal 
inequalities are examined. The three hypotheses are introduced in this chapter. The case study 
as a method and a discussion on its validity are examined in Chapter 4. The variables used in 
this thesis and how they relate to the hypotheses are also a part of Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the 
empirical analysis is presented, and the international, federal and group levels are examined. 
At the international level I first look at the five neighboring nations China, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan, and then India’s foreign policy towards these nations- 
Look East Policy and trade agreements follow. The federal level examines the power of the 
States, and how the State capability differs in Nagaland and Mizoram, as well as it discusses 
asymmetry, cosmetic federalism, the power of the rebels and the Armed Forces (Special 
Powers) Act (AFSPA), which is the early response from the Indian government. At the group 
level I examine cultural and political horizontal inequalities, the inter-group relationships and 
the support the groups receive from the inhabitants of Northeast India, as well as I look at 
migration from neighboring nations, the treatment the ethnic groups are given by the Indian 
government, and lastly I compare the issue of identity in Nagaland and Mizoram. A 
conclusion to which of the levels can answer my research question is arrived at in Chapter 6.  
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2.0 Recurring conflict and background 
In this chapter a discussion on what a recurring conflict is, and how we can say that the 
conflicts in Northeast are recurring is explained, and there is also a general introduction to the 
seven States in Northeast and their different conflicts.   
2.1 What is recurring conflict? 
The advantage of writing a qualitative analysis is that it is not necessary to compile different 
conflicts into one broad definition. Case studies have the possibility to differentiate more and 
give more nuanced definitions of war. Quantitative studies use battle deaths per given year in 
order to see whether there is a civil war or not, but the problem here is that many small 
conflicts that slowly accumulate deaths will then be coded as civil wars, depending on the 
coding of the data (Sambanis 2004: 819). This is the case in India, where several small 
conflicts led to numbers with over 1000 battle-related deaths per year, but where there is not 
one big civil war going on. It is clear from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 
which tracks all types of war, both interstate, intrastate, one-sided violence and non-state 
conflicts, that India has experienced all of these types of conflicts since 1946 (SATP 2013; 
UCDP 2013b).  
It is not only battle-deaths which are important when classifying a civil war or an armed 
conflict. UCDP focuses on separate elements of the definition of an armed conflict which is 
summed up like this: “[a]n armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (UCDP 
2013a). This standard is approved by Sambanis (2004):  
In the absence of a clear standard of how to handle such complicated cases, a rule of thumb 
should be to code a “civil war” in countries with many overlapping insurgencies when the 
violence escalates markedly and not at the start of low-level hostilities. In the case of India, 
this means that if we were to combine the rebellions in the Northeast states, a civil war should 
be coded as starting in the 1980s, when violence escalated in Assam, Tripuras, and Manipur 
(Sambanis 2004: 819-820).  
Nevertheless, Correlates of War (COW), developed by Singer and Small, operates with a 
definition of a civil war with a threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths per year for a conflict to 
qualify as a war, which is a very high number compared to UCDP and their definition, and 
this is criticized by for example Sambanis (2004) (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, 
Sollenberg & Strand 2002: 617; Sambanis 2004: 816). There are numerous discussions on 
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how we can define civil wars and armed conflict
5
, and in these discussions the issue of when 
an armed conflict starts and when it ends is also debated.    
In the case of Northeast India, what we call an armed conflict is very difficult to define. Due 
to the fact that there are seven States which all have had insurgencies, and several different 
rebel groups that operate in not only one, but maybe more of the States, how can we know 
that the conflicts are recurring as opposed to new conflicts? Different rebel groups from the 
same ethnic group and their different factions create troubles when trying to analyze this. 
Nevertheless, because it can be debated endlessly how we should define recurring conflicts, 
my view in this thesis is that there have been recurring conflicts in the different States, and 
even though the rebel groups have changed names and leaders, since they fight for the same 
thing; secession, the conflicts in Northeast India are recurring. Sambanis (2004) refers to 
Northeast India when talking about this:  
A useful example to consider is Northeast India (Nagaland), where Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
code an ongoing civil war since 1952. I was not able to find evidence that many (say, more 
than 100) deaths per year occurred in armed conflict there from 1952 to 1961. According to 
Gleditsch et al. (2002, appendix) and Small and Singer (1982, 339), there was no war or 
intermediate violence during any year of the conflict in Nagaland. This case illustrates not 
only the problem of how to code war termination with the cumulative threshold but also the 
related difficulty of how to handle several chronologically overlapping insurgencies in the 
same country. Combining regionally concentrated insurgencies in India’s Northeast states may 
be reasonable and would probably satisfy the aggregate-data threshold in the period 
considered by Fearon and Laitin. But a strict application of the cumulative-death rule in such 
cases is problematic, given that in other countries, chronologically and even geographically 
overlapping insurgencies are often treated as separate conflict (Sambanis 2004: 819).      
Because of these difficulties, a qualitative analysis of Northeast India, where these issues are 
addressed specifically and each state studied in detail, is best, and a case study is therefore 
ideal here.  
As seen in the case of Nagaland for example, the Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) which was 
established in 1947 started arguing for Nagas to get their own nation already then (Hussain 
1994: 30). This rebel group signed a peace accord with the Government of India in 1978, but 
around 140 NNC cadres refused to surrender and these cadres formed an underground 
movement called the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) (Kotwal 2000: 758; 
Hussain 2008: 550). This movement was split in 1988, into two factions; NSCN-IM and 
NCSN-K. These two rebel groups are still active today, and the Indian Government has tried 
to sign ceasefire deals with them, but the conflicts still continue (Lacina 2007: 173; Hussain 
                                                          
5
 See Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Sambanis (2004).  
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2008: 547). The group name may change, but the conflict remains between the same 
insurgents (DeRouen & Bercovitch 2008: 59). This thesis will argue that these conflicts are 
recurring, since there is no peace to be had for the inhabitants in Nagaland, and the people 
there are always preparing for battle. The problem is that the peace process is difficult 
because there are several players who all want different things, and this prolongs the conflict 
(Cunningham 2006: 875-886). The number of these factions or parties matter in a peace 
process, because “[t]he more hostile and numerous the factions, the more difficult is the peace 
process, and the more international assistance/authority is needed to establish peace” (Doyle 
& Sambanis 2000: 781). Several researchers have found that that more than two warring 
parties tend to complicate and have a negative influence on peace building and in these cases 
mediators must try to include all factions in the peace agreements. Different factions are 
spoilers for each other and they are therefore able to undermine the agreement that has been 
reached in a particular case. They may come from inside one of the parties which have signed 
the agreement, but they may also come from the outside. This is because not all leaders or 
factions see peace as beneficial, and “[e]ven if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do 
so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace” 
(Stedman 1997: 7).       
Walter (2004) claims that “earlier wars set the stage for conflicts that occur in later years 
because the original grievances were not resolved, because violence exacerbated ethnic 
divisions making coexistence difficult, because war ended in unstable compromise 
settlements, or because the human costs of  war created psychological barriers to building 
peace” (Walter 2004: 372). It is based on the fact even if a conflict is temporarily ended, a 
more satisfying solution will be fought for as soon as one or both sides have “regrouped 
sufficiently” (Walter 2004: 373). The conflict can start and stop repeatedly over many years 
and the conflict may therefore exist many years after the fighting stops (DeRouen & 
Bercovitch 2008: 56).  
Not only must the rebel groups and their claims for secession be addressed here, but it is also 
necessary to look into the Government of India and see why they have behaved the way they 
have. Since “[s]ocieties that have experienced one civil war are significantly more likely to 
experience a second or third war than are societies with no prior history of violence” (Walter 
2004: 371), it is reasonable to expect that a government will try to avoid war and end the 
conflicts as soon as possible. But ‘ending the conflict’ does not necessarily mean that they 
will sign peace agreements and, in the case of secession, grant the rebel group their demands. 
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It is unlikely that this will happen, especially in a state with many ethnic groups. This is 
because “governments are significantly more likely to fight against a particular separatist 
group if the number of future challenges and the potential long-term losses from future 
challenges are high” (Walter 2006a: 314, emphasis in original; 2006b: 110). The governments 
therefore have to: 
Weigh their immediate interests and capabilities when determining whether to grant 
concessions, but they also carefully calculate the effect this behavior may have on future 
challenges and future losses. If a government believes it could face multiple additional 
challenges over numerous pieces of territory, it has greater incentives to invest in building a 
reputation for toughness than if it knew it would face only one challenge, or relatively few 
challenges. The risks and costs of future confrontations, therefore, should factor into a 
government’s decision to compromise or fight at least in cases where it expects a series of 
similar challenges making similar demands over time (Walter 2006a: 313, emphasis in 
original).   
In general, governments are rarely willing to budge when it comes to issues related to 
territory, and a peaceful settlement is especially difficult if “the contested piece of land holds 
important natural resources, serves vital security functions, or plays a critical role in the 
identity of the country; they will peacefully relinquish lands that do not” (Walter 2006a: 313).  
Conflicts not only depend on governments, but also on rebel groups. These groups must have 
both the opportunity and the motivation to seek secession, and in order for this to happen they 
have to be “more geographically concentrated, are mobilized to pursue particular interests, or 
have grievances against the state have greater motivation and opportunity to seek self-
determination” (Walter 2006a: 323). This means “that the strength of the rebels relative to the 
government must be understood along two separate dimensions; namely, offensive strength, 
or the ability to inflict costs on a government in the center and the ability to resist or evade 
government repression in the insurgent’s “home” territory in the periphery and the 
underground” (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009: 575). It is not necessarily the case 
that all ethnic groups in a nation will seek secession, because: 
The characteristics that may motivate groups to take up arms are often inherently local, and 
may not bear any resemblance to national level aggregates. This can easily be seen in the 
context of many measures of ethnic heterogeneity and fractionalization. Minority groups 
seeking independence such as the Achenese in Indonesia are often a trivial fraction of the 
national population, and will not exert much impact on ethnic fractionalization measures at the 
national level (Cunningham et al. 2009: 592).  
Groups which seek self-determination are also the ones that most likely have territorial bases, 
and are able to oppose oppression by the state (Cunningham et al. 2009: 575). These groups 
will look to independence as the only reasonable answer for themselves, and for this they are 
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willing to go to battle and take risks in order to achieve this (Walter 2006b: 129). If groups 
have knowledge of the territory and can avoid getting caught by hiding from government 
forces, or they are helped by the locals, this will increase the chances of the rebels (Fearon & 
Laitin 2003: 88). Fearon and Laitin (2003) have written one of the most cited articles in 
conflict research, and they use the following criteria on what constitutes a violent civil 
conflict: 
(1) They involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate 
groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use 
violence to change government policies. 
(2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. 
(3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attached by rebels) (Fearon & Laitin 
2003: 76). 
It is clear from this that some years will constitute as years with violent civil conflicts, but the 
years where there have been ‘lulls’ will not have produced this amount of killed civilians, 
rebels or government forces. But, because civilians must expect attack, and the tribal groups 
are armed in order to fight the government forces, this thesis operates with recurring conflicts 
from the 1960s to today in Northeast India, and there seems to be no end to the fighting and 
no solution in sight. The federal system has been able to accommodate regional autonomy for 
the ethnic groups, and these “minority groups are influential in government decisions” 
(Walter 2006a: 323), but this has actually been shown to increase the chance of additional 
wars. This is because of the fact that concessions over territory make it easier for other ethnic 
groups to initiate their own demands (Walter 2004: 379).     
2.2 Background to the Northeast 
The Northeast of India lies where South Asia becomes less and less South Asia and more and 
more South East Asia and vice versa and in the region “an otherwise vast and culturally 
contagious space with one of the longest histories of almost incessant immigration from both 
sides was eventually reorganised into a number of heavily territorialised nation-states with at 
least in theory rigid and impenetrable international borders around them” (Das 2010: 344).   
The region of Northeast India was earlier the seven sister States of Arunachal Pradesh, 
Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, but after 2002 Sikkim is also 
included (Baruah 2005: 45). Initially all of these States were part of the Ahom Kingdom, but 
political reasons have led to the division of this region. Sikkim has been included after it was 
annexed by India, but since it has not experienced the unrest of the other States, in this thesis 
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the seven original States are the focus (Cline 2006: 127). These States border China’s Tibet 
region, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan, and about 99 percent of their borders are with 
foreign countries (see map on page 11) (Cline 2006: 127; Baruah 2007: 6). The mighty 
Brahmaputra River System and its numerous large and small valleys are included in the 
Northeast, which is part of the eastern Himalayan Mountain Range (Baruah 2007: 6). The 
Northeast region is linked to the rest of India by a narrow strip of land some 20 kilometers 
wide (Baruah 2003: 920).  
The Indian State of Assam has, since Independence, gradually fragmented into smaller States 
(Maaker & Joshi 2007: 384). Nagaland became a State in 1963, due to secessionist conflicts. 
Nagaland is composed of the Naga Hills district of Assam and NEFA province (Nayak 2009: 
7). The North-eastern States Reorganisation Act of 1971 “upgraded the Union Territories of 
Manipur and Tripura, and the Sub-State of Meghalaya to full statehood, and Mizoram and 
Arunachal Pradesh (then Tribal Districts) to Union Territories” (Bhattacharyya 2005: 13). 
Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram became full-fledged States in 1987. The demands for 
statehood today are for Bodoland, Karbi-Anglong and Poorbanchal in Assam, Kukiland in 
Nagaland, Garoland in Meghalaya and Hamar state in Mizoram (Singh 2003: 93-94). India 
realized its vulnerabilities in the Northeast during its border war with China in 1962, and 
these vulnerabilities were also exposed by the unrest of the tribals/indigenous people (Baruah 
2003: 915-920). It was after this war that the Indian government “began to fear the prospect of 
the external and internal ‘enemies’ in this region coming together and constituting a serious 
threat to India’s national security” (Baruah 2003: 920).  
A larger share of the population in Northeast, except for Mizoram, is poor compared to the 
rest of India (Hassan 2006b: 15). Especially Assam has a high proportion of people living in 
poverty; “[d]espite a decline in the proportion, more than a third of its people are below the 
poverty line” (Nayak 2009: 6). In term of the literacy of the people however, the Northeast 
has performed better than the rest of India. This is not due to the state, but due to the Christian 
missionaries and the continued support of local communities (Hassan 2006b: 15). The States 
in Northeast do not have very many revenue sources, because of their status as ‘Special 
Category States’ they must “rely primarily on central government assistance, which they get 
on a concessional basis of 90 per cent grants and 10 per cent loans” (Sachdeva 2000; Baruah 
2003: 924; 2007: 36). India’s national security goals in the region have fitted well with the 
creation of the small States in Northeast, because their complete dependence on New Delhi 
when it comes to finance and they are thus vulnerable to the government’s direct involvement 
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in their daily affairs (Baruah 2003: 924-925). These small States have therefore been seen as a 
sensible policy in the national perspective, even if the “how and when these States would 
become financially viable was not clear either to the Central planners or to the State 
governments” (Sachdeva 2000). Nevertheless, because the Indian government has never 
asked for accountability and transparency from the State government, but only have poured 
hundreds of millions of rupee into the region, some people have become enormously rich. But 
this includes only the people in politics or the bureaucracy and their favorite contractors, the 
majority has not reaped any benefits from these schemes and are therefore suspicious to the 
government (Hazarika 2004: 779). These corrupt politicians “siphon funds and buy property 
elsewhere in India and abroad to conceal their ill-gotten wealth; even rebel leaders invest 
elsewhere in the world” (Bhaumik 2009: 257).   
Figure 1: Map of Northeast India 
 
 (Maps of India 2013b).  
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Arunachal Pradesh 
All of the States in the Northeast have seen some measure of conflict between rebel groups 
and the government of India. Arunachal Pradesh, is believed to be the most peaceful State, but 
this has mostly been due to spillovers from the surrounding States. The militants from Assam 
and Nagaland use the western part of Arunachal Pradesh, which borders Myanmar, as a 
hideout, and the eastern part of Arunachal Pradesh “has emerged as an effective transit route 
to Burma and also a huge source of extortion, illegal trade and recruitment” (Upadhyay 2009: 
46). The border war with China in 1962 was due to the issue where the Chinese claim that 
Tibet had control over the area which is now Arunachal Pradesh before the British arrived, 
and from the 1950s they therefore laid claim to the entire area of Arunachal Pradesh north of 
the River Lohit which borders Tibet (Mukherjee 2007: 57). Even though Arunachal Pradesh is 
geographically the largest State in the region, there are only about half a million people living 
there, and they are interspersed in a huge and inaccessible area, which is heavily forested, 
generally underdeveloped with few roads, and for the different ethnic groups in the most 
interior areas, this has ensured isolation and distinctiveness. It has also hindered political 
modernization, which is why the state is the most diverse, but also the most peaceful one 
(Bhaumik 2000: 153; 2009: 39; Mukherjee 2007: 56-57).  
Mizoram 
Another State in the region which is relatively peaceful today, but where there have been a 
fair share of conflicts, is Mizoram. Mizoram borders to Assam and Manipur to the north, 
Tripura to the west, internationally with Myanmar on the south and east and Bangladesh to 
the west (Bareh 1994: 1). The Mizo insurgency began after the Mizos experienced a famine 
and the government Assam failed to address the issue adequately in 1959. It is therefore the 
second oldest insurgency in the Northeast (Lacina 2007: 168). During this famine the party 
Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) was established, in order to organize relief work 
(Chandhoke 2006: 22). The group was renamed in 1961 to the Mizo National Front (MNF), 
under the leadership of Pu Laldenga, whose goal was “complete political independence for 
greater Mizoram”. The Central government failed to respond adequately to this, so the armed 
wing of MNF, the Mizo National Army (MNA) turned the struggle violent in 1966 
(Chandhoke 2006: 22).  The Mizos felt that they lost their identity under the Assamese 
domination, and this was a factor in their struggle for independence. Mizoram became a 
Union Territory in 1972 (Egreteau 2006: 21). For Laldenga, the status of Union Territory was 
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seen as a transitional phase, and the insurgency therefore resurfaced in 1974 (Chandhoke 
2006: 22-23). After negotiations, an Accord was signed and on 20
 
February 1987 Mizoram 
became a full-fledged state (Egreteau 2006: 22).  This Peace Accord ended the insurgency, 
and today there are no violent conflicts in Mizoram.  
Meghalaya 
Meghalaya is the third State which has been relatively stable compared to other States in the 
area.  Because of the immigration problems that developed in Tripura and Assam after 
independence, the Mizos and Khasis started their demands for separate States due to neglect 
from the Assam government. The Nagas had risen up as an example, and New Delhi had no 
choice but to follow up with granting Meghalaya statehood in 1972. The issue in Meghalaya 
today has to do with Nepalese and Bangladeshi immigration (Mukherjee 2007: 48). The 
economic situation in Meghalaya is also bad; there is little industrial development, and even 
though Meghalaya is well endowed with natural resources, but the State is poor. Good 
governance might be able to solve this, “the problem is socio-economic and coloured by 
ethnic strife and nascent insurgency which needs to be resolved by good governance” 
(Mukherjee 2007: 49). There have been issues between the Khasis, the Garos and the Bodos, 
based on tribal differences, and there have been talks about splitting the State. Previously the 
Khasis mainly targeted Nepalese and Bengali immigrants, but now they are targeting all 
communities (Mukherjee 2007: 48). Low-level insurgent campaigns have been present in the 
State, by several militant groups: 
The Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) represents the Khasi tribe and the 
Achik National Volunteer Council represents the Achik. Both these groups formed in the 
1990s after the splintering of the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council that purportedly 
served the interests of both tribes. Smaller tribes also have their own movements, including the 
Hill State People’s Democratic Party and the Garo National Movement. The Naga NSCN has 
supported several of these group’s operations (Cline 2006: 140).    
For the other four States in the region, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur and Tripura, severe 
insurgency has been a fact, which has diverted attention to security issues instead of 
development (Bhaumik 2009: 238). These States are therefore ranked the most violent in the 
region, while the other three have had the potential to wage violent conflict, but the Indian 
Government has managed to prevent this proliferation of rebel groups in these States 
(Upadhyay 2009: 36).  
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Manipur 
Historically, Manipur has acted as the bridge to and the balance of power towards the 
Burmese (Hassan 2008: 61). Four hills districts in Manipur have a large Naga population, and 
there has been a growing trend of inter-tribal unrest in the past two decades. The valley which 
covers only 10 percent of the state’s geographical area is inhabited by the Meiteis, who 
constitutes more than half the population in Manipur, making them the largest ethnic group in 
the State (Upadhyay 2009: 40-41). Manipur’s strongest separatist group was formed in 1964 
by Meitei youths; the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), making demands on behalf 
of the ethnic Meitei population (Lacina 2007: 169). They were weakened due to the 
counterinsurgency campaigns by the Indian Army in the 1980s, but reemerged in 1992. They 
managed to fight back when “a determined Indian military offensive in 2005-06” tried to 
overrun the base areas in parts of the State bordering Mizoram and Myanmar. New Delhi has 
tried to negotiate with UNLF, but due to breakaway factions based on leadership disputes, 
there is still turmoil in the State (Cline 2006: 137; Lacina 2007: 169; Bhaumik 2007: 3).  
When one ethnic group starts an insurgency, in this case the Meiteis, other ethnic groups will 
respond to this with their own rebel groups. This has happened in Manipur as well:   
But Manipur has a number of other rebel groups representing smaller tribes like the Kukis, the 
Paites and Zomis – and more than half a dozen of these Kuki and Zomi groups are now 
actively collaborating with Indian troops against the Meitei rebel groups like the UNLF and 
the RPF after they signed Suspension of Operations (SOO) agreements with the Indian army 
and not with the country’s Home Ministry which normally negotiates with such groups 
(Bhaumik 2007: 3). 
The Kuki National Front and KNA are fighting for a separate State for the Kukis, and the 
fighting between them and the Nagas, who are supported by the NSCN-IM, have had 
particularly violent and intense clashes (Cline 2006: 137). The discontent among the Manipuri 
is fuelled by a “number of accumulated grievances, several of which are historical in nature” 
(Upadhyay 2009: 40). Further alienation of the minority tribal communities has been a result 
of the political mobilization by Meitei state leaders to create a society based on their limited 
identity. This was done in part to enable them to capture political power away from the central 
forces which were then in control of the State (Hassan 2008: 65). The Meiteis demand a 
separate homeland, one where they can eliminate the Indian script for writing and return to 
traditional cultural practices. Language has been a sensitive issue in Manipur, because it was 
only in 1992 that the Manipuri language was given the status as an official language in the 
Indian Union (Cline 2006: 137; Upadhyay 2009: 40). An estimated 15 militant groups operate 
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in Manipur today, with approximately 10,000 fighters (see list in Appendix B) (Lacina 2009: 
1016).   
Tripura 
As Manipur, Tripura was also a princely State, but Tripura was peacefully added to the Indian 
Union in 1947 and became a full-fledged State in 1972. Tripura borders Assam and Mizoram 
in the Northeast, but has international borders along all the other sides. In Tripura the major 
clashes have been between the tribal population and the immigrants from East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh, after the hill tribes have now been turned into a minority in their own 
State. The percentage of tribals sank from two-thirds to one-third in only a few decades, 
making the demographic profile completely different (Bhaumik 2007: 3; Upadhyay 2009: 44). 
Today the tribals and their distinctive culture has nearly been wiped out; they are dislocated 
from their traditional habitats and have experiences socio-economic deprivation. The native 
language in the region has even been replaced by Bengali as an official language, which 
further aggravated the tribals. The only way the indigenous Tripuris have resisted this 
transformation is by supporting the rebels, who are aiming at throwing out the immigrants in 
the State (Bhaumik 2004: 222; Cline 2006: 139; Baruah 2007: 25; Mukherjee 2007: 53).  
In 1978 the militancy began in earnest, with the formation of the Tripura National Volunteer 
Force (TNVF), who seemed to base their agenda solely on the anti-immigrant efforts without 
having much further ideology. They wanted to win ‘Tripura’s freedom’ and they were 
instrumental in an “explosion of ethnic violence in May 1979 and June 1980, in which some 
1,800 were killed” (Upadhyay 2009: 45; Cline 2006: 139). The TNVF agreed to a ceasefire in 
1988, but in the early 1990s two new separatist groups were formed to continue the armed 
agenda against the Bengali settlers; the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National 
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) (Rajagopalan 2008: 27; Bhaumik 2007: 3; Lacina 2007: 
172). Another group called the All Tripura People’s Liberation Organization (ATPLO) has 
also emerged (Upadhyay 2009: 45). The forming of new insurgency groups happens quite 
often:  
All the movements have been marked by factionalism extreme even by regional standards. 
The government has succeeded in convincing insurgents to surrender en masse – at times 
including entire insurgent groups – but new groups seemingly form almost as fast as the 
surrenders occur (Cline 2006: 139).      
Most of the struggles within Tripura then, both of the violent and non-violent kind, have 
revolved around the issues of expulsion of foreigners, restoration of tribal lands, immigration 
16 
 
controls and reservation of seats in the legislative assembly for the tribals (Upadhyay 2009: 
44-45). Today the two dominant groups in the State, ATTF and NLFT, operate with camps in 
Bangladesh (Rajagopalan 2008: 28). The fractionalized insurgent landscape sees high levels 
on violence against civilians and ties between the political parties and the rebel groups 
(Lacina 2007: 172).  
Nagaland 
The conflict in Nagaland is one of the longest running conflicts in the world, and it has been 
the source of many of the conflicts in the region. Nagaland was incorporated into the Indian 
Union in 1947 under the direction of Assam, but after the NNC was established in April 1946 
the insurgency for a sovereign nation state started for the Nagas (Hussain 1994: 30; Sahni 
2002). In March 1956 the first violent clashes between the NNC and the Indian security forces 
erupted, and large-scale violence continued throughout the Naga Hills before the GoI tried to 
appease the NNC by granting Nagaland statehood under the Union of India in 1963 (Kotwal 
2000: 758; Goswani 2007: 288). The NSCN’s reason for continuing the insurgency after the 
Shillong Accord was the fact that they claimed that legitimately, the Naga areas have never 
been part of the Indian Union, and their stand on independence is therefore inflexible. For the 
government “the separatist agitation is perceived as a violation of the territorial integrity of 
the state” (UCDP 2013b). The rebel violence in Nagaland has persisted because “the security 
forces had created a significant backlash in the insurgents’ favor” (Lacina 2007: 167). In 
1988, NSCN broke into two factions; NSCN-IM and NCSN-K. Clashes between the two 
factions went on for many years, but because of the role NSCN-IM has as organizer and 
supporter of other separatist movements, Delhi has prioritized negotiations with them, leading 
to a ceasefire between the government and NSCN-IM in 1997 (Lacina 2007: 173; Hussain  
2008: 547).  
NSCN-IM claims that the tri-junction of China, India and Myanmar has always had the 
sovereign existence, and they want their Nagalim (homeland of the Nagas) back (Upadhyay 
2009: 36). The NSCN-IM wants all of the 120,000 square kilometers to be a part of the Naga 
nation state: 
Nagaland extends to the River Chindwin in Myanmar; covers almost the entire Manipur; 
Cachar and North Cachar Hills and the Disturbed Area belt in Assam; Tirap, Changlang and 
Lohit districts in Arunachal Pradesh – but excluding the Kuki-Chin-Mizo belt in south 
Manipur – a huge area with a population of near 3 million. This is indeed a very difficult 
demand which cannot be met as giving in would amount to separating a large number of other 
ethnic groups from their primary treasure – ‘land’ (Mukherjee 2007: 30).  
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The factions of NSCN have developed satellites in Tripura, Assam, Mizoram, Manipur and 
Arunachal Pradesh, thereby extending their reach beyond the Naga-inhabited areas. Through 
this they have broadened the scope of their operations and the support base for their activities 
(Bhaumik 2009: 99). Nagas are numerous in the Northeast and not all of the followers of the 
NSCN factions come from Nagaland. The leadership of NSCN-IM and “at least 40% of their 
cadres are from the Tangkhul Tribe of the Nagas in Manipur and not Nagaland, with another 
40% being from other Manipuri, Assamese and Arunachali Naga tribes”, which means that 
less than 15 percent are from Nagaland tribes (Mukherjee 2007: 34). NSCN-K is 
headquartered in Myanmar adjacent to Arunachal Pradesh, and they also have control in parts 
of Nagaland and in the Naga inhabited areas in the adjoining States (Mukherjee 2007: 34).    
Assam 
The last violent State in the region is Assam. Assam was originally the overlord of the 
Northeast, being the largest and most populous State. Geographically it is a core State, and it 
shares a boundary with all the other six States in Northeast (see map on page 11). Parts of 
Assam have gone to Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh. And it even lost 
its capital Shillong, to Meghalaya (Bhaumik 1998: 317; Upadhyay 2009: 5). The political 
unrest in the State we know as Assam today was initiated due to the illegal immigrant flow 
from Bangladesh, and by 1979 it had become a great political issue (Cline 2006: 133). It 
became an issue because there were fears that non-natives have flooded the voter rolls and 
this has made it difficult for the local parties to win elections (Lacina 2007: 170).    
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was headquartered in Assam, organized with 
the help of NSCN, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, and Bangladeshi 
intelligence, and it carried out social work at the same time as organizing itself into a rebel 
group. Pressure from the Army and the police has relocated the ULFA to Bangladesh, where 
its headquarters are today (Cline 2006: 134; Mukherjee 2007: 20-21; Upadhyay 2009: 43). 
Mukherjee (2007) claims that even though ULFA originally started as the ‘protector of the 
people’s image’ and had a severe anti-immigration policy, ULFA is today “merely a tool in 
the hand of foreign powers to wage proxy wars against India in Assam” (Mukherjee 2007: 
22). ULFA has, just as NSCN-IM, supported insurgencies beyond their own borders, by 
helping other insurgent groups obtain funding, arms, training and cross-border sanctuaries. 
They have a strength of some 2500, and they have been “very active in extortion, with Indian 
security forces seizing millions of rupees that the group has gained through its ‘taxation,’ and 
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reportedly has become increasingly involved in the regional drug trade” (Cline 2006: 134). 
Their territory has therefore increased and this has diluted the Indian military’s presence in 
the region (Lacina 2009: 1004).  
The Bodos, one of the larger tribal groups in Assam, have complicated the insurgency 
environment further. After 1990 New Delhi has pursued major counterinsurgency operations 
in Assam, after the State government was dismissed. These operations were against ULFA, as 
well as other rebel groups in the State, such as the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU), which 
“was escalating the violence to protest the concentration of power among the ethnic Assamese 
and the influx of settlers into historically Bodo areas” (Cline 2006: 135; Lacina 2007: 170). 
Two breakaway factions of this group; National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and 
the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF), have negotiated with the Government of India, and 
even though NDFB did not sign an agreement, ceasefire has been upheld since 2004 (Lacina 
2007: 171). Thousands of members of other tribes have been displaced because “the Bodo 
insurgents have conducted as many attacks on other tribal groups – including civilians – as 
they have against security forces”, resulting in the arming of several tribes (Cline 2006: 136; 
Bhaumik 2009: 121). The Karbis and Kukis, who are of Bodo origin, have long led their own 
rebellions, and as a result of this there are talks between the government of Assam and the 
centre to try and resolve their grievances, and the Dimasas and Karbis have been given 
limited autonomy (Mukherjee 2007: 23).   
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3.0 Theory 
In this chapter I explain the theories behind the hypotheses in this thesis and look at the earlier 
research done on international environment, federal states and horizontal inequalities as 
reasons for rebellions. This chapter is therefore divided into three parts, each corresponding to 
three hypotheses which contribute to understanding why there are recurring conflicts in 
Northeast India.  
3.1 International level 
A number of scholars have emphasized the issue of geography and international borders as 
important explanatory factors for civil wars and recurring conflicts (Toft 2003; Buhaug 2006, 
2010; Salehyan 2007; Rustad et al. 2008; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009; Lacina 2012a, 
2012b). I will look into the issue of geography before looking at how international borders 
can affect recurring conflicts. Geography is relevant because:  
Geography significantly affects the duration of civil conflict. The relative location of 
governmental and rebel forces can enhance as well as reduce the relative military capabilities 
of the belligerent parties. Relative military capacity and distance play a fundamental role in 
determining who wins and who loses. Short of victory or surrender, the decision to continue to 
fight is shaped by the ability to wage war. In this regard geography plays a critical role in 
determining the dynamics of armed civil conflict (Buhaug et al. 2009: 566).  
Buhaug (2006) discusses the distinction between separatist and state control conflicts and 
concludes that the rebel groups “are often highly successful in denying government troops 
territorial control in rural areas but may be ineffective in toppling the ruling coalition” 
(Buhaug 2006: 695). This means that state control is difficult for a rebel group in the 
periphery to achieve, because they will have problems capturing the control of the state, and 
also upholding state power will be difficult (Buhaug 2006: 695). But then again, this is also 
most likely not the objective of the rebel group. Because of their placement in areas far away 
from the capital, where the public commodities are produced, they do not get the same profit 
for their taxes, making their incentive for secession greater than in more central areas (Buhaug 
2006: 697). “This is, of course, why contemporary separatist activities exclusively occur 
along the rim of the conflict-ridden countries” (Buhaug 2006: 695). Because the interest of 
this case study is Northeast India, where none of the rebel groups have shown a wish to gain 
control over the state, rather they all are separatist conflicts, the focus of this theory will relate 
to secessionist conflicts. Many scholars have also tested the particular geographical factors of 
a region, such as rough terrain, mountainous areas and forest cover, but they conclude that 
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these factors generally do not affect the conflict (Buhaug & Gates 2002; Buhaug & Rød 2006; 
Rustad et al. 2008). However, that is not to say they may not be important and influential in a 
single conflict, but I have nevertheless chosen to leave them out of this thesis, because they 
are shown to be non-significant.  
The demand for sovereignty by an insurgency group will depend on two things: “First, their 
capabilities must give them a reasonable chance of gaining control of the territory they desire. 
Second, they must believe that their cause is legitimate” (Toft 2003: 21). Monica Duffy Toft, 
a leading scholar on the importance of geography in conflicts, expands this issue like this:  
Capability refers to the capacity to wage a successful fight for independence. The number of 
group members influences the resources (including armed combatants) that can be brought to 
bear in the fight. These resources include control over economic, political, and social networks 
(and their more formal counterparts, institutions), access to communications and media that 
are vital to concerted action, and money or other goods that can be exchanged for weapons, 
food, medical supplies, or mercenaries… Legitimacy refers to the perceived justness of the 
cause; because it determines the effectiveness of mobilizing capability, legitimacy directly 
influences a group’s decision to seek sovereignty... Two principles of legitimacy links 
settlement patters to a group’s demand for sovereignty: homeland and majority rule… The 
homeland principle is the idea that a people with deep roots and a historical attachment to the 
land have right to control it. control over the homeland is vital because it determines how 
economic and political resources are distributed, how many foreigners can immigrate, which 
languages are recognized, sponsored , and spoken, and which gods may be worshiped (Toft 
2003: 22-23, emphasis in original).     
Therefore, the regions where the rebellions occur are regions the insurgent groups have ties 
to, and “the incidence of separatist war reflects governments’ political ties to competing 
ethnic groups in the periphery” (Lacina 2012b: 2). The fact that this concerns the periphery is 
an important factor which it is necessary to expand on.   
Geography, and through this the issue of peripheral conflicts, means that “[c]onflicts that 
occur far away from the state center last substantially longer; the average duration for the 10 
percent most distant conflicts is more than twice as long as that of the decile located closest to 
the capital” (Buhaug et al. 2009: 546). Operations over long distances will disadvantage the 
government forces, such as “physical barriers for transportation of troops and equipment 
(such as mountains and lack of proper transport network), higher costs associated with longer 
distance, limited knowledge of the local government, and, as is often the case, lack of support 
from the local population” (Buhaug et al. 2009: 550). The fact that small minority populations 
back different guerilla bands, especially when they are confined to the periphery of a country 
makes it much more difficult for the government forces to fight the rebel groups (Buhaug 
2010: 115). Distance to the capital is important because when rebel groups using guerilla 
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tactics choose the areas of fighting, they want to make the potential harm the government 
forces can inflict as small as possible, and “[t]his means exploiting remote and generally 
inaccessible areas” (Buhaug & Rød 2006: 318). It is also much easier to organize a rebellion 
in these regions because they are harder to reach for the government (Buhaug & Rød 2006: 
319), and “the risk of a separatist war is positively associated with the distance from the 
capital” (Buhaug & Rød 2006: 326). Rustad et al. (2008) support these findings: “[t]he further 
away the conflict zone is from the capital the lower the probability that the conflict will end”, 
and the duration of the conflict is therefore affected by the distance to the capital (Rustad et 
al. 2008: 775). This does not mean that secessionist conflicts may not occur close to the center 
of the nation state, it only means that the rate of success is greater for insurgent groups further 
from the capital. Distance to the capital is therefore one factor which may explain why it is 
easier for the rebel to gain control, and the fact that they can control where the fighting 
occurs, is an advantage they have over the government (Buhaug 2010: 110).  
Lacina (2012a) actually goes as far as to claim that the distributional conflict between the 
center and the periphery is the core cause of separatist war, and this is supported by the 
empirical work (Lacina 2012a: 4). The general pattern is therefore that “civil conflicts in areas 
favorable to guerilla warfare last longer” than conflicts in other areas (Buhaug et al. 2009: 
545). The insurgency groups take advantage of the favorable geography by “establishing 
bases in the mountains or behind national borders, limiting the area of operation to rural 
districts where the rebellion enjoys local support, and generally avoid open encounters with 
regular forces by conducting hit-and-run assaults” (Buhaug 2010: 111).  
National borders as a place to hide are emphasized in this thesis, because of the nature of the 
case in question. Buhaug et al. (2009) claims that “conflicts where rebels have access to an 
international border are twice as durable as other conflicts” (Buhaug et al. 2009: 546), and 
Toft (2003) finds that that rebel sanctuaries in other countries are associated with a greater 
likelihood of state conflict (Toft 2003: 60), and the conflicts close to international borders also 
last longer than conflicts in the middle of a country (Rustad et al. 2008: 776). This is because:  
International borders are hypothesized to be related to the size of a conflict zone because of 
the value of such borders to a rebel army. Rebels will push to gain access to an international 
border because neighboring countries often provide a safe refuge away from governmental 
troop, but also because weapons and natural resources are traded and transported across these 
borders. Control of international borders thus ensures that the rebel army will fight another 
day (Buhaug & Gates 2002: 422).    
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The issue of international borders is relevant because not only is it important for the rebel 
group to mobilize from a safe place, and neighboring countries can provide these “external 
sanctuaries”, but the other reason is that “they complicate the underlying bargain between 
states and rebels by exacerbating informational problems and introducing new actors into the 
bargaining environment” (Salehyan 2007: 218). This does not mean that the neighboring 
nations actively aids the insurgents from the original country, but “one of the most common 
types of foreign support for rebel groups is the provision of safe havens or sanctuaries on 
one’s territory” (Salehyan 2008: 54), and weak states may not be able to prevent this use of 
territory by foreign rebels (Salehyan 2007: 237; 2008: 55). Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) 
expands this finding when they find that “[a]ll else being equal, countries in a poor 
neighborhood are considerably more likely to experience domestic conflict at any given time 
than countries with wealthy neighbors” (Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008: 225). Not only is the 
poverty levels relevant, but if any neighboring countries are involved in conflict themselves, 
the original country is “twice as likely to experience an outbreak of conflict” (Saideman 1997: 
725; Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008: 225). This is because the risk of mercenaries moving across 
boundaries, easier access to cheap arms and cross-border rebel sanctuaries “contribute to the 
spread of violence” (Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008: 220). These conflicts can therefore “provide 
new sources of interstate tensions, and support for rebel organizations can complement or 
substitute for the direct use of force between states” (Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz 2008: 
502). There may also be ethnic ties between the groups in both sides of a border, making it 
more likely that the insurgency group will find shelter there and therefore it is more difficult 
for the government to defeat them (Saideman 1997: 727; Moore 2002: 79; Cederman, 
Girardin and Gleditsch 2009: 413).   
The fact that neighboring countries provide safe havens for insurgency groups create 
problems for the government forces, since they can only operate in their confined area; “They 
cannot easily exercise force outside of their national boundaries, as doing so would 
necessarily violate the sovereignty of others” (Salehyan 2007: 221). The chance of effectively 
beating the rebel group is reduced because the army cannot “operate outside of the state 
boundaries” (Buhaug et al. 2009: 552). Not only this, but “[c]ounterinsurgency operations 
across national boundaries are hampered because the state lacks familiarity with the terrain 
and population; it risks a confrontation with the host state; and it invites international 
condemnation for sovereignty violations” (Salehyan 2008: 56). This is probably why 
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Salehyan (2007) finds that 55 percent of rebel groups have used external bases (Salehyan 
2007: 218). The reason why support is important is explained by Stewart (2000) like this:    
Conflicts need resources, including arms, soldiers and food. Some can be seized from the local 
territory – more readily if the conflict is popular locally, which again depends on whether the 
group involved regards itself as being seriously disadvantaged. Fighting can survive without 
foreign resources, but the availability of support from outside – credit, food, technical advice 
and arms – clearly helps the resource situation and thus “feeds” the conflict (Stewart 2000: 
251-252). 
External sanctuaries therefore complicate negotiation as well as exacerbate information 
problems, making it “an information-poor environment” (Salehyan 2007: 227). Another type 
of problem is commitment problems: 
Second, external mobilization exacerbates commitment problems. For civil wars to end, 
combatants must credibly promise to lay down their arms and forgo future violence. Yet, as it 
is difficult to for states to gather reliable information about rebel mobilization, it is also 
difficult to monitor and verify full compliance with demobilization efforts. After a peace 
agreement rebels can hide resources across the border and regroup in external sanctuaries so 
long as permissive conditions in other states persist: this allows rebels the opportunity to 
renege on a deal in the future (Salehyan 2007: 227). 
But it is important to emphasize here it is not the case that the international borders cause the 
wars, but they increase the risks and opportunities in the nation, increase the uncertainty in the 
nation and thereby “contribute to the potential outbreak of violence” (Siverson & Starr 1990: 
50).  
Reasons for why a state will choose to fight the insurgent groups in the first place are when 
they fear precedent setting, which “arise when states fear that granting independence to one 
group will encourage other groups to demand independence, unleashing a process that will 
threaten the territorial integrity of the state” (Toft 2002: 85). Therefore violence will erupt 
because the territory is essential and indivisible (Toft 2003: 3). Toft (2003) calls this the 
theory of indivisible theory; “Attempts to negotiate a resolution short of war will fail when (1) 
the ethnic minority demands sovereignty over the territory it occupies, and (2) the state views 
that territory as indivisible” (Toft 2003: 127). The state will view the territory as indivisible 
when it has either a strategic value or an intrinsic value, and they are differentiated like this: 
Strategic worth describes the security value of a given piece of territory. Is the territory astride 
major routes of communication? Does it share an interstate border? Does it contain natural 
barriers to invasion from other states or from states considered historical enemies? Intrinsic-
value arguments focus on the wealth or resources that inhere in a territory. Does the territory 
contain a concentration of mineral or natural resources? Does it possess an infrastructure or 
industry of value? Does it have space for population expansion or arable land that could 
support an expanded population? If the loss of the contested territory threatens to undermine 
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the security or economic survival of an actor, then that actor is likely to resort to force (Toft 
2003: 6).      
Based on this evidence on international borders and the danger for recurring conflicts due to 
these borders, the hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: International borders offer a safe place for the rebels to hide and make 
it more difficult for the government to stop the conflicts, especially if the neighboring 
countries are hostile towards India, and this explains why there are recurring conflicts 
in Northeast India.    
3.2 Federal level 
Norman (2006) explains federal nations as a common political space which “two or more self-
governing communities share”, and the citizens “are members of both their province – 
sometimes called a canton, land, autonomous region, or somewhat confusingly, a state – and 
the larger federal state” (Norman 2006: 77). This is done in order “‘to accommodate the 
desire of national minorities for self-government’, principally by creating a province (or 
provinces) in which one or more minority group can constitute a clear majority of the citizens 
and in which they can exercise a number of sovereign powers” (Norman 2006: 88). It 
therefore divides and diffuses power, and if there are minorities, linguistic, national or ethnic, 
in the nation and they form the majority in one of the federal units, they can participate 
politically in these smaller political units more actively and obtain positions of power there 
(Woehrling 2011: 139). This makes it a democratic nation, because it “enhances political and 
democratic rights inasmuch as citizens can participate more effectively in political life within 
smaller political units where the locus of power is situated nearer to them” (Woehrling 2011: 
140, emphasis in original). The power is divided like this: 
[I]n a federal system both levels of government have certain sovereign powers as a matter of 
legal right, not simply on a delegated and revocable basis. Both the central government and 
the federal subunits possess sovereign authority over certain policy areas, and it is 
unconstitutional for one level of government to intrude on the jurisdiction of the other. The 
central government cannot ‘reclaim’ the powers possessed by the federal subunits, because 
those powers never belonged to the central government. Conversely, the subunits cannot 
reclaim the powers possessed by the central government, because those powers never 
belonged to the subunits. In short, unlike administrative decentralisation and confederation, 
both levels of government in a federal system have a constitutionally protected existence, and 
do not just exist on the sufferance of some other body (Kymlicka 1998: 120).      
A federation is therefore a nation where the national government has some power, and the 
federal units have some power, thereby dividing the responsibility of the state. Since some of 
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the units consist of the majority group in the nation, and some are dominated by the national 
minority, the units and the groups might be treated differently, as explained by Kymlicka 
(1998):  
For national minorities, federalism is, first and foremost, a federation of peoples, and decisions 
regarding the powers of federal subunits should recognise and affirm the equal status of the 
founding peoples. On this view, to grant equal powers to regional-based units and nationality-
based units is in fact to deny equality to the minority nation, by reducing its status to that of a 
regional division within the majority nation. By contrast, for members of the national majority, 
federalism is, first and foremost, a federation of territorial units, and decisions regarding the 
division of powers should affirm and reflect the equality of the constituent units. On this view, 
to grant unequal powers to nationality-based units is to treat some of the federated units as less 
important than others (Kymlicka 1998: 131). 
It is important for the national groups that they are represented at the central level, and that 
they are given their own rights over the territory, that the language is made official in the 
territory and that they can have control over public institutions such as education (Kymlicka 
2007: 36-37). When a unit feels that it is less important than other federal units, it might be 
the case that the federal nation is asymmetrical. A federation is either symmetrical or 
asymmetrical, depending on the different groups in the nation. The difference is that:  
When federations are symmetric, national minorities who believe they ought to possess more 
rights and powers may chafe at being equal to mere provinces or states. This may compel 
those who are part of a national minority to seek a change to the status quo in a way that 
makes their powers more appropriate to their status. When federations are asymmetric, 
increased institutional resources are granted to groups that might otherwise seek to secede or 
engage in conflict with the center. While this might mollify those who might otherwise 
support secession, it does provide the region with increased institutional resources and it 
provides other regions – regions that do not benefit from symmetrical arrangements – to be 
aggrieved and, therefore, seek secession (Anderson 2010: 135).     
We can therefore call it an asymmetric federation if the amount of power given to a minority 
group in a subunit differs (Karmis & Norman 2005: 16; Kymlicka 2005: 278). The difference 
in treatment is done because of the “validity of dealing with the differentially situated units 
differently”, and therefore treating alleged equals equally (Smith 1995: 2). The problem with 
asymmetry is that it might induce political divisiveness, because autonomy and regional 
interests are encouraged, and this “will strengthen the sense that these minorities are separate 
peoples with inherent rights of self-government, whose participation in the federation is 
conditional and revocable” (Kymlicka 1998: 140; 2007: 44; McGarry & O’Leary 2005: 263; 
Burgess 2006: 282). One objection to asymmetry is the issue with democratic accountability, 
which “arises when representatives of an asymmetrically autonomous region in the common 
legislature of the federation or unitary state are able to vote on matters that do not concern 
their region, while other legislators have no say on such matters within the autonomous 
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region” (McGarry 2007: 112-113). Nevertheless, asymmetry is not always a problem, it is by 
nationalist sub-state governments seen as preferable to symmetrical decentralization “because 
this recognizes the privileged national status of the sub-state relative to other sub-states within 
the same federation: after all, such sub-states demand recognition as nations, not simply as 
sub-states with a degree of autonomy within a given federal framework” (Marchildon 2009: 
445). And it is also the case that asymmetry does not create difference, it only reflects it, and 
in the pursuit of legitimacy it is designed to achieve flexibility (Burgess 2006: 221).   
Because minorities and majorities are treated differently, some say that:  
[F]ederalism provides a viable alternative to secession, since it is uniquely able to 
accommodate ethnocultural diversity. Federalism, it is said, respects the desire of groups to 
remain autonomous, and to retain their cultural distinctiveness, while nonetheless 
acknowledging the fact that these groups are not self-contained and isolated, but rather are 
increasingly bound to each other in relations of economic and political interdependence 
(Kymlicka 1998: 112). 
The opposite view of the above claims that federalism increases the political instability, since 
it forces minority groups with a legitimate claim for secession to remain in the larger nation, 
and consequently encourages movements for secessionism (Kymlicka 1998: 111). There are 
some minorities which “seek a role in federal foreign policy, or to be directly represented in 
international organizations” (McGarry & O’Leary 2005: 274). It is also easier for the 
minorities in federal units to claim secession, because the system makes it possible with 
referendums where the peoples’ support is gained, and it “provides the minority with political 
and bureaucratic resources that it can use to launch a bid for independence” (McGarry & 
O’Leary 2005: 275; Kymlicka 2005: 288; Smith 1995: 9). Their political confidence is then 
strengthened, and this affirms their national identity and makes secession more likely 
(Kymlicka 1998: 139).  
Territorially concentrated ethnic groups can through a federal system promote and protect 
their own culture and values, and this “enables them to develop professional and political 
careers in the administrative and representative structures within their sphere of jurisdiction” 
(Martinez-Herrera 2010: 143). These territorial lines make it easier for the ethnic groups to 
implement segmental autonomy, and the groups can therefore justify secession with fact that 
the federal system is either abandoned or undermined, and it is no longer a contract between 
partners, based on mutual respect, tolerance and reciprocity (Adeney 2002: 15; Burgess 2006: 
280-281).  
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Norman (2006) claims that the logical extreme of federalism is secession (Norman 2006: 119) 
and he explains it like this: 
When ethno-cultural groups come to see themselves as nations, this implies, by definition, that 
they seek self-determination and recognition in the family of nations. If a federal arrangement 
is being held out as a preferred alternative to secession or independence, it must also provide 
at least a degree of both self-determination and recognition. (Of course, the two often go 
together, most notably when powers of self-determination, or a right to secede, are given 
‘asymmetrically’ to the minority-controlled provinces only.) In short, although it can be 
difficult to judge the appropriateness of any particular form of constitutional recognition for 
minority or majority groups, it is much less controversial that some form of recognition is 
appropriate and that its complete refusal is problematic (Norman 2006: 161, emphasis in 
original).  
The fact that one majority within a province demands independence will create uncertainty for 
the other groups inside the province, as well as for the other provinces, and this is only 
increased if the independence is backed by a “reasonably democratic referendum” (Norman 
2006: 174). Yet, the units are also made more homogeneous, and this leads to federalism 
being used as “an effective harmonizing device” (McGarry & O’Leary 2005: 269-273). 
Adeney (2000) agrees with this, and claims that it is not the homogenous units which are 
responsible for provinces managing or attempting to secede, it has more to do with the federal 
design (Adeney 2000: 3). It might also be that the provinces manage to negotiate a certain 
degree of autonomy within the nation-state (Tierney 2011: 121). The claim for autonomy is 
actually a vicious circle, where “autonomy leads to nation-building, which leads to demands 
for more autonomy, and so on, until well-mobilized demands for secession are inevitable” 
(Norman 2006: 74). This will lead the other national ethnic groups to feel they are left out, for 
example: 
[I]f only one of several provinces in a federation happens to be controlled by a national 
minority, and if that province is granted special powers (e.g. control over education, the right 
to secede, or the right to veto constitutional amendments) that the other provinces do not 
enjoy, then the people of that province are both symbolically recognized as being unique and 
given special powers to manage their uniqueness” (Norman 2006: 76, emphasis in original).  
So even though federations are better able to manage different types of requests from the 
national majorities and minorities, symmetry is difficult to achieve, and asymmetry can lead 
to the slippery slope of increasing self-government. Therefore, “if limited autonomy is 
granted, this may simply fuel the ambitions of nationalist leaders who will be satisfied with 
nothing short of their own nation-state” (Kymlicka 1998: 141). And the nation-state will be 
reluctant to grant any territorial autonomy to national minorities, since this may lead to other 
minorities seeking secession as well (Woehrling 2011: 142). Autonomy demands also depend 
on the power of the government and state. If it can handle grievances through democratic 
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means and accommodate the demands, or it is able to repress the secession movement, 
conflict is less likely, because “the motivation for violent rebellion will be lessened” (Hendrix 
2010: 273). But, asymmetry has both advantages and disadvantages:  
In most plurinational federations, only some constituent states, sometimes only one, are 
control-led by a national minority and thus insist on more local autonomy. The other 
constituent states, which are inhabited by the national majority, will more easily accept the 
trend toward a greater centralization of power at the level of the federation. A way of 
accommodating these different positions could be to accept more asymmetry in the powers 
allocated to the constituent states inhabited by the national minority, on the one hand, and to 
the states that serve as territorial sub-divisions of the national majority on the other. However, 
such an asymmetry is difficult to reconcile with the principle of equality between the 
constituent states as well as equality between all citizens of the federation (as long, at least, as 
equality of treatment is understood as identical treatment rather than different treatment 
according to different situations) (Woehrling 2011: 142).  
This shows that although federations, especially multi-national ones, even if they allow 
minorities some degree of self-government, do not necessarily work as “conflict-regulating 
devices (McGarry & O’Leary 2005: 13).  
Hypothesis 2: Cosmetic federalism and political asymmetry contribute to the feeling 
that the Northeast has no real power, which in turn contributes to recurring conflicts 
in Northeast India.  
3.3 Group level – Horizontal Inequalities 
When there are different ethnic groups in a nation-state, there are also differences between 
these groups, differences which are not always apparent to outsiders. For the ethnic groups in 
question these differences are important, since they separate their ethnic identity from others. 
There are different views on why ethnicity matters when it comes to differences and identity, 
and the three main ones are primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist. The primordial 
view of ethnicity is that “ethnic identity is etched deep in the subconscious of the individual 
from birth” (Stewart 2008: 8). They mean that religion and ethnicity is tied to the history of 
the people, and it is therefore unchangeable. They have been criticized for not being able to 
explain the change in identity over time and space, and cannot explain new or transformed 
identities (Ellingsen 2005: 312). This means that conflict follows naturally from differences, 
and that this will not be changed overnight (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 5). The instrumentalists 
on the other hand, “see ethnicity as being developed instrumentally, to be used by groups and 
their leaders in order to achieve political or economic goals” (Stewart 2008: 8). What matters 
is therefore how individuals, groups or elites treat identity and culture which is important and 
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“upon whether the elites see it in their interest to use religion and ethnicity as tools to 
mobilize support for conflict or not” (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 6; Ellingsen 2005: 313). 
Culture will then only matter as a basis for conflict if the elites chose to focus on it. Critics of 
instrumentalism feel that identity is not only focused on if the elites do it, it is embedded in 
something bigger than that (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 6). The last are the constructivists, who 
blend the two previous views, and say that a community controls and anchors culture and 
identity. It is therefore too big for a person to control or decide themselves, the masses matter 
as well. Identities may evolve and differentiate over time and place (Ellingsen 2005: 313; 
Lake & Rothchild 1996: 6). Constructivists “believe that ethnicities are frequently used 
instrumentally for political purposes, but their emphasis in on the ‘making’ and ‘remaking’ of 
ethnic boundaries that must occur to make such instrumentalism possible. Differences are 
emphasized, even invented, by leaders in order to construct social groups” (Stewart 2008: 9). 
Because the conventional way of measuring inequality is individual-level, differences 
between groups and regions are not accounted for, and it is these differences that have shown 
to be “highly salient in ethno-nationalist and secessionist conflict” (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 290). 
When these differences manifest themselves as inequalities, where one group is prioritized 
over other groups, this is called horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities can be based 
on different dimensions, political, economic, cultural and social inequalities between different 
groups (Stewart 2008: 3), and these dimensions have different impact on the chances of 
conflict (Østby 2008: 145). Stewart therefore categorizes the inequalities into four areas:  
[P]olitical participation; economic aspects; social aspects; and cultural status.  Each of these 
contains a number of elements. For example, HIs in political participation can occur at the 
level of the cabinet, the parliament, the bureaucracy, local government or the army, amongst 
others. HIs in economic aspects encompass access to and ownership of assets (financial, land, 
livestock and human and social capital), employment opportunities and incomes. HIs in social 
aspects encompass access to various services (education, health, water, sanitation and 
housing), and human outcome indicators (such as measures of health and educational 
achievements). HIs in cultural status include the extent to which a society recognizes (or fails 
to recognize) a group’s cultural practices (for example, in matters of dress, holidays and so on) 
(Stewart 2008: 13).  
Langer and Brown (2008) particularly emphasize the cultural dimension of horizontal 
inequalities, and how it does not have to rely on political or socioeconomic inequalities. They 
define the inequality in cultural status as “as perceived or actual differences in the treatment, 
public recognition or status of different groups’ cultural norms, practices, symbols and 
customs” (Langer & Brown 2008: 42). It does not necessarily have to be explicitly expressed 
by the state that that they afford difference statuses to the different cultures, and it is enough 
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that there is an implicit popular perception of differences in this cultural status, which creates 
anxiety (Langer & Brown 2008: 42). They therefore find a link between “culture and group 
mobilization, including violent conflict, is the extent to which cultural groups’ practices and 
customs are differentially recognized in and by the state”(Langer & Brown 2008: 42, 
emphasis in original). Language is a part of this cultural dimension, the fact that one or more 
languages are deemed as ‘official’ languages, may make minority-language speakers feel as 
though they are not only significantly underprivileged, but also symbolically excluded, when 
the nation is promoting an overarching identity, where the minority-language speakers are 
dominated by the ones whose mother tongue is the official languages (Langer & Brown 2008: 
47).  
The social dimension of horizontal inequalities, “such as when groups use discriminatory 
educational policies to oppress minorities” (Østby 2008: 148), may also play a role in leading 
to conflict. Østby (2008) finds that “[r]obust results from panel and cross-section analyses 
show that social polarization and horizontal inequality are positively related to conflict 
outbreak” (Østby 2008: 143, 157). Even though it is not the direct outbreak of the conflicts 
which are discussed in this thesis, these horizontal inequalities may explain why the conflicts 
are recurring again after lulls in the fighting. These dimensions may also be connected:  
In contrast to multivariate approaches, we view the onset of civil war as influenced by a set of 
processes that interconnect political, economic, and social factors – a prime example of a 
complex adaptive system, in which many decision-making agents, each with their own 
characteristics and behaviors, interact with and change both the physical environment and 
other agents, leading to nonlinear and path-dependent dynamics” (Bhavani & Miodownik 
2009: 35).           
These differences between groups do not necessarily lead to conflict. When groups try to 
employ political routes and these routes are blocked, violence may be viewed to be the only 
viable option. According to Gibney (2008), groups are therefore “driven to achieve on the 
streets what they cannot attain through parliament or resort to gunfire because reliance on the 
ballot box is futile” (Gibney 2008: 25). In those cases where inequalities lead to conflict, their 
motivation may be personal, but it may also primarily be motivated by the individual’s group 
identity, especially if the boundaries between groups are “relatively clearly defined and have 
some continuity over time” (Stewart 2008: 7). The fact that these boundaries must exist over 
time, is emphasized by Brown (2008) when talking about the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia. He says that there are “[s]imilar historical ‘preconditions’ and processes of 
demographic and socioeconomic marginalization created conditions of severe grievance 
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among nationally peripheral ethnic groups in all three separatist cases” (Brown 2008: 253). 
He compares the cases of separatist conflict, and finds that:  
We have seen, then, that in the three separatist cases under consideration here, a combination 
of demographic transformation and the emergence of spatial and ethnic horizontal inequalities 
created conditions ripe for conflict. In the Philippines, violence did emerge, but in the form of 
sporadic intercommunal rather than antistate violence. In Aceh, a separatist movement was 
launched, but with little popular support, and was thus quickly suppressed. In each case, the 
mobilization of mass support for an explicitly separatist movement was linked to changes in 
government policy that were interpreted by the ethnic minorities in question as evidence of 
direct state discrimination. While horizontal inequalities generated occasionally violent 
communal tensions, violent antistate mobilization was directly linked to politicization of 
horizontal inequalities and their association with the state qua state, rather than the ‘other’ 
ethnic group (Brown 2008: 279, emphasis in original).        
The fact that these groups not only experienced relative disadvantage in comparison with the 
dominant ethnic or religious group, but also experienced “broader regional socioeconomic 
decline relative to the rest of the country” (Brown 2008: 253), leading to a double experience 
of horizontal inequalities.  
Studies on civil war and conflict have found that ethnicity seems to be a dimension leading to 
conflict, especially in developing countries, and horizontal inequalities therefore seem to 
matter when it comes to violent conflict (Mancini 2005; Murshed & Gates 2005; Østby 2008; 
Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch 2011: Deiwiks et al. 2012;). Murshed and Gates (2005) 
finds that whether it is based on religion, language or something else, ethnicity “is a powerful 
organizing principle, far superior to social class”, because when there are well-defined and 
ethnically distinct groups, this “resolves the collective action problem of mobilizing groups to 
fight one another” (Murshed & Gates 2005: 122). Fearon and Laitin (2003) also concludes 
with the fact that “ethnic antagonisms, nationalist sentiments, and grievances often motivate 
rebels and their supporters” (Fearon & Laitin 2003:76). The findings when it comes to 
horizontal inequalities are supported when Cederman et al. (2011) claim that “both political 
and economic inequalities contribute to civil war” (Cederman et al. 2011: 478). Stewart 
(2008) also argues this in her book: 
[G]roup mobilization along lines of identity is a central feature of many conflicts, taking a 
broadly social constructivist view of group formation. The salience of particular identities is 
increased by political action – by political leaders, media or the education system – sometimes 
in order to raise consciousness of own identities, sometimes of that of others. Yet, though we 
take a social constructivist line, we also argue that people themselves can become strongly 
convinced about the essential nature of their identities and that of others – which is why 
mobilization by identity can work. Moreover, while people can choose which identities are 
important to them, for the more enduring aspects of their identity they are not free to choose 
any identity, as it were, ‘off a shelf’, shifting to whatever seems more convenient at a given 
moment. Thus, while someone can readily choose to change their social club or to abandon it 
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altogether, Kenyans without mixed parentage cannot choose to stop being Kikuyu and become 
Luo, though they can choose to downplay their ‘Kikuyuness’. In any particular case, history 
and social context will determine the possibilities (Stewart 2008: 10, emphasis in original).      
In federal nations this is a particularly relevant assumption to look at, because there are often 
multiple nationalities, and the boundaries between these groups and the regions are not 
necessarily clear, and they may overlap. Violent struggles may arise over grievances when it 
comes to interregional inequalities (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 290).  
Diverse groups sharing the same political space (that is, residing within the same 
administrative boundaries that create local political units) create a scenario in which the local 
ethnic configuration affects the ability and willingness of elites at the center to accommodate 
minority groups. In ethnically heterogeneous regions within countries, local politics can 
become a zero-sum game, where state accommodation of one group disadvantages another. 
States facing demands from minority ethnic groups in this situation may be unwilling or 
unable to use accommodative strategies in response to minority demands because they will 
inflame other ethnicities in the shared space (Cunningham & Weidmann 2010: 1036).  
Poorer regions are more likely to see conflict, especially secessionist (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 
290), and larger groups are more likely to experience these rebellions as well (Cederman, 
Wimmer & Min 2010: 104-105). They show that:  
[C]onflict with the government is more likely to erupt (1) the more representatives of an ethnic 
group are excluded from state power, especially if they experienced a loss of power in the 
recent past, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity is, and (3) the more they have 
experienced conflict in the past. In view of these findings, we conclude that ethnonationalist 
struggles over access to state power are an important part of the dynamics leading to the 
outbreak of civil wars (Cederman et al. 2010: 88). 
In general Mancini (2005) claims that there is an indirect positive effect of horizontal 
inequalities on mobilization, when measured as “an intensity weighted sum of intergroup 
political, economic and social differentials”, and the findings also shows that “the likelihood 
of civil conflict is highest when low within-group coexists with high between group 
inequalities” (Mancini 2005: 10). From this evidence, the last hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 3: Horizontal inequalities in Northeast India complicate the ethnic 
environment and lead to recurring conflicts between the ethnic groups due to different 
treatment.   
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4.0 Methodology and Research Design 
In this chapter, I present the choice of the research method, and the reasons for choosing such 
a method is discussed. Since the goal of this thesis is to explain the recurring conflicts in 
Northeast India, it is a case study, where Northeast India is the case scrutinized. A case study 
is characterized by the unit of analysis, not the topic (de Vaus 2006: 6; Merriam 2009: 41). 
Because there are seven smaller States within Northeast India, these units will be compared in 
order to explain the overall case of the Northeast. The research technique depends on the 
question asked. The question “Why do Indian’s Northeastern States experience recurring 
insurgencies” is best answered through a case study of Northeast India. According to Yin 
(2009) case studies are the preferred method when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, 
where there are operational links which need to be traced over time (Yin 2009: 9).  When the 
investigator has little control over events and relevant behaviors, and when the focus is on 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context, the case study is preferred (Yin 
2009: 11-13). This description fits my question perfectly, since it is a “why” question, 
Northeast India is a contemporary real-life situation and it is not a case which can be 
controlled by anyone. Three different theories and levels of analysis are used in this thesis; all 
of them will be used as explanations for why there are recurring conflicts in Northeast India. I 
am therefore using these theories as a basis for my research, and seek to apply them to the 
case of Northeast India.  There are of course many more features which can be studied in the 
case of Northeast India, but I have chosen three different levels to be studied thoroughly and 
carefully. This is important in a case study, because everything cannot be studied (Stake 2006: 
3). This is also because there are multiple levels of components in this case, and we can only 
get a clear picture of the case if we combine the smaller elements (called embedded units) 
which make up the larger unit (Eisenhardt 1989: 540; de Vaus 2006: 6-7).  
The goal of this thesis is to explain recurring conflict in Northeast India, not develop a new 
theory, nor make a new theory for generalizing purposes, and this is generally a goal for case 
studies (Lijphart 1971: 692; de Vaus 2006: 11; Chadderton & Torrance 2011: 53). It is 
because Northeast India is an interesting case that I choose it, and that interest will be 
illuminated through this in-depth study of the case (Merriam 2009: 48 and 81). Case studies 
give ideas and guidelines on which variables one should examine further through quantitative 
studies. Through this comparison of cases, we can see which variables are and which are not 
significant, and through this make more general theories. Case studies therefore serves as a 
corrective for quantitative studies, they inform the theories. As I progress in my research, I 
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will be able to ascertain in what ways the theories work and how they do not work for the case 
of Northeast India. This thesis is therefore what Moses and Knutsen (2007) claims that case 
studies usually evolve into, “a combination of scientific objectives: including both theory 
development and theory testing” (Moses & Knutsen 2007: 140). The thesis is descriptive, 
which means that want I want to accomplish is to have a thorough and reliable description of 
Northeast India and try to understand this case (Stake 2006: 2; Merriam 2009: 43). The data 
on Northeast India is interpreted and analyzed through the concepts of theoretical 
interpretations and the findings in the thesis are discussed in relation to knowledge and 
theories which already exist. By doing this the thesis contributes “to expanding the knowledge 
base” by modifying the existing theories (Merriam 2009: 70).This will be done by: 
Drawing from the literature wherein the theoretical framework is lodged you identify what is 
known about the topic (citing appropriate literature), what aspect of the topic you are going to 
focus on, what is known (the “gap” in the knowledge base), why it is important to know it, and 
the precise purpose of the study (Merriam 2009: 68). 
By going through the theories on international borders, federalism and horizontal inequalities 
(see Chapter 3) and then applying these theories to Northeast India, an explanation for the 
recurring insurgencies is found. Because of the complex nature of the case, a complete 
solution for what can and should be done in order to stop the rebels is too ambitious in this 
thesis, but I hope that the analysis will give better insight into the international, federal and 
group situation there. Case study is therefore ideal in this situation, as explained by George 
and Bennett (2004), “case studies remain much stronger at assessing whether and how a 
variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing how much it mattered” (George & Bennett 
2004: 25, emphasis in original). Because Northeast India is a single case study and the 
emphasis is on understanding the recurring conflicts, it is not ideal for generalizing. But, I 
hope that this thesis can be a basis for other case studies, where the theories can be applied to 
other places with recurring conflicts. This is a possibility, because, as Merriam (2009) claims, 
“[e]very study, every case, every situation is theoretically an example of something else” 
(Merriam 2009: 225).  
The case of Northeast India is very complex, making it difficult with surveys or experiments, 
and the case study is therefore used to explain the causal relationship between recurring 
conflict and the three levels which will be investigated (Yin 2006: 84). Causality is not 
something that can be proven 100 percent, and Yin (2006) explains causality and theory as 
follows:  
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A theory is simply an a priori explanation of why some educational phenomenon might have 
occurred the way it did. The explanation is causal in the sense that it identifies cause-and-
effect relationships among a series of events, with each relationship being expressed as a 
hypothesis. The causal chain also must conclude with some measure-able outcome (Yin 2006: 
86-87, emphasis in original).  
He concludes that for case studies in general theory development is essential, and rival 
theories make a strong design for a case study (Yin 2006: 87).  
Because of Northeast India’s complex history and the varied States there, a statistical analysis 
would not sufficiently explain the differences and the analysis would therefore be too 
superficial. This is because in a statistical analysis the specifications are very broad, and a 
topic like recurring conflicts will be difficult to code correctly. The strict limitation of 25 
battle deaths per year which UCDP/PRIO operates with, or 1000 battle deaths per year which 
the COW dataset uses (discussed in Section 2.1), will not be able to account for the case of 
Northeast India. It is not quantity, nor amount, frequency or intensity which is the focus in a 
qualitative case study, it is not the variables which are important, rather the “socially 
constructed nature of reality” is important (Denzin & Lincoln 2011: 8). In a case study there 
can exist more nuances in the definition of recurring conflicts, because the conflict can be 
analyzed as recurring as long as people are mobilizing or preparing for battle, even though 
there might not be up to 25 battle deaths per given year. This type of detail would interrupt 
“the process of developing generalizations”, which is the goal of quantitative researchers 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2011: 9).  
According to de Vaus (2006), case studies have been important to the development of the 
social sciences, and he discusses the different cases one can study (de Vaus 2006: 5-6). In my 
thesis, the case is the region Northeast India, a place therefore functions as a case. No analysis 
is able to take into account all relevant factors for a case, since the situation is too complex, 
and we can never provide a complete objective overview of the case, since “[o]bjective 
representation of reality is impossible” (Denzin & Lincoln 2011: 10) . But, as de Vaus (2206) 
claims:  
A well-designed case study will avoid examining just some of the constituent elements. It will 
build up a picture of the case by taking into account information gained from many levels. The 
final case study will tell us more than, and something qualitatively different from, that which 
any constituent element of the case could tell us. In the case of a school, the insights gathered 
from students, teachers, parents, administrators and community members will probably differ 
and, when taken together, provide a much fuller, more complex understanding of the whole 
than would the perspective provided by any particular element of the case. The whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts (de Vaus 2006: 7).  
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This is an explanatory case study, where I use theories to explain recurring conflict in 
Northeast India. Because this is a single case where there are three units of analysis; 
international, federal and group level, the result will be an embedded case study (Yin 2009: 
50). An embedded case study will make sure that a fuller and more complete understanding of 
the recurrence of conflict in Northeast India is provided. The larger unit Northeast India is the 
focus, not the smaller analyses of the subunits (Yin 2009: 52).   
There have been several good studies on Northeast India, but as far as I know, none who have 
been done on three levels of analysis and a comparison of them, and this thesis should 
therefore “be embedded in a well-informed assessment that identifies gaps in the current state 
of knowledge, acknowledges contradictory theories, and notes inadequacies in the evidence 
for existing theories” (George & Bennett 2004: 74). The problem with doing the analysis on 
three levels is the fact that there will be conflicting explanations, and it might be that they 
have to be reconciled in order to explain the case. In this case George and Bennett (2004) 
make it clear that the different interpretations of a case not necessarily compete with each 
other, they just explains different aspects of the case (George & Bennett 2004: 91-92, de Vaus 
2006: 11). 
The aim of this thesis is that it will be able to achieve what Merriam (2009) deems as 
necessary for a case study: 
Anchored in real-life situations, the case study results in a rich and holistic account of the 
phenomenon. It offers insights and illuminates meanings that expand its readers’ experiences. 
These insights can be construed as tentative hypotheses that help structure future research; 
hence, case study plays an important role in advancing a field’s knowledge base (Merriam 
2009: 51).   
There are many who deem the case study a valuable way to conduct research, among them 
Stake (1995), Lijphart (1971), de Vaus (2006) and Yin (2003, 2009). But there are also 
several things that need to be considered when using case studies. Because it is difficult to 
generalize from one single or a small number of cases, there are many who do not accept the 
case study as a useful tool in the social sciences (Kennedy 2006: 92; George & Bennett 2004: 
25). According to Walton (1992) it is therefore important that “[c]ase studies get at the causal 
texture of social life, but drift without anchor unless they are incorporated into some typology 
of general processes, made casually explicit within the case, and ultimately referred back to 
the universe which the case represents, at least hypothetically” (Walton 1992: 124).  And even 
though case studies are “particularly suited to situations involving a small number of cases 
with a large number of variables” (de Vaus 2006: 19), it is critical that these small-N studies 
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measure the variables correctly and take care when developing the design (Lieberson 1992: 
114-115). And even if the case study is criticized for not being so involved with the 
quantitative research where frequency is important, “[c]ase study researchers are more 
interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur”, than finding out 
how often they occur (George & Bennett 2004: 31). Lijphart (1971) claims that there is only 
one big difference between the statistical method and case studies; “The crucial difference is 
that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control by means of 
partial correlations” (Lijphart 1971: 684), but this will depend on the question and 
measurement. Flyvbjerg (2006) summarizes common misunderstandings about case studies in 
his article, and reaches the conclusion that: 
It is correct that summarizing case studies is often difficult, especially as concerns case 
process. It is less correct as regards case outcomes. The problems in summarizing case studies, 
however, are due more often to the properties of the reality studied than to the case study as a 
research method (Flyvbjerg 2006: 241).  
Flyvbjerg (2011) claims that some of the strengths of case studies are that by studying a topic 
in depth, we develop an understanding of what causes a phenomenon, and can understand the 
context and processes with the linking of causes and outcomes. He also emphasizes the high 
conceptual validity we can achieve through case studies (Flyvbjerg 2011: 314).  
4.1 Validity  
Yin (2006) has given a reasonable explanation to how validity is achieved in case studies: 
Internal validity is achieved through the specification of the units of analysis, the development 
of a priori rival theories, and the collection and analysis of data to test these rivals. Similarly, 
external validity is achieved through the specification of theoretical relationships, from which 
generalizations can then be made (Yin 2006: 88).  
The external validity deals with generalizations and is “concerned with the extent to which the 
findings of one study can be applied to other situations” (Merriam 2009: 223; Yin 2009: 40). 
We can generalize if we have similar situations as Northeast India, through comparisons of 
competing explanations and precise descriptions of the cases. According to Yin (2009) case 
studies rely on analytical generalization, not the statistical generalizations used in quantitative 
research (Yin 2009: 43).    
Internal validity is “seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are 
believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin 2009: 
40). The issue of internal validity therefore deals with how the conclusion drawn in the 
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research matches reality; if we really are measuring and observing what we think we are 
measuring (Merriam 2009: 213).The problem of making inferences is a problem for internal 
validity, as well as not being aware of the fact that a third factor z may have caused the event 
y, and not only event x. Through the use of competing explanations for why there are 
recurring conflicts in Northeast India, and explanation building, the aspect of internal validity 
is addressed (Yin 2009: 42-43). By using multiple sources of evidence (the data on Northeast 
India is collected from different places, but they have the same findings), and establishing a 
chain of evidence (the theoretical and empirical knowledge are based on the research 
question, and the conclusions drawn will be based on the theories and explicit information of 
Northeast India), the importance of measuring what we think we are measuring is underlined. 
The goal is that the thesis will maximize its validity (King, Keohane & Verba 1994: 25; Yin 
2009: 41-42).  Because of the fact that case studies only look at one or few cases, there is no 
danger of combining cases that are dissimilar, or that do not really belong together. A small 
number of cases will allow for better validity, because of the “conceptual refinements”. 
Because of the focus on fewer cases, this makes it easier to “identify and measure the 
indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure” 
(George & Bennett 2004: 19). 
The validity of a case study must be addressed in order to justify the method, as well as the 
reliability if the study; “The connection between reliability and internal validity from a 
traditional perspective rests for some on the assumption that a study is more valid if repeated 
observations in the same study or replications of the entire study produce the same results” 
(Merriam 2009: 221). King et al. (1994) also emphasize reliability and mean that the fact that 
the data-collection methods will give the same result when applying the same procedure is 
essential (King et al. 1994: 25; Yin 2009: 40). Unlike a statistical study, case studies cannot 
be replicated directly, but through referencing, any other researcher should be able to get the 
same results: 
Replication of a qualitative study will not yield the same results, but this does not discredit the 
results of any particular study; there can be numerous interpretations of the same data. The 
more important question for qualitative research is whether the results are consistent with the 
data collected… That is, rather than demanding that outsiders get the same results, a 
researcher wishes outsiders to concur that, given the data collected, the results make sense – 
they are consistent and dependable. The question then is not whether findings will be found 
again but whether the results are consistent with the data collected (Merriam 2009: 221, 
emphasis in original).    
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The stability of the data collected is increased by using documentary material, which is done 
in this thesis. These data are more objective than interviews or observations, since what is 
being studied is not altered by the presence of the investigator (Merriam 2009: 155). This 
thesis is based on written documents like primary sources such as newspaper clips, as well as 
secondary sources; research done by investigators with direct contact to Northeast India. The 
distinction between primary and secondary sources is relevant because: 
An important distinction for historians that qualitative researchers might also attend to is 
whether documents are primary or secondary sources. Primary sources are those in which the 
originator of the document is recounting firsthand experience with the phenomenon of interest. 
The best primary sources are those recorded closest in time and place to the phenomenon by a 
qualified person. Given this definition, most personal documents and eyewitness accounts of 
social phenomena could be considered primary resources. Secondary sources are reports of a 
phenomenon by those who have not directly experiences the phenomenon of interest; these are 
often compiled at a later date. Interestingly, the same document could be classified as primary 
or secondary depending upon the purpose of a study (Merriam 2009: 152).  
Because of the situation in Northeast India, with different insurgent groups and warfare, and 
also because of their restriction on visitors to the area, I would not be allowed in to conduct 
fieldwork, and the thesis is therefore based on documents. In the case of India, English is an 
official language, so all relevant data can be found in English.  
4.2 Variables in the thesis 
I am expecting the relationship between the levels of explanation to look like this:    
Figure 2: Relationship between dependent and independent variables  
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The three levels are therefore independent variables, while “recurring conflict in Northeast 
India” is the dependent variable. Figure 2 shows that I am anticipating horizontal inequalities 
to have an effect on recurring conflicts, the federal system to have an effect of recurring 
conflict, as well as the international borders to have an influence on the recurrence of conflict 
in Northeast India. This does not mean that all of the independent variables necessarily have 
an effect on the dependent variable, and it also does not exclude other independent variables 
from having an effect on the recurrence of conflicts.  
The different levels have different variables (as explained in Chapter 3) and the relationship 
between the variables and the hypotheses is explained in this table: 
Table 2: Relationship between variables and hypotheses 
Level of 
explanation 
Independent 
variables Hypotheses 
 
Safe havens 
 
International 
Far away 
from capital 
 
International borders offer a safe place for the rebels to hide and make it 
more difficult for the government to stop the conflicts, especially if the 
neighboring countries are hostile towards India, and this explains why 
there are recurring conflicts in Northeast India.    
  
Hostile 
neighbors   
 
State power 
 
Federal 
Asymmetry 
 
Cosmetic federalism and political asymmetry contribute to the 
feeling that the Northeast has no real power, which in turn 
contributes to recurring conflicts in Northeast India. 
 
  
Cosmetic 
federalism   
 
Identity   
Horizontal 
inequalities  Differential 
treatment 
 Horizontal inequalities in Northeast India complicate the ethnic 
environment and lead to recurring conflicts between the ethnic groups 
due to different treatment.   
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5.0 Empirical evidence for recurring conflicts  
In this chapter the three hypotheses derived from the theory are tested in order to see which of 
them are supported and which has the most explanatory power when it comes to the case of 
Northeast India.  
5.1 International level 
In this section the first hypothesis is discussed: International borders offer a safe place for the 
rebels to hide and make it more difficult for the government to stop the conflicts, especially if 
the neighboring countries are hostile towards India, and this explains why there are recurring 
conflicts in Northeast India. State conflicts are accentuated by international borders, making 
conflicts twice as durable due to the rebel sanctuaries in the other countries (Toft 2003: 60; 
Rustad et al. 2008: 776; Buhaug et al. 2009: 546). There are five countries which needs to be 
examined when it comes to the international borders of Northeast India; Myanmar
6
, 
Bangladesh, China/Tibet, Bhutan and Pakistan. These countries and their ties to the rebel 
groups are looked at in this chapter, as well as the foreign policy India has responded with 
regarding trade agreements and their Look East Policy.  
The seven States in Northeast India share borders with China to the north, Bangladesh to the 
south west, Bhutan to the north west and Myanmar to the east, and approximately 99 percent 
of the borders are international (see the map at page 11) (Sahni 2002).  A total of 5200 
kilometers are bordering these four countries. These countries have either failed to control 
their own frontier regions, or they have been hostile to India, making it easy for the rebel 
groups in northeast to hide or get support from them (Bhaumik 2007: 26). Because of this the 
Northeast region is fairly closed off from the rest of India. The seven sister States are in the 
periphery of New Delhi, which means that the rebel groups have no chance of seizing control 
of the government of India, and they deny “territorial troops territorial control in rural areas” 
(Buhaug 2006: 695). However, because of their peripheral position, the rebel groups in 
Northeast are more likely to demand secession or a separatist state (a list of the insurgency 
groups can be found in Appendix B).  
Based on Toft (2003) and her focus on capability and legitimacy, this is examined for the case 
of Northeast India (Toft 2003: 21). The capability of the rebel groups in Northeast is 
                                                          
6
 In this thesis the name Myanmar will be used instead of Burma, unless there are direct quotes where Burma has 
been used.  
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dependent on the number of group members, as well as control over different networks and 
money (Toft 2003: 22). The number of group members is difficult to know, since these are 
insurgency groups, meaning people generally do not declare themselves as members of an 
insurgency. Control over the economic and political networks is something the largest groups 
have, due to corrupt politicians and taxing of the population (Hazarika 2004: 774; Lacina 
2009: 1015). When it comes to money this taxation of the population also comes into play, as 
well as the surrounding countries willingness to trade this money for weapons, food and 
medical supplies. Legitimacy is the justness of the cause; in the case of Northeast the issue of 
homeland is especially relevant (Toft 2003: 23). Most of these groups fight for their own 
State, because they believe that this is what rightfully has always belonged to them, not the 
Indian state. Even though none of the secessionist groups have ever managed to break out of 
the Indian federation, there have been ten separatist wars in India, and they have had 
“substantial costs in terms of national, regional and human security, claims Lacina (2012a: 
13).   
What Buhaug et al. (2009) mentions as severe problems with government forces having to 
travel great distances in order to reach the place of the insurgency are all supported in the case 
of Northeast India: physical barriers such as mountains and lack of proper transport network, 
limited knowledge of local government and lack of support from the local population (Buhaug 
et al. 2009: 550). The narrow ‘chicken neck’ or ‘Shiliguri Corridor’ which separates northeast 
India from the rest of India is approximately 33 kilometers on the eastern side and 21 
kilometers on the western side, a small stretch of land between Bhutan/Nepal and Bangladesh 
(Sahni 2002). This small corridor creates problems when transporting a number of armed 
men, and it also hinders easy travel from Northeast to North Bengal (Egreteau 2006: 7).  
5.1.1 China 
India and China has had a tense relationship ever since the “Indian intelligence supported the 
Tibetan armed struggle against the Chinese” in the 1950s, (Bhaumik 2007: 26). The Chinese 
were irritated with India about border disputes, resulting in wholehearted support to the 
separatist insurgencies in the Naga and Mizo Hills and in Manipur (Mukherjee 2007: 14). The 
Indian army cooperated with the Americans between 1951 and 1961, and they trained large 
batches of Tibetan guerillas, while the Naga insurgents were trained by the Chinese and 
Pakistani intelligence (Chadda 2002: 56; Bhaumik 2007: 28). The fact that the west and 
America supported India “only strengthened  China’s determination to help the Indian 
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insurgent groups, India’s antagonism to Pakistan gave Pakistan the resolve to support these 
groups through East Pakistan joining hands with China” (Mukherjee 2007: 14). China and 
Pakistan actually set up a “China-Pakistan Coordination Bureau” in order to coordinate the 
insurgency wars in Northeast, especially in the beginning of the Naga insurgency. Large 
batches were sent to China and Pakistan to train, due to their element of surprise, while, in 
order to slip through, smaller groups were sent later (Bhaumik 1998: 314-315; 2007: 28; 
2009: 159; Upadhyay 2009: 50). There are estimates which show that nearly 5000 Naga 
guerillas were trained in all by, among others, instructors from Pakistan’s Special Service 
Groups (SSG), an elite special forces unit (Bhaumik 2007: 27; 2009: 158). The Chinese 
agencies are working through the ISI, and the intelligence agencies are “working in tandem to 
create mayhem in India’s North-Eastern region” (Bhalla 2012). China has prompted all 
insurgent groups in the Northeast to demand secession from India, making the environment 
very unstable (Mukherjee 2007: 21).  
These aids to different insurgent groups, among them NNC, the MNF and later the PLA of 
Manipur, have been considerable, although it has been confined to training and arms 
(Bhaumik 2007:  27; Saikia 2009: 148). The PLA’s core leadership was trained in China, and 
the Chinese tried to politicize Naga leaders like Thuingaleng Muivah, the present general 
secretary of NSCN, as well. He has trekked to China at least three times via Myanmar’s 
jungles, and the NSCN-IM keep in contact with Beijing through the ruling communists, like 
they have since the 1960s (Bhaumik 2009: 45; Dholabhai 2010). In the early 1980s however, 
the Chinese stopped supporting the insurgency groups in Northeast, and by now they seems to 
have stopped backing guerilla armies against one another. Nevertheless, there have been 
unconfirmed intelligence reports on “a fresh batch of PLA and ULFA guerillas received 
training in China since mid-2009” (Bhaumik 1998: 323; 2007: 26; 2009: 17 and 45). This is 
what Stewart (2000) is talking about when she mentions that conflicts needs support from the 
outside; arms, food and training (Stewart 2000: 251-252). The support the Chinese have given 
the rebels in Northeast has led to it being difficult for the Indian government to stop the 
rebels, leading to recurring conflicts.  
Today India is worried about the use of Burmese as an access to the Northeastern States, as 
are China’s strategic attempts (Aung & Myint 2001: 100). The Chinese intelligence agencies 
are cultivating contacts and use them to get information about the forces which the Indian 
Army has in the Northeast (Dholabhai 2010). Malik (2007) claims that what have upset the 
Chinese calculations are the strategic implications of India’s ‘Look East Policy’, as well as 
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India’s ability to have such a high growth rate as eight to nine percent, and the recent 
hardening of China’s stance on the territorial dispute in the China-India relation is due to the 
internal reassessment of India (Malik 2007). In the case of China Hypothesis 1 is supported, 
they have been hostile to the Indian government and have helped the rebels in Northeast, 
making it difficult for the Indian government to stop the conflicts.  
5.1.2 Pakistan 
As claimed above, Pakistan has managed to create considerable difficulties for India by 
supporting the insurgency groups, both with and without the links to the Chinese intelligence. 
The Indian Government is also very quick to see the “hidden hand of Pakistan being almost 
all unrest within India, but there are strong indications that Islamabad has provided some 
fairly significant support to several insurgent movements in the northeast states” (Cline 2006: 
140). The ISI actually has strong bases in Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya and Manipur (Bhalla 
2012). By working together with China, the ISI has given a new dimension to the violence in 
Northeast by using other nations to destabilize India (Sekhon 2005: 11). Ever since the Naga 
insurgency started in 1951 Pakistan has helped the rebels with safe-havens and support in 
what was then East Pakistan (Sekhon 2005: 5; Sahni 2012). This support was given because it 
evened up Pakistan’s loses in Kashmir, “by engaging inner turmoil in the troubled north-
eastern frontiers of India and consequently weakening India’s internal security system”, 
which meant that the scope of activities under Pakistan’s ISI expanded (Upadhyay 2009: 50). 
Between 1956 and 1971, the ISI backed the NNC, the MNF and the Sengkrak of Tripura 
(Bhaumik 2007: 27). In order to keep the pot boiling in the Northeast, ISI has also sponsored 
the groups National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), 
ULFA, NDFB, NSCN, Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and others 
(Sekhon 2005: 6).   
After East Pakistan became Bangladesh, the links still persisted between ISI and the 
insurgency groups in Northeast India. During the 1980s the operations carried out by ISI was 
increased as they developed safe locations in and close links with the intelligence in 
Bangladesh. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh provided weapons, training and sanctuary for the 
Northeast rebels, and they were “instrumental in operating training camps in Bangladesh, 
where separatist rebels of the North East, collectively known as the ‘United Liberation Front 
of Seven Sisters’ were trained in subversive activities” (Bhaumik 2007: 26; Upadhyay 2009: 
50). Upadhyay (2009) explains the activities like this:  
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ISI’s subversive activities are widespread and include: overt and covert financial and material 
support to the local militia; indiscriminate violence against civilians; creation of new ultra 
groups such as fake passports, visa and other documents; deliver weapons and counterfeit 
currency; engage and encourage drug transfer and trade; sabotage oil and gas pipeline and 
other key installations, communication lines, railways and roads and; accentuate communal 
cleavages by way of disinformation campaigns (Upadhyay 2009: 50).  
Because of this Pakistani support, India’s initial response was to back a neighboring 
insurgency, and this aggressive regional diplomacy was added to India’s counter-insurgency 
repertoire in the mid-1990s. Islamabad’s support for insurgents in Kashmir and Punjab, as 
well as support for the Northeastern rebels, has been reciprocated by Indian support for the 
rebellion in East Pakistan, and Mohajir outfits in Sindh and Balochistan. The mutual backing 
of the other country’s rebel groups went hand in hand for two decades (Bhaumik 2007: 8; 
Saikia 2009: 146).  
By all accounts the ISI still continue to aid or at least have a close rapport with the ULFA and 
the other rebel armies (Bhaumik 2009: 155). The ISI is using Bangladesh as a bureau in the 
Northeast region. According to Saikia (2009) “[i]t is from its erstwhile eastern wing that 
Pakistan launches their covert operations in India’s mainland and North East India” (Saikia 
2009: 145). Today, the ISI are training cadres from ULFA, ATTF and Islamist groups in 
“various insurgency tactics, including mortar firing and in the use of explosives, later on the 
lines of car, motorcycles and cycle bombs” (Saikia 2009: 151). They are not doing this alone, 
but are supported by the CIA, and they are fomenting insurgency in order to destabilize the 
whole region (Times of India 2011). According to a report a mushrooming of madrassas has 
emerged in Manipur, which now is a hub of ISI activity (Sekhon 2005: 8).      
Since Pakistan does not share direct borders with the Northeast, they operate through 
Bangladesh. The fact that the neighboring countries give shelter to the rebels ensures that the 
rebels have control of the borders and can continue fighting. As Buhaug and Gates (2002) 
claim, “[r]ebels will push to gain access to an international border because neighboring 
countries often provide a safe refuge away from governmental troops, but also because 
weapons and natural resources are traded and transported across these borders” (Buhaug & 
Gates 2002: 422). The rebels in Northeast do not have to push to gain access to international 
borders, as already mentioned, 99 percent of this region’s borders are international, making 
the environment very unstable (Baruah 2007: 6). For Pakistan, who fights against India in 
Kashmir, it is an advantage if the Government of India’s attention is diverted away from 
Kashmir and towards Northeast India instead. They have therefore helped the rebels fight the 
Indian government and contributed to the recurrence of conflicts, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
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5.1.3 Bangladesh  
Bangladesh emerged as a hideout already when it was East Pakistan, due to the Pakistani 
support to the NNC and their parallel government, the Federal Government of Nagaland 
(FNG). Officials in the Indian military actually estimate that as many as 3000 Naga guerillas 
were trained in East Pakistan (Bhaumik 2009: 157). Several batches of 200-300 militants 
started pouring over the borders, for training and weapons (Bhaumik 2007: 9). After this, as 
spite to Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War, the Indian intelligence trained 
“thousands of Bengali guerillas in hundreds of camps located in the northeastern states of 
Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam as also in West Bengal” (Bhaumik 2007: 26). In mid 1978, 
Bangladesh first started providing shelter for the rebels, as a response to the Indian support, 
training and arming of the Shanti Bahini. One of the first groups to set up camps in the 
Chittagong Hills Tract after the birth of Bangladesh was the MNF (Bhaumik 2007: 31; 2009: 
168).  
According to different reports, there are several militant camps and hideouts in Bangladesh, 
with over a hundred camps located in the border areas alone (Upadhyay 2009: 51). Bhaumik 
(2009) claims that these numbers are exaggerated by the Indian intelligence, “but there is no 
denying that at least 63 camps and large hideouts of safe houses of eleven rebel groups from 
northeast India remain operational” (Bhaumik 2009: 174). He further claims that:   
After 1990, the DGFI developed close links with the ULFA, the NDFB, the PLA and United 
National Liberation Front (ULFA) of Manipur. Now even Meghalaya rebel groups like the 
Achik National Volunteers Council and Tripura rebel groups like the All-Tripura Tiger Force 
(ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) are all based in Bangladesh. The 
Indian government has recently claimed that 108 bases belonging to as many as 11 rebel 
groups from northeast India exist in Bangladesh (Bhaumik 2009: 169).  
The ULFA, as well as other groups of Assam and Meghalaya, all have training areas in 
Bangladesh. The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) is actually believed “to be the 
second largest insurgent groups present in Bangladesh” (Upadhyay 2009: 52). This makes 
Bangladesh the major foreign area, even though  the Bengali population there is less then 
friendly towards the ULFA or the NDFB and the border is largely riverine (Bhaumik 2007: 
31; 2009: 177). Das (2008) explains the border like this: 
The porosity of the border, lack of economic opportunities, poverty and underdevelopment, 
attitude of the people towards petty crimes, laxity in vigilance, nexus between criminals, and 
police and border guarding forces all contribute to the escalating trans-border crimes. 
Smuggling of cattle, arms, and other essential items, human and narcotics trafficking, 
counterfeit currency, kidnapping, and thefts are quite rampant along, the India-Bangladesh 
border (Das 2008: 372).  
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It is difficult to differentiate between the citizens of India and Bangladesh, making it easy to 
cross the border to a welcoming population, since the trans-border ethnic and socio-cultural 
ties exist even today (Das 2008: 369). This is what Cederman et al. (2009) are referring to 
when they mentions ethnic ties, and how they make it difficult for the government to 
differentiate and defeat the insurgents (Cederman et al. 2009: 413). The DGFI (Directorate 
General de Forces Intelligence) of Bangladesh and the ISI have a myriad of subterfuges in the 
Northeast, and they are beginning to “expand their aid to the insurgent organizations of North 
East India by including Islamist groups in the region” (Saikia 2009: 155). These two 
intelligence agencies are believed to stand behind several anti-India operations, which are 
facilitated by the overwhelming presence of the illegal immigrants in the Northeastern States. 
The bases in Bangladesh are also very strategic for the rebel groups, because “it provides 
them proximity to the Cox Bazaar port – the key receiving point of weapon consignment 
shipped from the black markets of South East Asia” (Upadhyay 2009: 51-52). Through this 
Bangladesh has emerged as the major transit base for smuggling of arms into India due to the 
fact that “ISI facilitates meetings between various Indian insurgent groups, arranges founds, 
weapons and ammunition for them” (Sekhon 2005: 3). Hypothesis 1 is strengthened when it 
comes to Bangladesh, because the country harbors many rebel camps and is a safe haven for 
the insurgency groups.    
5.1.4 Myanmar 
The 1643 kilometers long border India shares with Myanmar is just as dangerous as the one 
shared with Bangladesh, if not more so, since most of the insurgent groups have camps there 
(Saikia 2009: 152; Das 2010: 348). It is also an important border for India, marking the bridge 
to Southeast Asia, and because it is unfenced, it is used as a springboard for hit-and-run 
strikes from the militant outfits (Kanwal 2010; Roche 2010). Since Myanmar are 
geographically contiguous to four of the Northeastern States, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, 
Manipur and Mizoram, it is important that India maintains “a cordial relationship with 
Myanmar’s non-democratic military junta to extend  its influence in Southeast Asia and due 
to internal security concerns of its north-eastern states which are under continuous threat from 
various insurgent groups” (Routray 2011: 299). Mukherjee (2007) feels that “[u]nfortunately 
our pro-democracy and anti-military rule policy towards Myanmar, a military ruled state, led 
to misunderstandings with the country, with a result that Myanmar gave sanctuary to a 
number of north-eastern insurgent groups” (Mukherjee 2007: 78).  
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In the early 1990s, India shifted its Burmese policy, in order to search for stability in India’s 
troubled Northeast region, to counterbalance China’s growing regional presence as well as 
looking at the economic opportunities tendered by Myanmar (Egreteau 2008: 939). China has 
a high degree of political and economic influence in Myanmar, and this poses an obstacle for 
India to push for its own economic and strategic goals there (Egreteau 2008: 954). Aung and 
Myint (2001) explain the transition like this:  
There were waves of refugee exodus from Burma to neighbouring countries as a result of 
these military campaigns. In particular, hundreds of Nagas refugees fled to Nagaland in India 
in the beginning of 1992. India protested over this Naga refugee issue and asked the Burmese 
government to stop atrocities on innocent villages on the border. Later, India and Burma 
worked together of the repatriation of these Naga refugees to Burma. There were cases then 
Burmese army personnel crossed the Indian border in pursuit of the Burmese rebels. When the 
Burmese government started paying attention to Kachin insurgents of the Indo-Burmese 
border, an unwritten understanding developed between the authorities of the two countries: 
troops from either side could cross the border to a certain limit in pursuit of the insurgents. As 
in the 1970s, India realized that it needed a friendly relationship with the Government of 
Burma to contain its own insurgency problem in Northeast India, as some of these groups 
established their camps within Burma (Aung & Myint 2001:  93-94).  
The military cooperation between India and Myanmar became more concrete in April 1995 
when, in order to dismantle the base camps of the ULFA, the PLA (People’s Liberation 
Army), NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and the CNF (Chin National Front), “both armies conducted a 
joint counterinsurgency operation called Operation Golden Bird against various ethnic rebel 
outfits” (Egreteau 2008: 941). During this operation about 40 insurgents were killed and a 
huge cache of arms was recovered (Kanwal 2010).  
Myanmar and India have continued with these military operations after 1995, for their mutual 
benefit. In October 2000 Burmese military fired on what they believed to be Naga rebels, but 
what turned out to be an Indian patrol party, killing three Indian soldiers (Aung & Myint 
2001: 96). On 17 November 2001 the Indian Home Minister L. K. Advani and Burmese 
Home Minister Col. Tin Hlang had a meeting, where it was agreed that the Burmese military 
would be extending its cooperation to Indian in countering the insurgents on the border (Aung 
& Myint 2001: 99-100). The Myanmar army raided several Manipuri rebel bases in 
November 2001, where they rounded up almost 200 rebels and recovered around 1500 guns. 
These operations are also necessary to control narcotics trafficking and to limit the increase of 
small arms in the region (Kanwal 2010). But despite “the counterinsurgency operations 
launched every winter against Naga and Manipuri rebels by the Burmese armed forces”, New 
Delhi’s expectations have not been fulfilled, even though they have been effective (Egreteau 
2008: 946; Das 2010: 346). This is much due to the fact that the rebel groups have 
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exceptionally mobile base camps in the remote hills of western Myanmar, as well as reliable 
information networks which ensures their continued existence and resistance (Egreteau 2008: 
947).  
The heightened insurgency in 2002 led to the Assam Rifles guarding the Myanmar border 
(Ranjan 2012). The border problems between Myanmar and India includes among other 
things, the problems posed by Nagas and Mizos, who for decades have been living on both 
sides of the border (Aung & Myint 2001: 92). This is what Moore (2002) sees as a problem 
which can increase foreign policy conflict, especially between bordering countries (Moore 
2002: 79). These ethnic ties between the Nagas and Mizos on both sides on the border make it 
easier for the Indian Nagas to get support from and be able to hide with the Burmese Nagas. 
However, Cline (2006) claims that it is not so much Burmese support to the insurgent groups 
which is a problem, it is more to do with the fact that Yangon itself has problems controlling 
its periphery, making the whole area perfect for hide-outs and rebel camps (Cline 2006: 141).    
India started helping Burmese rebel groups in order to dislodge the NNC and NSCN, the 
MNF and the Manipuri rebel groups from their camps in Myanmar, and the Indian 
intelligence “ran hideouts and arms catches in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and 
Mizoram for the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army and the Chin National Front 
of Burma” (Bhaumik 2007: 27). It was relatively easy for rebel groups such as the Nagas, 
Mizos, Meiteis and Tripuras to find training facilities and safe havens in Myanmar, due to the 
fact that “[t]he Kachins of North Burma have for long been suppliers and trainers to the Nagas 
and host of other North Eastern ultras, notably the ULFA, the PREPAK from Manipur and the 
PLA from Tripura” (Upadhyay 2009: 52). The backing for these rebel groups has stopped and 
New Delhi tries to appease the Burmese military junta instead, and the junta then undertakes 
campaigns on the Northeast militants based on its Sagaing Division (Bhaumik 2007: 26). In 
order to make Myanmar turn against the Northeast rebels, India has offered military hardware 
and other concessions (Bhaumik 2007: 8). They have also offered tanks, military pieces and 
an assortment of other heavy weapons (Bhaumik 2007: 32).   
Myanmar does not actively support the militant groups anymore, although they are “non-
institutional subterfuges that take place in the lower echelons of the Burmese army – 
primarily for money” (Saikia 2009: 152). Even though Myanmar and India have not reached a 
diplomatic stand-off or conflict since independence, they “are cooperating in many fields, 
including countering insurgency on the border, sharing intelligence on a real-time basis, 
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promoting trade and investment” (Aung & Myint 2001: 87).  This development has happened 
because the Indian government realized that “India’s national interest is best served by a 
strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict neutrality between India and China and also 
cooperates with India in the common fight against insurgencies raging in the border areas of 
both the countries” (Routray 2011: 306). India has therefore tried to obstruct the external 
sanctuaries which can complicate negotiation, something Salehyan (2007) mentions as 
reasons for an environment with little information, and which have helped the recurring 
conflicts (Salehyan 2007: 227). The recurring conflicts are aided by Myanmar and the rebel 
groups have a place to hide on Myanmar’s side of the border. The fact that Myanmar is also 
hostile to India strengthens Hypothesis 1.       
5.1.5 Bhutan 
Bhutan borders Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, and has usually been considered a peaceful 
royal kingdom. Nevertheless, “porous borders, weak Bhutanese armed forces, the strength of 
the militant outfits from the Northeast, the rise of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the problem of 
“unwanted” refugees and a conflict of political interests have drawn the kingdom into the 
turmoil affecting India’s Northeast” (Egreteau 2006: 135). Although Myanmar has taken over 
some of the camps to the Bodo insurgents, ULFA and the NSCN-K, insurgents in Northeast 
still play a role in the dealings between India and Bhutan (Aung & Myint 2001: 107). Bhutan 
depends on India for economic survival, due to its landlocked geographical position, which 
poses obstacles on the road to establishing independent foreign relation since it is a nation 
between the superpowers China and India (Hsu 2005: 3). Bhutan is, however, “a lot closer to 
India, and the two share intimate bonds in the areas of foreign affairs, economy, trade, 
education and technology, and national defense and security” (Hsu 2005: 9). This is why it is 
a problem that the border areas of Bhutan are used as safe havens for militants who have 
established sanctuaries in the Manas Reserve Forests and the Manas Game Sanctuary in lower 
Assam (Upadhyay 2009: 60). The southern borders of Bhutan have been occupied by rebel 
groups for a long time (Hsu 2005: 11). Bhutan has made no secret of the fact that the 
Northeast rebels have camps in the kingdom, contrary to what Bangladesh has done. Instead 
of a protracted military operation however, the royal government tried persuading the rebel 
leaders of ULFA and NDFB to leave Bhutan. This move was motivated by three factors; 
pressure from India, disturbances on Bhutan’s southern borders increased and the Lhotshampa 
issue (Mazumdar 2005: 569; Bhaumik 2007: 178). The Lhotshampas are a group in Bhutan, 
and they resided near the Indian insurgents camps. Due to the fact that officials though the 
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insurgents might be “supplying arms to the Lhotshampas and causing a full-scale ethnic 
insurgency in the southern areas”, it was necessary to act against ULFA and NDFB 
(Mazumdar 2005: 572). But these rebel groups would not leave, and their presence was 
gradually becoming a security threat for Bhutan itself, “as the groups were propping up 
Maoist presence owing to their strengthened links with the Nepalese Maoist insurgents” 
(Kumar 2004: 391). This has created uncertainty in Bhutan, and the rebel groups from 
Northeast India are therefore doing exactly what Siverson and Starr (1990) mentions as the 
dangerous element with international borders; they contribute to the potential outbreak of 
violence in Bhutan (Siverson & Starr 1990: 50).    
This is not the only threat the insurgents present: 
There were also fears among royal government officials that India might carry out “hot 
pursuit” of insurgents across the border at some stage to deal with the rising problem. This 
would be a violation of Bhutan’s sovereignty but, considering the mismatch between the 
capabilities of the two countries, Bhutan would not be able to respond to such incursions. 
Officials therefore thought it prudent to prevent escalation. In addition, the frequent attacks on 
Bhutanese citizens made the presence of the insurgent groups an internal security issue for 
Bhutan, which was forced to address it (Mazumdar 2005: 579).    
The Indian government had a strategy which involved the royal Army of Bhutan demolishing 
nearly thirty camps of three separatist groups from Assam and northern Bengal in 2003 
(Bhaumik 2007: 8).  
Bhutan’s Operation All Clear (OAC) was launched in 2003, and it was an operation where 
“the use of force to enact the ‘will of the state’” reaffirmed the idea “that the state alone must 
remain the agency for the ‘legitimate use of force’ within its territory” (Kumar 2004: 392; 
Egreteau 2006: 137). OAC may be what future military cooperation between South Asian 
neighbors in the war against terrorism is all about, because “so far they backed insurgent 
forces against each other but now many of them are joining ranks in trans-national joint 
coordinated operations to control and neutralize insurgent armies” (Bhaumik 2007: 32-33). 
Due to its treatment of the insurgency groups, New Delhi has used Bhutan as a model for 
other nations in the region, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, urging them to follow the 
examples set by Bhutan (Mazumdar 2005: 580). But, India also fears that the refugees from 
Nepal in Bhutan would join the rebels and make them stronger, as well as rebels remaining in 
Bhutan and still pose a threat to Indian security (Hsu 2005: 12). The case of Bhutan does not 
actively strengthen Hypothesis 1, since they are not hostile to the Indian government, but the 
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fact that they do not have complete control of their borders still makes it easy for the 
insurgency groups to hide there.   
5.1.6 Look East Policy 
The Look East Policy is supposed to benefit India’s Northeastern States, and has been a 
solution the government of India has looked at in order to make it more difficult for the 
rebellions in Northeast to receive support from neighboring countries. The aim of the policy is 
to liberate the region “not only from its presently landlocked and peripheral status but also 
from the governmentalised modes of imagining it” (Das 2010: 344). The policy is posited as 
part of India’s foreign policy, and it came about in the beginning of the 1990s (Das 2010: 348; 
Yuanying 2012). The major focus is on economic cooperation, and in the 21
st
 century, “India 
began adopting specific action, transforming to all-round cooperation from exclusive 
economic exchanges and enlarging its foreign policies from the Southeast Asia to East Asia 
and Australia” (Yuanying 2012).  
Diplomacy, communications, economics and military means are other options, that India has 
explored in varying degrees. While on the one hand, through sustained campaigns India has 
sought to focus global attention on the nature and extent of eternal involvement in its troubled 
frontiers, on the other, it has also been trying to aggressively engage its eastern neighbours 
through its Look East Policy. The idea is to revive the historical and geographical links 
between North East India and the immediate neighbourhood. Post-partition, the disruption of 
the communication network with East Pakistan – rail, road and river links – put an end to the 
geographical advantage that the region enjoyed, located at the crossroad of the newly 
emerging nations of Asia. The 1962 border war with China and the increasing hostilities with 
Pakistan, transformed the region sharing 4500 kms of border with the newly emerging nations 
of Asia, namely, China, Burma, East Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal, into a landlocked outpost of 
a large continental economy” (Upadhyay 2009: 94).  
The Look East Policy involves opening points along the border with Myanmar, covering 
Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, and make this into continental 
connections, because it makes strategic and economic sense (Upadhyay 2009: 95).   
The focus of the government is for Northeast India to become a gateway to Southeast Asia, 
and in order for the Look East Policy to be successful, Upadhyay (2009) claims that the 
Southern Silk Road and the Ledo Road need to be opened, because the Southern Silk Road 
connects “China to the Indian Ocean, from its Sichuan and Yunan province to Yangon 
(Rangoon) in Burma, the Ledo Road connects the Ledo town in Upper Assam to Yuban in 
China” (Upadhyay 2009: 98). This was something that President Kalam looked at in 2006, “in 
order to facilitate movement of people and commodities” (Das 2010: 348). Gokhale (2012) 
claims that India’s Northeast and Myanmar should be the main target markets of many 
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products manufactured in the Special Economic Zone “to once again make India’s north 
eastern states and northern Myanmar a natural economic zone, which they historically were, 
providing a sustainable economic life line to the north eastern states” (Gokhale 2012). There 
is illegal and legal trade between India and Myanmar through Tamu in Myanmar and Moreh 
in Manipur, so the economic linkages already exist. This will make it easier to make 
Myanmar the linking route between India and the other Southeast Asian countries, as well as 
the point of convergence (Gokhale 2012). The Look East Policy tries to work for peace and 
stop the recurring conflicts in Northeast, it a therefore a policy the Indian Government put 
forward as a response to the insurgencies. Because of the value the GoI has put on the Look 
East Policy, they feel that the international borders are a problem with regard to the 
insurgencies, and their policies therefore support Hypothesis 1.     
5.1.7 Trade 
Indian government has also looked at other methods in order to stop the recurring conflicts in 
Northeast. The other solution when it comes to better relationship between the neighboring 
countries is trade agreements. India and Myanmar signed a boundary agreement in 1967 
(Routray 2011: 302). The main gateways from India to Myanmar, the Tirap and Changalang 
districts of Arunachal Pradesh are today important centers for illegal trade and recruitment 
(Upadhyay 2009: 61). 
A bilateral agreement was also signed to regularize and promote border trade to be conducted 
through Moreh in Manipur State of India and Champhai in Mizoram State of India 
corresponding to Tamu and Hri on the Burma side. The border trade was, accordingly, 
officially opened on 12 April 1995 at Moreh in the presence of the Indian Commerce Minister 
P. Chidambaram and the Burmese trade minister Lt. General Tun Kyi. Since that time, the 
Indo-Burmese relationship has been steadily improved and there have been a number of 
informal and formal visits of senior officials and ministers of the two countries (Aung & 
Myint 2001: 94-95).  
There has also been other agreements, one “was signed to regularise and promote border trade 
to be conducted through Moreh in Manipur and Champhai in Mizoram corresponding to 
Tamu and Rhion the Myanmar side” (Routray 2011: 305). The Bangladeshi Cox Bazaar is a 
haven for militants and gun runners, and arms are smuggled into India in this tri-junction 
which is the ‘no-man’s land’ between Bangladesh, Myanmar and India. The southernmost 
part of the relatively peaceful State of Mizoram, which lies in this tri-junction, “has emerged 
as a turf for both nacro-terrorism and gun running” (Upadhyay 2009: 61).   
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Narcotics is becoming a big problem in the Northeast, and although the military, paramilitary 
and police deployment are checking the insurgent activity, they are not able to keep narcotics 
out of the area. It does not help that that “[t]he Burmese army is believed to be already 
involved in heroin smuggling, and in any event the heroin-producing cartels of Myanmar 
enjoy substantial protection from the army which is also the ruling authority” (Bhaumik 1998: 
326). The States Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland are identified as “extremely fragile areas 
along the drug trafficking route” by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 
(Upadhyay 2009: 57). Full-time drug trade is an attractive venture, since the Northeast 
insurgents draw their strategic and tactical inspiration from across the borders anyway, 
especially from Myanmar (Upadhyay 2009: 57). It has even gone so far that “[e]thnic 
separatists taking to drug trade, are also known to encourage tribal farmers to cultivate poppy, 
particularly in parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland and Assam” (Upadhyay 2009: 
58).  
The illegal border trade has been overlooked by the State governments because it creates a lot 
of economic activity in Northeast India. Sachdeva (2000) claims that certain areas in the 
region should be declared Free Trade Areas, since for all intents and purposes, they are 
practically free trade areas anyway. There is corruption at every turn since the commodities 
are not officially declared legal, and this is a problem solved by free trade areas (Sachdeva 
2000). The border today is a barrier for India to both Southeast Asia and China, but given the 
strategic importance of the Northeast region, India needs to “devise a clear strategy to open up 
its eastern frontier to its neighbors”, so that Myanmar can be seen as a continental gateway to 
Southeast Asia, not just a maritime one (Egreteau 2008: 956). Today the border with 
Myanmar is corrupt and problematic: 
Some quantities of weapons’ supplies to militants in the Northeast are also being sources from 
various other countries. A number of weapons recovered from the ultras in recent times were 
of German, Italian and Israeli manufacture. These were also brought into India mostly through 
Myanmar, and it is believed that Dimapur has become a hub for transaction of such weapons 
by the militants groups. Sources of weapons recovered in the Northeast have also been 
identified as including Pakistan, Belgium, Thailand, Russia, USA, UK, Czechoslovakia, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar (Sahni 2012).  
The smuggling routes through Myanmar and Bangladesh offer access to the rebels in the 
Northeast, and small arms from China appear to have been released into the region (Sahni 
2012). Groups in both Nagaland and Assam are rumored to have received these arms 
consignments, and “in this regard, it is significant that China’s three largest arms clients are 
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Pakistan, Burma and Bangladesh” (Upadhyay 2009: 48). The routes for transporting these 
illegal weapons in the region are:   
From here, the arms are routed to destinations in Burma and North east India, through 
different routes. The Naga Hills in Burma’s Chin state, adjoining Manipur and Mizoram, is 
one of the prominent routes through which arms sneak into North East India. Some of the 
arms move up the CHT and enter India through Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya and Nagaland. It 
is noteworthy that Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya and Dimapur in the Assam-Kohina 
border, have emerged as the important chains in this underground arms network. Besides 
smuggled arms, country-made weapons also contribute towards the proliferation in a 
significant way (Upadhyay 2009: 56).  
In general the arms into the Northeast have come through Myanmar or through Bangladesh, 
and Southeast Asia is the natural arms bazaar for the insurgents in the Northeast (Routray 
2011: 316).  
Based on the evidence in this chapter it becomes clear that the international environment 
contributes to the recurring conflicts in Northeast India. Not only does India’s neighboring 
countries actively support and help the different insurgency groups, but they also make it 
much more difficult for the Indian government to know how many rebels they have to 
negotiate or fight with. Whenever there are lulls in the fighting between the government 
troops and the insurgency groups, the latter can go into hiding in China, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar or Bhutan, and there they can gather weapons, food and intelligence and build up 
their strengths before they start the insurgency again. Even though the response from the GoI 
has been trade agreements and Look East Policy, they have not managed to stop the recurring 
conflicts. Since the insurgency groups fight for the same thing all the time; sovereignty, the 
conflicts can be characterizes as recurring, because the entities in the conflicts, the GoI 
against whichever rebel group, are the same. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported by the 
evidence in this chapter; the international borders in the Northeast make it more difficult for 
the government of India to stop the recurring conflicts. Nevertheless, not all of the seven 
States have recurring conflicts, even though they all have international borders, which show 
that Hypothesis 1 is not the hypothesis with the most explanatory power.   
5.2 Federal level 
In this section Hypothesis 2 is tested: Cosmetic federalism and political asymmetry contribute 
to the feeling that the Northeast has no real power, which in turn contributes to recurring 
conflicts in Northeast India. Narang (2003) summarizes the federal system in India as 
follows:  
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The scheme of the Constitution was described as one of ‘cooperative federalism’, but in fact 
India is a federation with a strong centre and with certain unitary features.  It is so structured 
as to establish the supremacy of the union, while assuring the autonomy of the states in certain 
fields. The scheme of distribution of powers in the legislative, administrative and financial 
fields under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution has been so affected as to make the 
union government more powerful than the states. In addition, the residuary powers are also 
conferred on the union government. The Constituent Assembly has originally assumed that 
residual authority would be left with the state governments, but after the agreement on 
partition, the Assembly decided that, as part of the general attempt to strengthen central 
powers, residual authority would vest in the centre (Narang 2003: 73).   
The focus of Indian politicians has therefore been on making the centre strong, in order to 
maintain the unity and integrity of the country, as well as to serve the interests of balanced 
development. Indira Gandhi in particular advocated this unitarism and she wanted to 
restructure the institutional framework. The response from the States however, was to demand 
greater political autonomy, supported by the political participation of the people, which 
happened not only in the Northeast, but also in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab (Narang 
2003: 78). This unitarism is supported by the fact that the States in India are not the cause of 
Indian federalism, rather they are the consequence of it, since the Indian nation is not made up 
of pre-existing States and the federation-making has been carried out from above 
(Bhattacharyya 2005: 11, 14).   
India has always been a country with many languages, regions, cultures, tribes, traditions, 
religions and communities, which are identity markers that have fuelled a certain degree of 
regionalism. These differences are recognized in different federal nations, which are 
constructed precisely for this reason. A federation is considered to be the solution for 
sustaining a durable peace in a diverse society, as it is more able to accommodate these 
distinct regional differences (Neisah 2000: 55; Adeney 2002: 9; Bhattacharyya 2005: 2-3; 
Miklian 2011: 26-27). This is what Norman (2006) talks about when he says that the minority 
groups in a nation can be a clear majority in their given State, and where they then can 
“exercise a number of sovereign powers” (Norman 2006: 88). Singh and Verney (2003) 
means that one of the important distinguishing features in India compared to other federations 
is the “reluctance to allow important demographic changes to be reflected in the composition 
of Parliament itself” (Singh & Verney 2003: 12-13). Neisah (2000) claims that the “rigid 
control exerted by the centre over the chief ministers of state governments” is one of the 
symptoms which have weakened the federal structure in India (Neisah 2000: 54). I will now 
see if this federal system is the reason for the recurring conflicts in Northeast India, thereby 
testing Hypothesis 2.   
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5.2.1 Power of the government and the States 
How the Indian federation works in practice is essential for our understanding of the different 
States. The responsibility of the Indian nation is divided between the national government and 
the federal States, just what Kymlicka (1998) explains as what signifies a federal nation 
(Kymlicka 1998: 120). The working of the federation in regard to the power and influence of 
the separate States are summed up in short here: 
1. The central government has the powers to control and command the State government, 
this through the office of State governor (Rajashekera 1997: 247). 
2. There are three layers for the State as a federal unit: district, block/taluka/village, and the 
balance between these layers is difficult to determine (Mathew 2003: 281).  
3. “Article 355 empowers the central government to intervene in the affairs of states under 
three circumstances: external aggression, internal disturbance, and when a state 
government cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution” 
(Rajashekara 1997: 249).  
4. There is a basic division of powers, “with a ‘concurrent list’ enumerating shared powers 
such as civil and criminal law, and planning; a ‘state list’ enumerating state powers such 
as education, agriculture and welfare; and a ‘union list’ enumerating the centre’s powers” 
(Neisah 2000: 57). 
5. The State is subject to two conditions: “first, that the state legislation should have received 
presidential assent, and second, that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from 
enacting a law with respect to the same matter, including a law adding to, amending, 
varying, or repealing the state law” (Rajashekara 1997:248).  
6. Article 244 stipulates that there are two types of decentralized units within certain States. 
The Fifth Schedule concerns Tribal areas in Indian States, and the Sixth Schedule 
concerns the Tribal areas in Northeast India, and it covers Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram 
and Tripura (Mathew 2003: 278).  
7. “The states have to spend huge amounts of money on the welfare of backward castes, rural 
development, health, education, women, child development, agriculture, irrigation, road 
construction, and so on, and they do not have adequate financial resources to carry out 
development programs effectively” (Rajashekara 1997: 251).  
8. Parliament may by law increase or diminish the area on any State, alter the boundaries or 
name of any State, form a new State by separation of territory from any State, or by 
uniting two or more State, or parts of States, or by uniting any territory to any part of any 
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State (Bhattacharyya 2005: 9). This means that the States are destructible and its identity 
can be altered or even obliterated (Rajashekara 1997: 246).      
Based on these stipulations, the States do have some power, but the political centre controls 
the finance and laws. Because the States are not allowed to borrow money from outside the 
country, and without the consent of the Union government they cannot borrow public funds 
even within India, they are dependent on Central funds. This has created a government 
monopoly in employment, and encouraged patronage and corruption (Rajashekara 1997: 251; 
Sachdeva 2000).  The District Council in the region “has power to levy and collect taxes on 
profession, trade, callings and employment, animals, vehicles and boats , even within the 
jurisdiction of the Regional Council” (Prasad 2004). New Delhi is therefore central in shaping 
the development of the region, since the planning, design, and financing of projects are done 
there. This means that the local visions of the future are not considered, and the local 
politicians are given incentives to encourage fiscal irresponsibility. Since 2001 a cabinet-level 
Department of North East Development has been included in the central government, even 
though no other region has this type of presence. Through this the autonomy of the States is 
compromised (Baruah 2003: 920, 924; Baruah 2007: 36). The result is: 
The existence of states and the very survival of their elected governments is dependent upon 
the will of the Union government. The single Constitution for the whole country (except 
Jammu and Kashmir), the unilateral power of Parliament to amend it, the provision for 
supersession of state governments and centrally appointed state governors, the discretionary 
powers of governors to reserve state bills for consideration of the President and his veto power 
over such bills, the affluence of the Union government, the vertical planning system, and the 
centralized party system have been mainly responsible for the aberration, distortion, and 
perversion of Indian federalism (Rajashekara 1997: 252).  
When all the power is in the hands of the government, the States have no choice but to follow 
the stipulations that government has for them, they are not able to stop the rebel groups and 
the federal environment thereby leads to these recurring conflicts, supporting Hypothesis 2.  
5.2.2 Asymmetry and the Sixth Schedule  
In order for federalism to work as a conflict regulation mechanism among ethnic groups, there 
can be no great disparity between the units, be this either in size or in the distribution of 
resources (Adeney 2000: 22). If there is great disparity, this is called asymmetric federations. 
It needs to be emphasized that in a formal constitutional sense, India is not an asymmetric 
federation, but in practice this might be different (Tillin 2006: 62). It is also more reasonable 
to assume that asymmetric federalism will be legitimate in India, as it will allow the “diverse 
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communities to negotiate the federal compact to best suit their particular interests and 
aspirations” (Nesiah 2000: 63). 
One aspect of the asymmetric federalism which exists in India is illustrated through the Sixth 
Schedule, and its stipulations on the Northeast. Under this Schedule, “the authority for land 
administration is vested in the autonomous District Councils, which run the administration in 
accordance with the old customs and usages of the region” (Singh 1987: 149). The elected 
councils in the States have the powers to administer justice in limited cases, to regulate the 
shifting cultivation, to determine the occupation or use of land, as well as to regulate 
customary law. These elected councils are elected for the autonomous districts and 
autonomous regions within those districts (Baruah 2003: 919). More closely they have these 
responsibilities and powers:  
The District Councils have powers to make laws for allotment, occupation, use of land, other 
than reserved forests for purposes of agriculture, grazing and other residential and non-
residental purposes; management of unreserved forests, use of water courses and canals for 
agriculture purpose, regulation of shifting cultivation, establishment of village councils and 
town committees, administration of village policy, public health and sanitation,  appointment 
and succession of chiefs or headmen, inheritance of property, marriage, divorce and social 
customs, money lending and trading by non-tribals within the autonomous districts. The 
Governor has power to alter laws or rules passed by the District Councils, which are in 
violation of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. The Sixth Schedule, thus makes the 
Governor the head of the Autonomous District Council (Prasad 2004).   
To date there are two District Councils in Assam, three in Mizoram and Meghalaya each, six 
in Manipur and one in Tripura, in total fifteen District Councils in Northeast India. Even 
though the Sixth Schedule was practically provided for the Nagas, Nagaland has no District 
Council presently (Prasad 2004). This Sixth Schedule, which creates a distinction between the 
tribal areas in Northeast compared to those in the rest of the country, is noteworthy when it 
comes to asymmetric federalism. “Unequal economic and political opportunities coupled with 
unequal access to resources, aggravate perceptions of being deprived among the 
disadvantaged, who clearly feel discriminated against in a setup that does not depend upon 
institutions but culture” (Upadhyay 2009: 32).  The issue within Northeast India is that the 
States there are not as homogenous as other States in India, and this has led to secessionist 
conflicts (Adeney 2000: 18).      
Because ethnicity emerged as an accepted principle of reorganization in Northeast, and tribal 
identities were emphasized, there were more demands for separate States, or reorganization of 
districts (Bhaumik 1998: 320). For example for the Bodos, which are a larger group than 
Nagas have not yet received their own State. Though it has been proposed a Bodoland 
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Territorial Council in Assam, to be created under the Sixth Schedule, this has not happened to 
date. The problem is that the Bodos will not be a majority in Bodoland, despite the fact that 
the State was proposed in order to protect their identity in the region where they live today 
(Bhattacharyya 2005: 7). This is an example of what Kymlicka (1998) mentions as a problem 
which creates political instability in federations; minority groups with legitimate claims for 
either their own States or their own nation are forced to remain in the larger nation or State 
(Kymlicka 1998: 111). The Bodos in Assam seek recognition and self-determination, and 
when they do not get this the response is secession and fighting in order to accomplish this 
(Norman 2006: 161). The asymmetry of the Indian Union and the feeling the Northeast has of 
being left out makes it easier for rebel groups to control the States, because the States have no 
real power, and this leads to recurring conflicts, and supports Hypothesis 2.      
5.2.3 Integration and state capability of Nagaland and Mizoram 
There has been a demand for greater autonomy for the States, in order to bring the 
government closer to the people. This is proposed to be accomplished through “increased 
financial resources, decentralization of planning, more independence in administrative areas 
for which states are constitutionally responsible” (Hardgrave 1983: 1172), and New Delhi has 
tried to accommodate some of this. It has “offered settlement packages that involve 
devolution of greater political and administrative autonomy, a much greater flow of federal 
funds for economic development (part of it also siphoned off to rebel coffers to keep them 
happy) and an expressed commitment to promote local culture and interests” (Bhaumik 2007: 
5). Nevertheless, despite the rich natural resources which exist in the region, the States here 
remain at the bottom of the process of industrialization (Bhaumik 2009: 236). Even though it 
can be claimed that there is a cosmetic federalism existing in India, particularly concerning 
the Northeast region, not everyone agrees that the Northeast are overlooked. Mizoram’s 
Governor A. R. Kohli said in 2004 that the Northeast is the “most spoiled child in the 
country”, and did not agree that the Northeast was the most neglected region. Kohli 
“attributed the reason for this to the Northeast being pampered by the Centre, which “showers 
funds and other goodies” liberally on it” (The Telegraph 2004). The North East Students’ 
Union, which is a conglomerate of youth organizations in the region, reacted to this statement, 
since: 
For decades now, the Northeast has been crying for attention from successive governments in 
Delhi and has been accusing the Centre of exploiting the region’s rich resources without 
giving anything in return. This perceived neglect of the region has been the rallying point for 
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mass organisations to launch countless agitations and has also spawned armed insurgencies 
(The Telegraph 2004).   
This has led to the questioning of state capability in Northeast, and this authority has failed to 
perform the basic functions of a nation, such as the monopolization of legitimate power, 
protection of citizens, and the influence on social and economic behavior. The effective role 
of the state has been absent, and this is critical in order to understand the instability in the 
region. The task of providing for its citizens is hindered by rival social forces (Hassan 2008: 
58-59). The Indian government is so far from the region, and because of its apathy and 
neglect, the people feel alienated and distant. The legacy of colonial times have increased this 
feeling, since the reliance of chiefs and tribal strongmen instead of police have continued, and 
“the presence of the formal coercive authority of the state – the police and investigative 
agencies – is only symbolic” (Hassan 2006b: 9). Because of India’s diversity, there are 
generally demands for a decentralization of power and resources, to levels below the state as 
well as the highest level (Bhattacharyya 2005: 22). And the problem is that when people lose 
faith in the state institutions, “they are compelled to resort to violence outside the sphere of 
formal politics, or in an extra-institutional space” (Chandhoke 2006: 7). As I will come back 
to later, these key functions that the state is responsible for are not taken care of, leading the 
people to turn to the militant organizations, which do protect the citizens. Many of the locals 
in Northeast think that the insurgency groups not always want political autonomy, but that 
they come about because of “the behest of security and intelligence agencies combating 
insurgency” (Baruah 2002: 4178; Baruah 2007: 9). Why there has been a loss of security is 
explained by Bhaumik (2009) like this:  
The legislative instability in northeast India has been caused by a combination of the following 
factors: (a) a political culture based on parochial loyalties, personalities and ethnic affiliations 
and not on ideology or long-term vision; (b) the small size of the assemblies, mostly 
comprising 40 or 60 members (only Assam has an 126-member assembly), which makes it 
possible to topple a ruling party or coalition by engineering the defection of a small group of 
legislators; (c) the designs of parties or coalitions in power at the Centre, as a result of which 
the office of the governor and the services of the central intelligence services are frequently 
misused to put in power a government of the Delhi’s choice or bring down if it does not like; 
(d) the emergence of powerful vested interests (business-contractor lobbies, insurgent-NGO 
and military-bureaucrat combines) who seek to bring down a government that refuses to 
oblige; (e) endemic corruption, as a result of which legislators change loyalties when promised 
ministerial berths or chairmanship of state-owned corporations and (f) growing political 
competition. When these factors combine in a state, systemic instability is sure to follow 
(Bhaumik 2009: 222).   
New Delhi initially tried to integrate the region, “[b]ut when such assimilationist efforts 
provoked discontent and armed revolt, Delhi responded with a combination of force, 
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monetary inducements, split and political reconciliation”, leading to further alienation 
(Bhaumik 2007: 1; Routray 2011: 314). This alienation has in turn led to secessionist 
conflicts, which the government has not been able to stop. Baruah (2001) claims there are 
three reasons for why these insurgencies have turned into recurring conflicts:   
(a) the goal of counter-insurgency is limited to creating conditions under which particular 
insurgent groups or factions surrender weapons, come to the negotiation table on the 
government’s terms and make compromises in exchange for personal gain; (b) counter-
insurgency operations do not dramatically change the conditions on the ground that breed and 
sustain the insurgent political culture and lifestyle; and (c) the political initiative that 
accompany and supplement counter-insurgency operations try to utilise former militants in the 
war against insurgents, thus creating a climate of mistrust and a cycle of violence and counter-
violence between anti-government and pro-government insurgents” (Baruah 2001). 
As an example of the strength of the States in Northeast and how this matters, I have looked 
into Nagaland and Mizoram, where the latter has managed to end the insurgencies, and the 
former has had recurring conflicts the last 49 years. In the case of Nagaland, the NSCN-IM 
and the NSCN-K have been able to break the ceasefire rules many times, without a response 
from the Indian Government (Lacina 2009: 1015). This could be because they have led 
insurgencies in so many years, making the NSCN-IM one “of the most sophisticated militant 
outfits in the region in terms of their access to weapons and funding, level of training, and 
network of safe areas” (Lacina 2009: 1014). But for the citizens in Nagaland it has gone so 
far, that, in order to protect the civilians, “the local villagers have undertaken counter-
insurgency measures by forming their own small groups of armed young men for security 
against insurgents raids especially at night”. This is a role that should be reserved to the 
police, but the nation’s security forces have remained aloof or inconsequential, and the role 
have passed to these “small village defense units, which are without any steady payroll and 
ill-equipped to fight highly armed insurgents” (Bhaumik 2007: 11; Goswani 2008; Goswani 
2009a: 78). The NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K have their own security dictates, and exercise 
control which is normally reserved for the Indian Government (Baruah 2002: 4178; Lacina 
2009: 1015).   
If many theorist criticize what the GoI has done in Nagaland, they applaud what have been 
done in Mizoram, where “the process of state-making was such that it consolidated the public 
legitimacy and authority of reigning institutions among all sections of society, resulting in the 
strengthened capability of government agencies to provide services, manage group 
contestations and avoid breakdown” (Hassan 2008: 53). Mizoram has therefore been able to 
provide justice and maintain order. Goswani (2009a) attributes this fact to the inclusive 
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democratic institutional mechanisms, where there have been institutional successes which 
have “gradually strengthened peoples’ loyalty to state agencies” (Goswani 2009a: 72). The 
government had a strategy where they appealed directly to the hearts and minds of the people, 
and they wanted to develop the society. Chandhoke (2006) thinks that “[t]he Mizo case 
clearly shows that when the Central Government sincerely sets out to tackle the structural 
causes of the insurgency, conditions become favourable for cessation of violence” 
(Chandhoke 2006: 28-29). Hassan (2008) explains the process in Mizoram like this:    
Greater participation of the Lushais in the power structure post-1986, the cementing of the pan-
Mizo construct and its being made the core of the Mizo state had the effect of making state 
power better grounded in a broader in a broader Mizo society, envisaged this time as having the 
elements of both Lushais and non-Lushais. This grounding may have provided state leaders in 
Mizoram with cohesive power that in conjunction with an integrated social structure helped 
create the internal demand for restoration of peace and contributes to the state’s continuing 
stability. Today, the state and civil society’s persistent efforts to maintain this pan-Mizo edifice, 
sometimes at the cost of excluding non-Mizos, may be seen as the anxiety of the ruling elite 
there to sustain that social base of power and maintain order (Hassan 2008: 73).     
As mentioned earlier by Kymlicka (2007), it is important that the groups in the nation are 
represented at the central level, that they control their own public institutions, that they are 
given their own rights over territory, as well as their language being made official in the 
territory (Kymlicka 2007: 36-37).  The case of official languages is a problem for example in 
Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, where the language or dialect spoken by an 
overwhelming number of people is not recognized, and the “state level official languages are 
not spoken by the majority of the people in the states” (Bhattacharyya 2005: 8). When groups 
and States are not represented properly in the political environment, there are greater chances 
for insurgency and recurring conflicts, giving support to Hypothesis 2.  
5.2.4 Cosmetic federalism  
The Northeast has been treated different than other States, leading to what Sanjib Baruah 
(2003; 2005) calls ‘cosmetic federalism’:  
It is unlikely that the protective discrimination regime of Northeast India will be removed any 
time soon, but the strains on the regime as a result of demographic change are quite apparent. 
In order to contain the potential political fall-out, the government of India, through 
constitutional amendments, has frozen the balance of seats reserved for STs in the state 
assemblies of the region. This should not obscure the political significance of the demographic 
facts on the ground: whether intended or not, the trend towards the minoritization of the 
indigenous populations, despite the symbolically significant phenomena of state legislatures 
and state governments made up of their representatives, appears to be one of the most 
predictable effects of developmentalism and cosmetic federalism in Northeast India (Baruah 
2003: 933).  
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This cosmetic federal order came into being after Nagaland was formed, because it “became 
de-linked from the questions of either fiscal viability or of compatibility with the 
constitutional architecture of the pan-Indian polity” (Baruah 2003: 919). After the border war 
with China the Indian government felt the need to nationalize this frontier space, by extending 
the institutions of the state all the way into the international border zones. This has changed 
the demography of the region, making the political trends much more complex (Baruah 2003: 
921-922). The central government of India “has powers over important areas and the national 
security establishment in New Delhi even has the capacity to monitor and control political 
developments” (Baruah 2005: 38). According to him, it was clear already from the beginning 
that “the promise of autonomy embedded in India’s federal constitutional design, and the 
realities of the cosmetic federal regional order of Northeast India” would create tensions, 
because of the forced demographic change. The Constitutions Sixth Schedule reinforced and 
modified the tribal autonomy, while the nation-building process marginalized the tribal 
peoples in their own habitats (Baruah 2003: 925, 927):  
The governmental infrastructure of the region has been fundamentally redesigned to create a 
number of mini states, all endowed with the formal institutional apparatus of Indian state 
government. However, the new regional order is federal only in a cosmetic sense: the central 
government has powers over important areas and the national security establishment in New 
Delhi has the capacity to monitor and control political developments. This new arrangement 
has, in effect, enabled the penetration of the Indian state and has put some of the remote parts 
of this frontier region on a developmentalist track (Baruah 2003: 921).   
It is a middle ground that would “enable penetration of pan-Indian institutions into the region 
and, at the same time, allay the fears of the people of this sparsely populated area about being 
swamped by immigrants from the rest of the country” (Baruah 2003: 927), only this strategy 
has not worked. The area is much more closely managed area than the rest of India, largely 
because of their small size. They have a relatively low population, but they are still organized 
into both districts and sub-divisions (Baruah 2002: 4178). These tribal regions have therefore 
remained under a largely military rule from the government, due to “both the continuing 
danger of unrest and the strategically vulnerable nature of the region” (Hardgrave 1983: 
1174). The only beneficiaries of developmentalism and cosmetic federalism are the emerging 
modern elites, who are, through the development as an instrument in the project of 
nationalizing space, provided with “a mental map to navigate the increasingly problematic 
social reality around them” (Baruah 2005: 57). The fact that the Northeastern States are 
treated differently than other Indian States is what leads to cosmetic federalism and 
Northeastern inhabitants being unhappy with their government: 
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Military formations much larger than brigades – corps headed by lieutenant generals and 
divisions headed by major generals – are now stationed in Northeast India. In Vairengte, a 
Mizoram village, there is even a Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School for officers to 
fight the militias. And the Indian Army is only one of the security forces deployed in the 
region. Other paramilitary units controlled by the central government, such as the Central 
Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), the Assam Rifles, various 
intelligence bureaus and the police force of each state, are also involved in counter-insurgency 
operations. And, as I would argue in this chapter, overseeing these operations is a parallel 
political structure that works outside the rules and norms that govern India’s democratic 
political institutions (Baruah 2005: 61). 
Institution-building has to be the priority in Northeast India, because when the money spent to 
accelerate development goes right to the coffers of the rebel groups, the State does not receive 
the attention needed, leading to the policy-agenda overlooking the issue of the quality of 
institutions (Baruah 2007: 18-19). Effective states can only exist if the “state leaders have 
been successful in making themselves the sole provider of rules and sustenance in society, in 
opposition to their non-state rivals, who typically base their legitimacy on local resources, 
symbols and organisations” (Hassan 2008: 59). Because the Northeastern States feel that they 
are only being placated by the Indian government, and that even though they are given 
segmental autonomy, they still do not have legitimate control, the rebel groups will continue 
to fight for secession. They continue with their attacks on the government, leading to 
recurring conflicts, because they feel that the federal system undermines them, and the 
relationship between the Northeastern States and the government is not based on mutual 
respect and reciprocity, thereby justifying their claims for secession (Adeney 2002: 15; 
Burgess 2006: 280-281). This evidence leads us to believe that Hypothesis 2 is supported and 
that the cosmetic federalism leads to recurring conflicts.   
5.2.5 “State power” of the rebels 
Cosmetic federalism is not the only problem, it operates together with “ambiguous financial 
incentives, and social and political expectations, that are largely absent from discussions of 
the law’s implementation” (Farrelly 2009: 289). The common people pay taxes to the rebel 
groups, and the total annual budget of these rebel groups is comparable to certain sectors of 
government spending. The groups also “extort huge ransoms from business groups and 
government organizations” (Bhaumik 1998: 323). This is the major source of income for 
these militant groups, usually called extortion, but Baruah (2002) claims it can be seen as 
“taxation by non-state actors” (Baruah 2002: 4180; 2007: 12). This illegal taxation is an issue 
in the whole of the Northeast, and “it is not merely insurgent organizations, but mainstream 
political parties, student organizations, corrupt officials, all resort to coercive and illegal 
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modes of ‘tax collection’ from businesses – big or small” (Baruah 2005: 73).  The insurgents 
are able to gather better information about the inhabitants, based on popular perceptions and 
credible rumor rather than what is officially declared as income, and they can therefore 
impose higher taxes because they can assess income more realistically (Baruah 2005: 73).  
The extremist groups can provide the security the state cannot for the ethnic groups, which is 
why the funds granted to development in the region goes into the hands of militant groups 
(Baruah 2002: 4180). It is also difficult to separate the political actors who are rebels and the 
ones who are mainstream, because “[a]rmed rebels at times could be on the same side as 
significant sectors of civil society and even mainstream local politicians – all united against 
pan-Indian authorities” (Baruah 2007: 12). The rebels even spend their money in a way that 
the Indian government should note:  
Much of the funds raised are spent on routine expenses such as cadre salaries, arms purchases 
and operational expenses, but huge funds are also invested in companies and stocks so that the 
rebel groups do not have to worry about funds in future to keep the organization going 
(Bhaumik 2009: 256).   
The fact that Indian security forces are known for human rights violations such as torture, 
illegal detention, rape, disappearances, and destruction of villages, property, foodgrains and 
lifestock, does not create trust among the people. But since preying on the people is also done 
by the militant groups, the population is caught between armed groups (Hazarika 2004: 773). 
The government has implemented varying degrees of autonomy for particular tribal groups, 
but this has certainly been a double edged sword politically. As particular groups have been 
singled out for more autonomy, other groups have increased their demands in response. Any 
suggestion of the government favoring certain groups has commonly resulted in 
intercommunal violence. The government’s treatment of the various ethnic groups appears to 
be much less a deliberate policy of ‘divide and conquer’ than it does as being a short-term 
reaction to political exigencies (Cline 2006: 143).  
The violent groups in the region enjoy impunity for different crimes and claim a share of the 
development money that comes from New Delhi, and in exchange for this they use coercion 
to support a certain politician or organization, “for example, by tampering with elections, 
enforcing general strikes, or threatening political rivals” (Lacina 2007: 174).   
Finally, armed groups serve as the thugs of the inter-communal struggles that beset the region. 
Some of this violence is a product of direct competition between separatist organizations for 
access to important smuggling routes or resources. But it is also the case that in an 
environment where legal institutions are inefficacious, insurgent groups can gain power and 
money by providing security and vigilante justice in the face of inter-communal brutalities and 
by deploying violence against other groups in order to initiate voters, change migration 
patterns, drive peasants from their land, practice indiscriminate retribution for crimes, and 
maintain existing social hierarchies. Thus, multiplication of violent groups is a self-reinforcing 
cycle of competitive mobilization” (Lacina 2007: 175).  
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Because the insurgency groups have this much power in their respective States, it makes it 
much easier for them to continue fighting even when the fighting mainly kills civilians and 
rebels (see Table 1 and Appendix A). This contributes to making the conflicts in Northeast 
recurring, because the rebel groups are never completely beaten or a peace is not negotiated 
with all factions of a rebel group, thereby supporting Hypothesis 2. 
5.2.6 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) was introduced by the Indian government 
in 1958, as a response to the violence in the Northeastern States (Ministry of Home Affairs 
2013). Not only does the state lack legitimacy, but unified identities, common civic spaces, or 
a common civic basis of citizenship are not created through mobilization, and this fragmented 
social structure leads to a state system that does not really fit (Hassan 2008: 78). These 
democratic issues are escalated by the controversial AFSPA, which needs to be questioned, 
even though “India has steadfastly resisted any international attempt at monitoring the 
AFSPA regime” (Baruah 2007: 21). Bhaumik (2007) explains the problems like this:      
Extra-judicial killing, ethnic cleansing and large-scale massacres followed by substantial 
internal displacement – India northeast has witnessed it all. The growth of civil society in the 
strife-torn region has been impeded by the lack of democratic space, because special laws, all 
very draconian and very unpopular with local communities, have remained in effect in the 
Northeast to fight the insurgencies. The high level of legislative instability in some of the 
northeastern states have been compounded by the growing linkages between legitimate 
political parties and the underground rebel factions or those who have gained state patronage 
after surrender (Bhaumik 2007: 2).  
In order to deal with the insurgents, one of the key elements for stopping national 
fragmentation  is AFSPA, which provides the legal framework where the security forces have 
sweeping powers to engage in counterinsurgency operations against armed rebellions in the 
region (Baruah 2007: 1-2; Farrelly 2009: 283). The special powers of the armed forces are 
summarized in Appendix C, and AFSPA stipulates that any officer in the Indian Army can go 
to extreme measures in order to stop the rebels (Ministry of Home Affairs 2013). The law has 
not been received positively, because:  
Emotions against the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) – a law that gives 
sweeping powers to security forces engaging in counterinsurgency operations – reached 
explosive new heights after the abduction, suspected rape, and killing of Thanjam Manorama 
in July 2004. The Indian Army claimed that Ms. Manorama was a member of the banned 
People’s Liberation Army, and it challenged the Manipur State government’s authority to hold 
an inquiry, citing the controversial act. In July 2004 about a dozen Manipuri women protested 
the Manorama incident with an act of unusual courage and eloquence. Standing naked in front 
of the Indian army’s base in Manipur’s capital city Imphal, they held a banner that read 
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“Indian Army Rape Us”. There is little more than Manipuris can do to draw the nation’s 
attention to the vulnerability that civilians, especially women, feel during counterinsurgency 
operations (Baruah 2007: 1).  
In Manipur there has been other protests as well; “another Meitei Irom Sharmila has 
continued an indefinite fast (broke only by force-feeding) for six years” as a way to get the 
Indian government to listen, saying that “she will only eat when the controversial act will be 
revoked (Bhaumik 2007: 18; 2009: 113). This is perhaps “the world’s longest continuous 
protest of this kind, the hunger strike led to her arrest and force-feeding at a hospital”.  Local 
human rights activists outwitted security and intelligence officials and whisked her away to 
New Delhi in October 2006. She hoped to arouse the nation’s conscience by continuing the 
hunger strike, “but she was arrested and removed to a hospital, where she continued to be fed 
forcibly” (Baruah 2007: 2). It is claimed that this law has led to illiberal democracy in 
Northeast India, because “beyond the intimidating presence of armed forces in the region, it 
also empowers officers to act without the normal restraints of warrants and permissions 
(Baruah 2007: 54; Rajagopalan 2008: 33).  
The AFSPA is criticized by national and international human rights organizations due to its 
violation of human rights laws and norms. It applies to Nagaland, Manipur and Assam, as 
well as in Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh and in specified areas of 
Tripura, after having been amended to account for changes in names and States after its 
implementation in 1958 (Baruah 2007: viii-2; Bhaumik 2007: 18; Farrelly 2009: 289). 
However, all rebel groups in the region are targeted:  
In a borderland of many other secrets, the number and diversity of militant outfits in Northeast 
India is striking. All are targeted by the AFSPA. Some of these rebel movements are no longer 
the potent forces of the past and have made tentative ceasefire arrangements. Some have fully 
surrendered. Some continue to build economic power through extortion. Others still, as far as 
can be discerned, have continued to recruit and expand their military operations. In Manipur 
and Assam, in particular, some are still engaged in fighting not only with the government but 
also with other armed groups. The area that is nowadays most often identified with this 
ongoing sub-national warfare in Manipur, which hugs a long border with western Burma. It 
was about 15 active armed groups and a further 25 inactive groups; although there is, like 
much else, still some confusion about the exact number (Farrelly 2009: 287).          
The failure to resolve the federal issue in Northeast has led to “violent agitations and 
insurrections, which in turn led to the emergence of the security state” (Bhaumik 2009: 207).  
This chapter has looked at the federal nature of the Northeastern States, in order to see 
whether it influences the recurring conflicts. As becomes clear from the empirical evidence, 
the asymmetric relationship between the different Indian States, and through this the issue of 
69 
 
cosmetic federalism, does influence the recurrence of conflicts. The way the ethnic minority 
groups in Northeast are treated gives legitimacy to their cause of secessionism, and this in 
turn leads to both support from the people and continued recruitment to the insurgency 
groups. This in turn leads both to recurring conflict and to continued recruitment to the 
insurgency group, which leads to recurring conflicts. This is true for the four States where 
there are recurring conflicts today; Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, but it cannot 
explain why there have not been recurring insurgencies in Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and 
Meghalaya. Because all the States in Northeast India are treated equally by the Indian 
government, neither of them is given any real power, and Hypothesis 2 is therefore partly 
supported due to the fact that four out of seven States have recurring conflicts. There have 
been conflicts in the three other States, but they have not been recurring due to the federal 
environment. The conflicts in Arunachal Pradesh are mostly due to “’overflow’ of violence 
from Nagaland”, and cannot be attributed to the federal environment (Sahni 2002). The 
conflict in Mizoram ended because Rajiv Gandhi managed to arrange a peace agreement with 
MNF in 1986, and the Mizos then received what they wanted; statehood (Bhaumik 2007: 14). 
As can be seen in Appendix A, there are still fatalities in Meghalaya due to insurgencies. 
Egreteau (2006) claims that there is increasing instability in Meghalaya, and that the State 
may be entering a period of destabilization due to the State being controlled by criminal 
outfits (Egreteau 2006: 88). The evidence from these three States therefore show that 
Hypothesis 2 is only partly supported, and in the next section on horizontal inequalities I will 
see if Hypothesis 3 might explain the upsurge in conflicts in the three latter States.        
5.3 Group level – Horizontal Inequalities 
Horizontal inequalities are differences between groups based on the dimensions political, 
economic, cultural and social differences, which are the differences Stewart (2008) base her 
analyses on. In this section the horizontal inequalities in Northeast India are looked at, thereby 
testing Hypothesis 3: Horizontal inequalities in Northeast India complicate the ethnic 
environment and lead to recurring conflicts between the ethnic groups due to different 
treatment. In India all of these differences are apparent, but in Northeast the differences are 
first and foremost based on ethnicity and cultural differences. It is therefore the issue of 
identity, when it comes to “us” as an ethnic group, compared to “the other” ethnic group. The 
whole region is diverse, linguistically, religiously and ethnically, but this in itself may not 
necessarily lead to conflict. As emphasized by Langer and Brown (2008), it is first when some 
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of the groups perceive that they are differently treated from other groups that conflicts may 
arise (Langer & Brown 2008: 42), which is what has happened in Northeast India. 
According to Sachdeva (2000) the Northeast is in fact quite egalitarian compared to the rest of 
India; the type of poverty which exists in other parts of India is not present there, making the 
region more homogeneous (Sachdeva 2000). Nevertheless, there is an enormous diversity 
which is reflected in the fact that there are over 500 different ethnic groups, and 110 of these 
are major groups, and the only thing they have in common is “a partially mongoloid heritage” 
(a list of the ethnic groups in the respective States can be found in Appendix D) (Mukherjee 
2007: xiii). Based on the fact that it is only their heritage which is similar, it is easy to see 
why there might be a conflict due to identity issues such as religion, ethnicity, language and 
political status. This heritage is also a fact which separates the Northeast from the rest of 
India, since they do not look like Indians. The ethnic groups in Northeast India stems from 
China (Tibet) and the Indochinese peninsula, and this makes the appearance of Northeast 
Indians closer to Indochinese than to the ones from the Indian continent (Egreteau 2006: 9; 
Mukherjee 2007: 5, 10). This is illustrated through the Inner Line, which originally formed 
the security parameter of the colonial India, but which is still in force today in Arunachal 
Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram. The line is “designed partly to keep “primitives” bound to 
their “natural” space in the hills, the Inner line defined the limits of the “civilizational” space 
beyond which the colonial state would not provide security of property” (Baruah 2007: 26). 
The Northeast is therefore differently recognized by the Indian state than the other parts of 
India, and this creates a reason for insurgency for the groups in that region. There are 
therefore not only horizontal inequalities between the ethnic groups in Northeast India, but 
there is also an “us vs. them” attitude between the people in Northeast and the rest of the 
Indian Union. Through this Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
5.3.1 Cultural Horizontal Inequalities 
Groups in this situation are tribes, and there are more than two hundred tribes in Northeast 
India, a feature B.P. Singh (1987) means that makes this region the most diverse and one with 
more variety than any other place in the world (Singh 1987: 28; Bhaumik 2000: 143). The 
definition of a tribe is: 
A tribe is usually composed of a number of clans, kinship groups and extended families. All 
its members have a sense of belonging to a community which once had common ancestors. 
This unit had found its cementing force in the tribal animistic faiths. The tribal dialects, which 
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in several instances, such as with the Bodos and the Khasis, have developed into sophisticated 
modern language, have provided cohesion to the tribal way of life (Singh 1987: 147).    
The largest ones are the Assamese, the Bengalis (both Hindus and Muslims) and the 
Manipuris (or Meiteis). Tribal populations make up about one-fourth of the total population in 
Northeast, but in the States Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, tribals 
are in majority (Weiner 1989: 53; Bhaumik 2000: 143; Sachdeva 2000). The tribals speak 
languages of Tibeto-Burmese origin, and there are almost as many languages as there are 
tribes (Bhaumik 2000: 143). According to Baruah (2007) it is not uncommon for someone to 
speak three languages, because the different dialects are so linguistically different that even 
among the same major tribes they may not always understand each other (Baruah 2007: 22). 
The Nagas for example, have a total lack of a common language. The languages are so 
different that “[e]ven today people of different Naga tribes and even clans can speak to each 
other only through Nagamese (Assamese tinged by a smattering of words of different dialects) 
or English (Mukherjee 2007: 31). Language is an important part of a person’s cultural 
identity, and the fact that only some of the languages spoken in Northeast India are classified 
as an official language, means that the minority-language speakers feel excluded from the 
Indian society, feel that they are dominated by the majority-language speakers, and that they 
are not recognized by the Indian government. This is what may lead to conflicts (Langer & 
Brown 2008: 47). Only two languages in the Northeast are recognized as official, Assamese, 
spoken by 48,81 percent of the people in Assam, and Manipuri, spoken by 55,19 percent of 
the population in Manipur (Bhattacharyya 2005: 6; Maps of India 2013a). This different 
treatment of language in Northeast leads to horizontal inequalities because they groups are 
differently recognized by the Indian government and this makes for greater chances of 
recurring conflicts (Langer & Brown 2008: 42), giving support to Hypothesis 3.   
5.3.2 Political Horizontal Inequalities 
Rajagopalan (2008) talks about recognition of ethnic groups, and mentions three ways 
through which they can be recognized in the Indian Union: 
The first is cultural recognition by inclusion of their language in the Eight Schedule of the 
Indian Constitution, which lists India’s national language. This carries symbolic rather than 
material value. Second, recognition as a Scheduled Caste or Tribe is an acknowledgement of 
previous oppression and present disadvantage and carries with it access to special quotas for 
education and employment. The third type is recognition through the creation of a territorial 
unit, usually named for the group (Rajagopalan 2008: 39-40).   
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As already mentioned, there are only two groups which have an official language, the 
Assamese and the Manipuris. Recognition through the definition of a Schedules Tribe or 
Caste is through the Constitution of India and only some of the castes in the region have this 
recognition. The creation of territorial units named after the groups have also been done for 
the larger groups; both Nagaland and Mizoram were forged from Assam after Independence 
due to the separatist insurgencies, and Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh were formed 
because it ensured that China could not make claim on these territories (Chadda 2002: 51). 
The States were carved out because of the “anticipation that adequate political representation 
would quell the upheaval” (Upadhyay 2009: 89). This has turned out to have catastrophic 
consequences, because, as Deiwiks et al. (2012) claim “[d]espite the hope that regional 
institutions may appease ethnic group in their demands for self-determination, it seems that 
these institutions can fuel secessionism and hence increase the probability of secessionist 
conflict” (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 301). This difference in political recognition and participation 
is an example of what Stewart (2008) calls political horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2008: 13). 
This can lead to conflicts because the groups will want equal treatment, and the conflicts will 
continue to occur until the Indian government treats them equally. As long as the Bodos in 
Assam, with their unique identity and large population not receive the same treatment as the 
Nagas when they lived in Assam (meaning, being granted their own State), the issue of 
different identity will continue to lead to conflict in Assam.    
It is important to be aware of the fact that ethnicity has not always been such a sensitive issue 
in the Northeast. Singh (1987) claims that: 
The political impact of the recognition of each tribe for the conferment of certain 
administrative and electoral privileges that was set in motion in 1935 has been strengthened 
with reservations of jobs for Scheduled Castes and Tribes under the Constitution of India. The 
economic aspirations and, above all, politicization of ethnic identity in electoral processes, and 
demands for development programmes among the areas of a particular tribe, have all 
continued to further politicize ethnic bonds. There is a far greater awareness of ethnic labels 
after Independence than at any earlier time (Singh 1987: 33).    
Because of the Inner Line the tribals in Northeast rarely had anything to do with the rest of 
India, but after independence and democratization this all changed. This internal border was 
between the ‘settled area’ and the people who lived beyond it. The international border was 
then known as the ‘outer line’ (Maaker & Joshi 2007: 381-382). This Inner Line did not only 
prohibit outsiders to enter what are now the States of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and 
Mizoram, it only prohibited Indian citizens to enter these areas (Baruah 2003: 919). Because 
of this, this Line compromises “the constitutional right to free movement in India, and this is 
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also coupled with the issue of restrictions on property ownership by non-tribals (Baruah 2003: 
932). The fact that the people in the Northeast are ethnically distinctive and because they 
share a common history, culture, values and language, the identities have been easy to form, 
and this is a important and dangerous instrument for mobilization (Upadhyay 2009: 34). The 
collective action problem is therefore easily solved, and the importance of this is explained 
both by Murshed and Gates (2005) and Stewart (2008). This group consciousness may lead 
members of the group to help each other, or to a sense of pride, or to a more strict observance 
of cultural and religious practices, thereby not leading directly to inter-group conflict. But 
“[c]onflicts arise when a group asserts its identity by attacking the identity of other groups 
and, above all, when a claim for group rights is perceived by other as threatening” (Weiner 
1997: 492). When these claims are either supported, or when one group attacks another, the 
horizontal inequalities deepen and may lead to recurring conflicts, thereby supporting 
Hypothesis 3.  
5.3.3 Inter-group relationships and support from the people 
Inter-group conflicts are the battles which have been waged after the ethnic groups have 
received their own States, but are still fighting among themselves. I will compare Nagaland 
and Mizoram here, sue to their similarities as Christian States with similar history. The Naga 
uprising for example did not end even though the Nagas received their own State in 1963 
(Kotwal 2000: 758). The uprising was weakened when the main political party, Naga 
Nationalist Council (NNC), split along those who wanted their own State within India and 
those who wanted to continue the fight for their own nation, creating the National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1978 (Kotwal 2000: 758). Repeated splits along tribal lines 
have now lead to several factions of the NSCN fighting each other, among them NSCN-IM, 
NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K), and NSCN-Khole-Kitovi and NSCN-U. The clashes between 
the factions of NSCN have actually claimed more lives than the initial insurgency (Bhaumik 
2004: 223; Upadhyay 2009: 103; Sahni 2012). The different Naga factions have been driven 
to resort to gunfire in order to get the recognition they want from the Indian government, they 
only saw violence as an option to achieve this (Gibney 2008: 25). The problem for the Indian 
Government is that what the factions of NSCN want is a composite homeland for the Nagas, 
which would mean stretches of territory from not only other States in India such as Assam, 
Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, but also parts of Myanmar, where Nagas live as well. 
Because of this, the Indian government is not able to placate or negotiate with the rebels, or 
they only achieve to ceasefire with one of the factions, not all, and this leads to recurring 
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conflicts. It is therefore not only conflicts based on the horizontal inequality between the Naga 
identity and the Assamese identity, it is also horizontal inequalities between the different 
Naga identities against each other. The Naga conflict is an example where the same 
insurgency group is not the same all the time, but nevertheless the conflict is recurring in 
Nagaland, because it is always Nagas fighting for secession. The Nagas in Myanmar provide 
shelter for the Naga insurgents, making it difficult for the Indian Army to negotiate (Bhaumik 
2009: 3; Upadhyay 2009: 102-103). This support might explain more than Hypothesis 1 can 
in the case of Myanmar; because this means that it is not Myanmar supporting the rebel 
group, but it is the ethnic cousins the rebel groups in India have across the border who give 
them shelter and training. The insurgency in Nagaland started uprising in the other States as 
well, because if the Nagas received their own State, why should not the Mizos, the Khasis, the 
Garos, the Bodos and the Karbis as well (Bhaumik 2009: 18). These various tribes which 
entered India in medieval times have made homeland demands “that has often led to conflicts 
and created substantial internal displacement” (Bhaumik 2009: 141). Because of these effects 
of horizontal inequalities, when the groups feel that they are treated differently, there is a 
greater chance of secessionist claims from all groups in a region (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 301).   
In Mizoram, where the initial insurgency has ended, the smaller tribes have also broken out; 
“[t]he Hmars had fought shoulder to shoulder with the Lushais and the other groups loosely 
called the Mizos, but once Mizoram became a state, the Hmars demanded a separate 
autonomous region” (Bhaumik 1998: 320). Today, the “Hmars, Lais, and the Maras have 
joined the Chakmas and the Reangs to challenge the Mizos” (Bhaumik 2009: 35). The Mizos 
have consequently been successful in building up a common Mizo identity, not dividing it 
along tribal lines. And through this the conflict in Mizoram has ended, giving support to 
Hypothesis 3. This is because there do not exists great horizontal inequality in Mizoram, but 
neither are there recurring conflicts there. Identity is therefore something that differentiates 
between the seven States in Northeast and this is then a factor which leads to recurring 
conflicts. Because of the recognition the Indian Government decided to give to some of the 
ethnic groups in the region, the way was paved for other ethnic groups as well. Almost every 
insurgent organization has origins in an ethnic distinctiveness, which means that the conflicts 
have been waged along ethnic lines (Saikia 2009: 157).  
Because the people do not trust the Indian Government to provide for their security, ethnic 
militias are formed in order to provide for their own security. And when one ethnic group 
does this, another might see this as a threat to their security and then again form their ethnic 
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militia (Baruah 2007: 11). There is a limit to how far an ethnic group can go to defend their 
cultural identity before another group feel that their identity is threatened, leading to an 
escalation of violence and arming of ethnic groups (Upadhyay 2009:35). Therefore:  
The creation of the new states and autonomous councils in the North East have indeed opened 
a Pandora’s Box. The Bodos, the Karbis, the Dimasas, the Hmars and even the Garos, who 
have produced more chief ministers in Meghalaya than the Khasis, have militant groups 
fighting for new states, autonomous regions and even independent homelands (Bhaumik 2009: 
23).  
The Nagas number about half the Bodos, who feel that they should either, be given their own 
state within India, or outside it. The Kukis in Manipur are ethnic cousins of the Mizos, the 
latter have a state to themselves, while the former do not. The Nagas and the Kukis have been 
pitted against each other due to the Kukis’ demand for a separate homeland, and this has led 
to the emergence of a separate Zomi identity. The Meiteis in Manipur refuse to recognize the 
Bishnupriyas as Manipuris, while their own identity “has been reinforced by the rich 
Manipuri language and culture” (Bhaumik 2009: 35). Many smaller ethnic groups feel that 
generic larger identities have been imposed on them, and they want “separate territorial 
identities in the form of autonomous councils or states” (Bhaumik 2000: 145). This is exactly 
what Brown (2008) talks about when it comes to the double experience of horizontal 
inequalities; the Northeastern States and the people there feel that they are treated different 
than the rest of the country. Smaller ethnic groups in the region also feel that there is 
differential treatment between them and the dominant groups in the region (Brown 2008: 
253). These facts give support to the idea that ethnic identity is an explanatory factor for the 
recurring conflicts, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
5.3.4 The issue of migration 
The issue of migration is important with respect to Northeast India, because it has led to 
powerful mobilization among the ethnic groups. While the States that border Myanmar have 
been spared this kind of migration, they have tribal demands for a homeland; making it a 
conflict-ridden region everywhere you turn (Bhaumik 2009: 141). Northeast has always been 
a land frontier which have attracted large-scale immigration from the rest of the sub-
continent, and because of this unstoppable demographic transformation restrictions were 
made, such as the Inner line and the Sixth Schedule (Baruah 2003: 930). The demographics 
have changed in Assam and Tripura, and this happened especially after the Partition divided 
the tribal populations from their ancestral lands. Migrants from Bangladesh (and before that 
East Pakistan) have come in huge flows as economic migrants, and a sizeable number have 
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also come from Myanmar and Nepal (Bhaumik 2000: 144). The responses among the original 
population have ranged from “complete hostility to xenophobic intolerance, that more often 
than not manifest as violent insurgencies intrinsically linked to the politics of ethnic 
cleansing” (Upadhyay 2009: 67). Through this infiltration of migrants the demographic 
balance has been upset, and it has also diluted the identity of the people. Bengalis are now a 
majority in Tripura and in Assam Bengali Hindus and Muslims nearly outnumber the 
Assamese (Bhaumik 2000: 144; Upadhyay 2009: 74). Mukherjee (2007) sums up the effects 
of the migration in Northeast India like this: 
The effects of this migration are – Tripura which had a tribal majority in the early 20th century 
is now a tribal minority state with a consequent long drawn insurgent movement by the tribals; 
Sikkim which earlier had a Lepcha and Bhutia majority now has a Nepalese majority; Assam 
today; has at least 30% of its population as Bangladeshi immigrants, with another 8-10% from 
Bengal, Bihar, UP and Rajasthan, which has changed its demographic profile and given birth 
to the Assam (ULFA), Bodo (NDFB and BLT), Karbi and Dimasa insurgencies; Assam now 
also has a minority Islamic fundamentalist movement, reduced per capita income and forest 
wealth;... in Meghalaya  it gave birth to the Khasi (HNLC) movement and the anti non Khasi 
agitations; and in other hill states harsh anti immigration policies (Mukherjee 2007: 12).  
In Meghalaya the Bengalis have remained relatively calm, while in Tripura the Bengalis have 
retaliated to the anti-migration movements (Bhaumik 2000: 149). In order to not disrupt the 
current political balance too much through demographic changes, the government has made a 
constitutional amendment where “the balance between reserved and unreserved seats in the 
assemblies in Arunachal, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland has been frozen” (Baruah 2007: 
50). The vibrant civil society in Northeast India has an impact on the working of the state and 
its institutions, and several movements, for example student unions in Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Nagaland and Tripura, as well as associations in Mizoram have “been at the forefront of the 
movement to expel illegal migrants” (Bhaumik 2009: 225; Upadhyay 2009: 92). Bhaumik 
characterizes that there have been eight displacement instances over the recent years, and 
these have been induced by the conflicts between the ethnic groups. These are: 
(a) the displacement of Hindus and Muslims of Bengali descent from and within Assam;  
(b) the displacement of Adivasis (also called tea Tribes) and Bodos within and from western  
                 Assam;  
(c) the displacement of Bengalis from Meghalaya, particularly Shillong;  
(d) the displacement of Bengalis from and within Tripura; (e) the displacement of the Nagas,  
      Kukis and Paites in Manipur;  
(f) the displacement of the Reangs from Mizoram;  
(g) the displacement of the Chakmes from Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram and  
(h) the displacement of Karbis and Dimasas during the DHD-UPDS feud in October 2005” 
(Bhaumik 2009: 130, emphasis in original). 
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All these diverse groups, both migrants and tribal population, share the same political space, 
exhibiting what Cunningham and Weidman (2010) mentioned as a “zero-sum game, where 
state accommodation of one group disadvantages another” (Cunningham & Weidman 2010: 
20). The GoI therefore struggles with accommodating all the diverse identities in Northeast 
India, and this creates horizontal inequalities among the groups. The state leaders are pulled in 
different directions, because “[e]thnic violence in the region exists alongside inter-ethnic 
contestations over resources and opportunities” (Hassan 2008: 54). Stewart (2008) mentions 
this as a constructivist view on the issue of identity, which Upadhyay (2009) supports, where 
people are mobilized based on the “essential nature of their identities, although this identity is 
increased by the leaders of the movements, who are capable of mobilizing these ethnic 
constituencies (Stewart 2008: 10, emphasis in original; Upadhyay 2009: 34). The people in 
Northeast have a dual identity, where their identity as Indians is surpassed by their ethnic 
identities, of class, tribe or religion (Singh 1987: 59; Farrelly 2009: 288).  
While the radical profiling approach of mainstream India has had an effect on the victims, the 
victims in turn are becoming radical and anti-Indian, not necessarily by taking recourse to the 
gun, but by demanding autonomy, redressal of problems such as unemployment, the 
institution of discriminatory and ‘draconian’ acts, centrist condescension, and corruption. In 
certain parts of North East India, earlier Hinduized populations are beginning to retrace their 
roots to their age-old ancestry. This is becoming evident with certain members of the younger 
generation adopting names that indicate their earlier identities (Saikia 2009: 143).      
Harriss (2002) tells a story about a man from Mizoram, and his experience with the Indian 
security forces, which illustrates how similar the ethnic groups are in the area, and how it is 
difficult for the government to separate the tribals from each other.  
As we drove he talked to me about his family, and as he did so he started to recount first his 
father’s experiences as a police officer, and then his own, witnessing the heavy-handed action 
of Indian army jawans as they sought to control actual or supposed insurgents. It was evident 
from the way in which the young man described these experiences that he had been 
profoundly alienated from India through his perceptions of these actions. Then later in our talk 
he happened to mention that for his research he would need to visit an archive in Rangoon. It 
would be simple he said. He’d take a horse from his village, ride to the border, cross the river 
and then just travel down to Rangoon. Nobody would stop him, he said, because nobody 
would know that he was not Burmese, given the continuities of language and ethnicity 
between Mizoram and other parts of the North East with northern Burma. Then he surprised 
me by saying that, if there were a different and more democratic regime in Burma, then he and 
he thought most people in Mizoram, Manipur and Meghalaya, at least, would rather be part of 
Burma than of India. It is perhaps only because Burma is not quite like Pakistan that the 
nationalities issues of the North Eastern states have not become quite so explosive as those of 
Kashmir. The slogan of some people in the Khasi Hills of Meghalaya is “Khasi by blood, 
Indian by accident” (Harriss 2002: 2).  
The States in Northeast feel that they are not really a part of India, and they are not given any 
real power (discussed in Section 5.2), and this issue does not make it easier to remove the 
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horizontal inequalities which exist in the region. Some of the States are carved out of Assam, 
and they have never been independent from India. However, Manipur for example, does not 
have this experience. Manipur was a princely state, ruled by a Maharaja. On a visit to 
Shillong, his house was surrounded by soldiers and he was severely misinformed since he was 
separated from the Manipuri public opinion, his advisors and his council of ministers. Finding 
himself virtually imprisoned signed an agreement to fully merge his State with India. A 
number of militias in Manipur today view this merger as illegal and unconstitutional, and 
there is bitterness about the merger in Manipuri public life today, especially concerning the 
way it was signed. Due to this there is “a de facto parallel structure of governance directly 
controlled from Delhi that manages counter-insurgency operations”, even though Manipur 
has, as all other States in the Union, an elected chief minister and an elected state legislature 
(Baruah 2005: 9, 60).  
This shared ethnicity has been an issue with regard to the Look East Policy (Section 5.1.6), 
because this policy will make it easier for the communities living on the border to visit their 
ethnic cousins, especially with regard to Myanmar (Das 2010: 350-351). The relationship 
between the different tribes is tense. According to Das (2010) there are many tribal 
organizations including the Naga Student’s Federation (NSF), which “in the not so distant 
past have cautioned ‘their girls’ against marrying the non-Nagas”. There are closer ethnic ties 
with the people across the border then with the one in India (Das 2010: 354).     
The Indian experience suggests that preferential politics facilitate the mobilization of groups to 
demand preferences or their extension, creating political struggles over how the state should 
allocate benefits to ethnic groups, generating s backlash on the part of those ethnic groups 
excluded from benefits, intensifying the militance of the beneficiaries, and reinforcing the 
importance of ascription as the principle of choice in allocating social benefits and facilitating 
mobility. A major consequence of preferential policies, therefore, is that they create a political 
process influencing the ways in which groups organize, the demands they make, the issues 
over which policies are debated, and the coalitions that are formed. From a political 
perspective, it is the impact of preferences on ethnic group cohesion, group status, and 
political mobilization that is significant. Preferential policies are intended, not to destroy the 
system of ethnic hierarchy, but to improve the position of groups in within the hierarchy. The 
purpose of such policies is not only to facilitate the upward movement of some individuals, 
but to move an entire group within the hierarchy. Positional change, not individual mobility, is 
the aim (Weiner 1989: 172).      
Nevertheless, the variance in the levels of separatist contestations cannot be explained by the 
“ethnicity-based grievance discourse”, which is important but it can only explain one aspect 
of the struggles in Northeast (Hassan 2008: 57). Sahni (2002) does not agree with this: 
[E]ven where militant groups direct their rhetoric and their violence against the symbols of the 
state, the underlying motives and ideologies are more correctly interpreted in terms of 
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conflicting tribal identities and histories of internecine warfare based entirely on tribal, sub-
tribal, or tribal-outsider rivalries and corresponding competition over limited resources, 
especially land (Sahni 2002). 
The conflicting tribal identities and the competition over limited resources prove the argument 
that horizontal inequalities contributes to recurring conflicts, supporting Hypothesis 3.  
5.3.5 Recognition and treatment by the Indian government  
The Indian government has not managed to adequately handle the insurgencies and the 
treatment of the ethnic groups has not been fair, and this is difficult to rectify: 
Article 355, for example, provides for reservations of appointments of schedules castes and 
schedules tribes to the administrative services, and other provisions provide for reservations in 
parliament and state assemblies. Thus, the Indian government in its Constitution and in 
subsequent legislative and administrative decisions, confirmed in court rulings, established the 
policy that the government can and should allocate seats in legislative bodies, admit student 
into educational institutions, grant scholarships, provide employment in government services, 
and make available various other entitlements to individuals on the basis of membership in a 
group. Once this principle was established, the political controversies then centered on two 
ancillary questions: what groups should be entitled to preferences? What particular preferences 
should be provided? (Weiner 1989: 162).  
The relationships between the ethnic groups are rooted in age-old suspicion. All groups or 
tribes in the Northeast have developed their own word to denote “the outsider”, be it other 
tribal groups, those who live on the plains compared to those in the hills or the indigenous 
population against the migrants (Singh 1987: 56). These outsiders saw much of the land in 
Northeast as wastelands, while it had alternative uses for the locals, who were shifting and 
settled cultivators as well as hunter-gatherers. Due to “the modern politics of numbers”, the 
tension between the outsiders and the indigenous “became a perennial source of conflict in 
Northeast India” and the question of whose land it was came to the fore (Baruah 2007: 26).  
The common mode of livelihood in the hills is slash and burn agriculture, and this confuses 
most outsiders. “The dispersed and mobile populations could not be captured for corvee 
labour and military service by the labour-starved states of the plains; nor could tax collectors 
monitor either the number of potential subjects or their holdings and income” (Baruah 2005: 
8). The extremist groups therefore already have a support base from the beginning, through a 
well-defined group of people (Upadhyay 2009: 33). Even those groups who were content to 
belong to the larger identities, for example in Assam during the anti-foreigner movement in 
1980s, where the sword-arm was the Bodos, the Lalungs, the Rabhas and the Mishings, “all 
want separate states now” (Bhaumik 2000: 145). Through the differential treatment the Indian 
government has given the different ethnic groups, the horizontal inequalities have deepened 
and this has lead to greater chances of conflict, supporting Hypothesis 3.   
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5.3.6 Identity in Nagaland and Mizoram 
In order for people to identify with the state and feel connected to each other, they need a 
common identity. In this context factors such as ethnicity, religion, language, common 
history, etc. matters. In order to see how this fit with the case of Northeast India, examples 
from Nagaland and Mizoram are used again, since these States differ in the area of identity.   
There is no overriding Indian identity that rules in Nagaland and Mizoram, and this is the 
reason why they demanded to become separate nations (Cline 2006: 127). As said in the 
background for the two States, there are twenty major tribal groups, and over twenty sub-
tribes in Nagaland. While in Mizoram there are only six tribes in Mizoram, with six smaller 
sub-tribes as well. In Mizoram all the tribes except two speak the same language, Lushai, and 
in Nagaland each tribe and sub-tribe speaks a different language (Hussain 1994: 1-2; Bareh 
1994: 40). The fact that Mizoram is significantly less fractionalized than Nagaland is 
significant in the context of identity, because twelve tribes which speak the same language are 
easier to unite than over forty groups speaking different languages.  
In Mizoram the Mizo Union (MU) reinvented the Mizo identity, so that it did not only include 
one ethnic group. Its objectives were among others; “unify and integrate all Mizo people”, “to 
normalize relations between chiefs and the commoners”, “to act as a representative of the 
Mizo people” and “to popularise the Mizo language”. The identity they devised was inclusive 
and unified (Hassan 2006a: 5-19; 2008: 71; Hussain 2008: 549; Goswani 2009b: 584). The 
process of converging the different sub-tribes in Mizoram into one Mizo Nationality with the 
Lushai (Dulian) language as official language, and Christianity as a common faith, was almost 
complete by the 1960s. The Mizo National Front (MNF), who took over after MU as the 
leading party in the region, was very serious about its Christian identity (Nag 2003). “There 
was neither factional fighting nor inter-tribal hostility for hegemony within the Mizo 
separatist movement”, because the “process of creating a Mizo identity has empowered the 
state to better respond to ethnic demands and has helped it manage conflicts” (Bhaumik 2004: 
235). The political actors and the state in Mizoram have therefore managed to “incorporate 
competing social forces into a unified whole within the state” (Hassan 2006a: 5). 
Different social organizations have helped build up under this Mizo identity, and the 
Presbyterian Church and Young Mizo Association (YMA) have focused on “preserving the 
common Mizo identity and upholding order” (Hassan 2006a: 20). Because around 98 per cent 
of Mizos are Christian, and YMA is a centralized bureaucracy, every member of society is 
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bound to their framework. Since these two institutions are so central to Mizo identity, it is 
logical that they have emphasized the issues of “peace and order; unity and a common Mizo 
identity; good Christian behaviour’; and a social and political responsibility” (Hassan 2006a: 
21-22).  
In Nagaland, today, “a single, united, Naga voice is still nowhere to be heard” (Hussain 
2011). This is because the loyalties to the tribe in Nagaland are much greater than the group 
loyalty, and this destabilizes the Naga society (Goswani 2007: 287). Goswani (2008) explains 
that:  
The increasing violence and social divisiveness in Naga society is advocated by insurgent 
groups aligned along tribal lines: The NSCN (I-M) is mostly made up of Thangkuls, the 
NSCN (U) of Semas, and the NSCN (K) of Konyaks, while the Naga National Council (NNC) 
comprises Angamis. The other major tribe, Ao, oscillates between the three factions, but 
mostly leans towards the NSCN (I-M) (Goswani 2008).   
The ethnic composition of the Naga movement is weak and sporadic, and this has roots 
back through Naga history (Nag 2003). Since the 1940s the Naga movement has been 
separated by tribal infighting, the distrust and violence among the groups and clans are 
therefore big (Goswani 2007: 288). “Although the concept of Naga identity has gained 
greater momentum over the decades, many Nagas still remain Angami, Sema, Konyak, 
Tanghul or another tribe first” (Sashinungla 2005). There is little inter-mixing between the 
different Naga tribes, and the attitudes to tribes that are not one’s own are unfavorable. 
Because of this, it is easy for the rebel groups to use this distrust to gain social support for 
the violence (Goswani 2008b). The rivalry between NSCN-IM and NSCN-K has led to the 
undoing of whatever Naga identity that existed, and the tribal identity has taken over. The 
elites, or the leaders, in NSCN have learned to use their identity in order to pursue their 
own interests, which they claim are the interests of the community. But since the elites 
assert two different identities, the NSCN factions can all claim to represent the Nagas, and 
they can also claim to represent their respective tribal identities. The community has two 
identities to rely on; one tribal identity, and one larger Naga identity (Sahni 2002).  
In the context of Mizoram, the fact that the focus of these people’s identity changed from tribe 
to group level, making identity changeable through time and place will give support to 
constructivism, and show that identity is a changeable concept. Nevertheless, constructivism 
cannot explain the case of Nagaland, because the original tribal identity has remained the 
same. Primordialists will be able to explain why the Nagas have not come together as one 
group. The inter-factional and inter-tribal distrust and rivalry existed before the Naga 
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movement commenced, but when the question of leadership came up, distrust between the 
factions was intensified (Sashinungla 2005). The elites and leaders in NSCN have emphasized 
tribal identity, and used this as an instrument to divide the people. The NNC tried to build a 
common Naga identity, but the original tribal identity of the Nagas has prevailed as dominant. 
This supports the primordialist view that identity is unchangeable.  
Given the ethnic composition of Northeast India, it is not difficult to see that the issue of 
horizontal inequalities will be relevant here. Due to the sheer number of ethnic and tribal 
groups (see Appendix D), it is virtually impossible for the Indian government to make sure 
that they all get the recognition they feel they deserve, especially when they are so different in 
numbers. The treatment they are given by the Indian government is, as seen in section 5.2, 
different on the State-level, which leads to one type of horizontal inequality and conflict. The 
other type is between the groups in Northeast. The response from the ethnic groups is to 
gather in insurgency groups and turn to violence in order to receive what they want. These 
conflicts are recurring because even though one group feels that they get what they deserve, 
this is often at the expense of another group, which will then turn to violence. The conflicts 
within the States can therefore be recurring, as well as conflicts between the different factions 
in an ethnic group, as seen with the example of the Nagas. The different factions of NSCN are 
spoilers for the others ceasefires and negotiation processes. These breakaway factions can 
explain why the conflict continued in Nagaland as opposed to Mizoram. Due to the common 
identity MNF managed to build between the Mizos, no other factions surfaced, while in 
Nagaland they are not able to reach a peace agreement with all factions (Bhaumik 2007: 14).  
This shows that the horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups in Northeast India can be a 
reason for the recurring conflicts and Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported through the material 
in this chapter. The issue of identity and horizontal inequalities can explain the recurring 
conflicts in Northeast India; nevertheless, Arunachal Pradesh, with its numerous ethnic 
groups, has never had any conflicts due to ethnic identity, which shows that Hypothesis 3 is 
not foolproof. Arunachal Pradesh is the most diverse of the States, but it has not been through 
the same insurgencies its neighboring States have. According to Mukherjee (2007) this is 
mostly due to “its small population being interspersed in a huge and relatively inaccessible 
area being heavily forested, under-developed with few roads, thereby ensuring relative 
isolation and distinctiveness for its ethnic groups” (Mukherjee 2007: 56).      
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6.0 Conclusion 
As specified in the introduction, my thesis aims to explain why there are recurring conflicts in 
Northeast India, as stipulated by my main research question “Why do India’s Northeastern 
States experience recurring insurgencies?”. As is seen throughout the thesis, I have attempted 
to answer this by posing three hypotheses, one for each of the levels. All of these hypotheses, 
as seen in Table 3, are supported and they all contribute to answering the main question.  
Table 3: Summary of hypotheses 
 Supported Partly 
supported 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 1: International borders offer a safe 
place for the rebels to hide and make it more 
difficult for the government to stop the 
conflicts, especially if the neighboring 
countries are hostile towards India, and this 
explains why there are recurring conflicts in 
Northeast India.    
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cosmetic federalism and 
political asymmetry contribute to the feeling 
that the Northeast has no real power, which in 
turn contributes to recurring conflicts in 
Northeast India.  
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Hypothesis 3: Horizontal inequalities in 
Northeast India complicate the ethnic 
environment and lead to recurring conflicts 
between the ethnic groups due to different 
treatment.   
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
As seen here, the first two hypotheses are only partially supported by the empirical evidence, 
while Hypothesis 3 is fully supported. The dependent variable recurring conflicts in Northeast 
India can be explained by all the independent variables on all three levels. Nevertheless the 
independent variable identity and horizontal inequalities give support to the other levels and 
has the most explanatory power. This is because this is the independent variable with the most 
difference across the States in Northeast India. All seven States have international borders and 
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they border hostile countries, they are also all treated equally by the Indian government, they 
are all asymmetrical compared to the other States in the Indian Union and they only have 
cosmetic power. The difference between the seven States is how many ethnic groups live in 
the State and how much power and political influence they have.     
All three factors of international borders and support from neighboring nations, the federal 
nature where the States are given no real power and the different treatment of the ethnic 
groups in the region add together to answer the research question. The analysis of the three 
levels has shown that it is not only one phenomenon which explains the recurrence of 
conflicts, it is the fact that all three factors are present which complicates the peace process 
and make it very difficult for the Government of India to end the conflicts. It is therefore 
necessary for researchers to look at all three levels of analysis in order to understand recurring 
conflicts in Northeast India.    
One of the advantages of doing a case study is that it makes it possible to see whether and 
how variables matters for the outcome of the situation (George & Bennett 2004: 25). In this 
case study I have shown that all three levels of analysis matters and through this in-depth 
analysis it is also shown how they matter for recurring conflicts. International borders and 
hostile neighboring countries add to the difficulties the Indian government has to stop the 
rebels, because the insurgency groups are given support and safe places to hide on the other 
side of the border. The political asymmetry between the States in Northeast and the other 
States in the Indian Union, and through this the fact that the Northeastern States are given 
little actual power, leads to growing resentment. This resentment aids the cause of the rebels 
and contributes to recurring conflicts. Horizontal inequalities between the ethnic groups 
follow from the differential treatment they are given by the Indian government. The ethnic 
environment with numerous ethnic groups in each State consequently leads to the recurrence 
of conflicts because the ethnic groups feel they deserve more than they are given and rebel in 
order to achieve this. If I had more space and better resources, all of the States could be 
analyzed and looked more closely at, as seven separate case studies, in order to see whether 
any of the explanation factors have different importance in the States. Actual fieldwork would 
also greatly improve the knowledge on why there are recurring conflicts in Northeast India, 
but as a Westerner the access would unfortunately be severely restricted. Other explanatory 
factors to why there are recurring conflicts could be examined as well, for example the 
negotiation processes from the Government of India, spoilers, several factions of the 
insurgency groups, and so on.  
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Appendix A: Number of fatalities in Northeast India 
All numbers are from SATP 2013 and data is till 05.05 2013.   
Table 4: Fatalities in Northeast India from 2006-2013 
Year States Civilians SFP* Terrorists Total 
2006 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 0 0 
 
Assam 96 35 43 174 
 
Manipur 107 37 141 285 
 
Meghalaya 7 0 17 24 
 
Mizoram 1 0 1 2 
\ Nagaland 10 1 81 92 
  Tripura 11 19 30 60 
2007 Arunachal Pradesh 2 3 16 21 
 
Assam 269 19 149 437 
 
Manipur 150 40 218 408 
 
Meghalaya 4 1 13 18 
 
Mizoram 2 0 6 8 
 
Nagaland 20 0 88 108 
 Tripura 10 5 21 36 
2008 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 2 2 
 
Assam 224 16 133 373 
 
Manipur 131 13 341 485 
 
Meghalaya 0 1 12 13 
 
Mizoram 0 4 1 5 
 
Nagaland 42 2 101 145 
 Tripura 7 4 17 28 
2009 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 9 9 
 
Assam 175 21 196 392 
 
Manipur 77 18 321 416 
 
Meghalaya 1 0 4 5 
 
Mizoram 1 0 0 1 
 
Nagaland 7 0 11 18 
 Tripura 9 1 1 11 
2010 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 0 0 
 
Assam 48 12 98 158 
 
Manipur 26 8 104 138 
 
Meghalaya 3 0 17 20 
 
Mizoram 0 0 0 0 
 
Nagaland 0 0 3 3 
 Tripura 0 2 1 3 
2011 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 41 41 
 
Assam 34 15 45 94 
 
Manipur 25 10 30 65 
 
Meghalaya 11 10 8 29 
 
Mizoram 1 0 0 1 
 
Nagaland 7 0 8 15 
 Tripura 1 0 0 1 
 
96 
 
Year States Civilians SFP* Terrorists Total 
2012 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 4 4 
 
Assam 32 4 55 91 
 
Manipur 25 12 73 110 
 
Meghalaya 27 2 19 48 
 
Mizoram 0 0 0 0 
 
Nagaland 6 0 55 61 
  Tripura 0 0 2 2 
2013 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 1 1 
 
Assam 4 2 16 22 
 
Manipur 4 5 12 21 
 
Meghalaya 5 2 9 16 
 
Mizoram 0 0 0 0 
 
Nagaland 3 0 6 9 
  Tripura 0 0 0 0 
*Security Force Personnel  
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Appendix B: The different insurgency groups in Northeast today  
Insurgency groups in Northeast India (Active or proscribed per. 27.03.2013) (data gathered 
from SATP) 
Arunachal Pradesh 
None 
Assam 
1. National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 
2. United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 
3. Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF) 
4. Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) 
5. Hmar People’s Convention-Democracy (HPC-D) 
6. Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) 
7. Black Widow (BW) 
8. All Adivasi National Liberation Army  (AANLA) 
9. Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) 
10. Hill Tigers Force (HTF) 
11. Karbi People’s Liberation Tigers (KPLT) 
12. Dimasa National Revolutionary Front (DNRF) 
13. United Kukigram Defence Army (UKDA) 
14. Rabha Viper Army (RVA) 
15. United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA) 
Manipur 
1. Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 
2. Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) 
3. Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF) 
4. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
5. People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) 
6. United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 
7. Hmar People’s Convention-Democracy (HPC-D) 
8. Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) 
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9. Kuki National Army (KNA) 
10. Kuki National Front (KNF) 
11. Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) 
12. National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) 
13. People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) 
14. United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) 
15. Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) 
Meghalaya  
1. Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)  
2. Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) 
3. Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF) 
4. Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) 
Mizoram 
1. Hmar People's Convention- Democracy (HPC-D) 
Nagaland  
1. National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) 
2. National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) 
3. National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Unification (NSCN-U)  
4. National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-Khole-Kitovi)  
Tripura 
1. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 
2. National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) 
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Appendix C: AFSPA  
Powers under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 (Ministry of Home Affairs 
2013) 
Special Powers of the armed forces – Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-
commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a 
disturbed area,- 
(a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, 
after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise 
use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in 
contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area 
prohibiting the assembly of five or move persons or the carrying of weapons or of 
things capable of being used as weapons or of fire-arms, ammunition or explosive 
substances; 
(b)  if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms dump, prepared or 
fortified position or shelter from which armed attacks are made or are likely to be 
made or are attempted to be made, or any structure used as a training camp for armed 
volunteers or utilized as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any 
offence; 
(c)  arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or 
against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to 
commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the 
arrest; 
(d) enter and search without warrant any premises to make any such arrest as aforesaid or 
to recover any person believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined or any property 
reasonably suspected to be stolen property or any arms, ammunition or explosive 
substances believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises, and may for that purpose 
use such force as may be necessary. 
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Appendix D: Ethnic groups in Northeast India 
Data from Shimray 2004 and Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment 2013. 
Table 5: Ethnic groups in Arunachal Pradesh 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Abor 
2. Aka 
3. Apatani 
4. Dajla 
5. Galong 
6. Khampti 
7. Khowa 
8. Mishmi 
9. Mongba 
10. Any Naga Tribes (Wancho, Tangsa 
and  Nocte) 
11. Sherdukpen 
12. Singpho 
 
More than 80 groups 
 
 
Table 6: Ethnic groups in Assam 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Bansphor 
2. Bhuinmali, Mali 
3. Brittial Bania, Bania 
4. Bhupi, Dhobi 
5. Dugla, Dholi 
6. Hira 
7. Jalkeot 
8. Jhalo, Malo, Jhalo-Malo 
9. Kaibartta, Jaliya 
10. Lalbegi 
11. Mahara 
12. Mehtar, Bhangi 
13. Muchi, Rishi 
14. Namasudra 
15. Patni 
16. Sutradhar 
1. Chakma 
2. Dimasa 
3. Garo 
4. Hajong 
5. Hmar 
6. Khasi, Jaintia, Synteng, pnar, bhoi 
7. Any Kuki tribes 
8. Lakher 
9. Man (Tai speaking) 
10. Any Mizo (Lushai) 
11. Mikir 
12. Any Naga 
13. Pawi 
14. Sytheng 
15. Barmans 
16. Boro 
17. Deori 
18. Hojai 
19. Kachari 
20. Lalung 
21. Mech 
22. Miri 
23. Rabha 
24. Mishing 
25. Karbi 
26. Bodo 
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Table 7: Ethnic groups in Manipur 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Dhupi, Dhobi 
2. Lois 
3. Muchi, Ravidas 
4. Namasudra 
5. Patni 
6. Sutradhar 
7. Yaithibi 
1. Anal 
2. Angami 
3. Chiru 
4. Chothe 
5. Kabui 
6. Kacha Naga 
7. Koireng 
8. Lamkang 
9. Mao 
10. Maram 
11. Maring 
12. Monsang 
13. Moyong 
14. Sema 
15. Tankhul 
16. Aimol 
17. Gangte 
18. Hmar 
19. Vaiphei 
20. Koirao 
21. Kom 
22. Any Mizo (Lushai) 
23. Paite 
24. Purum 
25. Ralte 
26. Suhte 
27. Simte 
28. Thadou (Kuki) 
29. Meitei 
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Table 8: Ethnic groups in Meghalaya 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Bansphor 
2. Bhuinmali, Mali 
3. Brittial Bania, Bania 
4. Bhupi, Dhobi 
5. Dugla, Dholi 
6. Hira 
7. Jalkeot 
8. Jhalo, Malo, Jhalo-Malo 
9. Kaibartta, Jaliya 
10. Lalbegi 
11. Mahara 
12. Mehtar, Bhangi 
13. Muchi, Rishi 
14. Namasudra 
15. Patni 
16. Sutradhar 
 
1. Boro 
2. Kacharis 
3. Chakma 
4. Dimasa 
5. Garo 
6. Hajong 
7. Hmar 
8. Khasi 
9. Jaintia 
10. Koch 
11. Any Kuki tribes 
12. Lakher 
13. Man (Tai speaking) 
14. Any Mizo  
15. Mikir 
16. Any Nagas 
17. Pawi, Raba and Synteng 
 
Table 9: Ethnic groups in Mizoram 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Bansphor 
2. Bhuinmali, Mali 
3. Brittial Bania, Bania 
4. Dhupi, Dhobi 
5. Dugla, Dholi 
6. Hira 
7. Jalkeot 
8. Jhalo, Malo, Jhalo-Malo 
9. Kaibartta, Jaliya 
10. Lalbegi 
11. Mahara 
12. Mehtar, Bhangi 
13. Muchi, Rishi 
14. Namasudra 
15. Patni 
16. Sutradhar 
 
1. Chakma 
2. Dimasa 
3. Garo 
4. Hajong 
5. Hmar 
6. Khasi 
7. Jaintai 
8. Any Kukis 
9. Lakher 
10. Man (Tai speaking) 
11. Any Mizo 
12. Mikir 
13. Any Nagas 
14. Pawi, and Synteng 
15. Lushai 
16. Fanais 
17. Tlanglan 
18. Pang 
19. Paki 
20. Reang 
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Table 10: Ethnic groups in Nagaland 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Garo 
2. Kachari 
3. Kuki 
4. Mikir 
5. Nagas 
 
At least 39 smaller Naga tribes 
1. Tangkhul 
2. Konyak 
3. Ao 
4. Sema 
5. Angami 
6. Lotha 
7. Rengma 
8. Kuki 
Table 11: Ethnic groups in Tripura 
Scheduled tribes Other groups 
1. Bagdi 
2. Bhuimali 
3. Bhunar 
4. Chamar, Muchi 
5. Dandasi 
6. Dhenuar 
7. Dhoba 
8. Dum 
9. Ghasi 
10. Gour 
11. Gur 
12. Jalia Kaibarta 
13. Kahar 
14. Kalindi 
15. Kan 
16. Kanda 
17. Kanugh 
18. Keot 
19. Khadit 
20. Kharia 
21. Koch 
22. Koir 
23. Kol 
24. Kora 
25. Kotal 
26. Mahisyadas 
27. Mali 
28. Mehtor 
29. Musadar 
30. Namasudra 
31. Patni 
32. Sabar 
33. Dhuli, Sabdakar, Badyakar 
34. Natta, Nat 
1. Bhil 
2. Bhutia 
3. Chaimal 
4. Chakma 
5. Garo 
6. Halam 
7. Jamatia 
8. Khasi 
9. Any Kukis 
10. Lepcha 
11. Lushai 
12. Nag 
13. Munda 
14. Naotia 
15. Orang 
16. Reang 
17. Santhal 
18. Tripuri, Trupuri, Treppera 
19. Uchai 
 
 
